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Images of Decision Making and the Launch of the Challenger Space Shuttle. 
Terence Michael Garrett. Ph.D. The University of Oklahoma, 1997. Chair; 
Professor David G. Camevale.
The Challenger space shuttle launch incident on January 28, 1986 is a 
fascinating topic for comparison of theoretical conceptions offered by 
organization theorists. By examining this case study we can see the intricate 
complexities and richness of human activity surrounding a single event in 
organization theory. The case study method is useful for exploring theories of 
organization. This study provided me the opportunity to analyze a relatively 
widely known case within a  government agency and make a contribution to the 
field of public administration. What is notable about this topic is that there was 
plenty of information concerning problems with the space shuttle system, such 
as weather-related and technical issues, available to managers prior to the 
launch to prevent the event from transpiring and yet the decision to launch took 
place anyway. Many scholarly interpretations have been offered so that this 
incident (case study) provided much theoretical evidence for consideration. 
These interpretations were oftentimes conflicting or contradictory in their 
respective interpretation of events. In order to analyze the disparate theories 
explaining the launch decision, I used Burrell & Morgan's metatheoretical 
frameworks method, which consists of functionalism, radical humanism, radical 
structuralism and interpretivism, to organize the various theoretical explanations 
about the Challenger space shuttle launch.
Furthermore, I found that the interpretation of events leading to the 
Challenger decision was subject to the analyst’s  preconception of what 
transpired. I confined my research primarily to theoretical interpretations of the 
the launch event in order to assess the state of the field of public administration
Vi
generally and in particular the subfield of organization theory. There are 
numerous qualitative theoretical conceptions available to scholars. These 
theories, or images, are valuable for analyzing a  complex event like the 
Challenger space launch. There is no single theory or paradigm which 
completely explains the launch as there is no single all-encompassing theory 
which adequately explains human behavior in a predictable fashion in the 
social sciences. Instead, we (I mean we. the academic community) render 
scholarly judgments concerning events that we study using theoretical tools 
available to us. In a  similar fashion. I have presented an analysis of the 
Challenger space launch decision. We offer judgments to members of 
organizations, particularly managers, to provide them with insights (the 
practitioners who live in and depend on the work-world, i.e.. executives, 
workers, managers, clients and investors) so that tragic consequences may not 
result to human beings in the future. As such, I used Hummel and Camevale's 
concept of the “knowledge analytic” to tie together some of the interpretations 
offered by scholars analyzing the Challenger incident The knowledge analytic 
provides us with a  means to appreciate and recognize that where we are in an 
organization affects how we perceive ourselves, each other, and the work we 
are involved in. “Knowledges” incompatibility is a  primary cause for people in 
organizations to not come to an understanding about what should be done in 
order to accomplish a  task in an organization or how we cooperate in 
completing organizational endeavors. I discovered in my case study analysis of 
the Challenger launch decision that a failure of recognizing differences in 
knowledges, particularly between executives, managers and engineers, led to 
disaster.
The framing or “images” method offers scholars the means to analyze in
vii
a comprehensive fashion theoretical explanations of human events. For 
example, the richness and complexity of the world we live in is inadequately 
covered by the simplistic, parsimonious and positivist-scientific theoretical 
renditions which are often used to explain reality. Human beings and human 
behavior cannot be scientifically categorized once and for all. Organizations, as 
human artifacts, similarly cannot be judged completely by science. Science 
may be useful in describing the superficial appearance of an organization at a 
single moment in history, but time and space limitations provide only an 
ephemeral snapshot of reality. The framing method is an appropriate beginning 
for managers and academicians to recognize and understand the shortcomings 
of all current theoretical explanations in public administration organization 
theory.
vm
CHAPTER I:
AIM OF THE DISSERTATION
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the behavior of 
organizations, and individuals in organizations, when they are faced with critical 
m anagem ent problems. I will be analyzing the decision to launch the 
Challenger sp ace  shuttle on January 28, 1996 using the "framing" or 
"metaphorical" multitheoretical approach from the organization theory literature, 
focusing primarily on the works of Morgan (1986) and Burrell and Morgan 
(1979). Several theoretical and historical explanations of the decision to 
launch the Challenger under poor conditions have been offered by government 
officials, journalists and social scientists. There is a  notable lack of consensus 
about these explanations as to why this tragedy occurred and how it could have 
been avoided. My intent is to explore the events leading to the complex launch 
decision in a  historical context to examine how and why academicians and 
practitioners have come to their various interpretations. By examining case 
studies such a s  the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
Challenger space shuttle disaster in 1986, we can begin to understand how 
managers and their organizations react to situations where lives were at stake, 
and subsequently lost, and how future managers may avoid some of the same 
pitfalls.
The general thesis will be outlined with three hypothesis statements, 
which will be supported by data and subsequent interpretation of the case 
study. I will also  make my “case” for the the case  study method for 
understanding complex managerial problems as opposed to using a  more 
traditional quantitative analysis. The case-study method has been criticized by 
som e in public administration, particularly as pertaining to dissertation
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research.^ I believe that case studies are an important form of intellectual 
inquiry because of their contextual value, historical nature and time specific 
contents There is considerable support for the case study approach from a 
significant number of scholars in the scientific, historical, critical theory, and 
phenomenological academic traditions.3 Barrett and Srivastva (1991) have 
lamented the predominance of structural functionalism and logical positivist 
analytical techniques in organization theory and its lack of historical analysis. 
They find the tendency dehumanizing and inappropriate for human 
organizational analysis:
1 Howard E  McCurdy and Robert E  Cleary (1984, 49) have decried the poor state of doctoral 
research in public administration and, in particular, the case study They compared public 
administration to that of other social science disciplines and conclude that the field "must often 
rely upon scientific findings from other disciplines. But methods of inquiry developed in other 
disciplines may not be appropriate to the needs of public administration as its own techniques like 
the case study. The case study, however, is generally viewed as  having limited validity."
2 See Gell-Mann (1994) for a  physicist’s  perspective on statistical analysis on complex adaptive 
systems, such as human beings and organizations. Gell-Mann maintains that “the apparently 
hard-headed practice of ignoring values difficult to quantify is often advertised as being value- 
free. On the contrary, it represents the imposition on any analysis of a  rigid system of values, 
favoring those that are easily quantifiable over others that are more fragile and may be more 
important. All our lives are impoverished by decisions based on that kind of thinking [e.g., 
economists and political scientists have a  propensity for leaving fragile values to the political 
process] (324).
3 Scientists such as Robert K. Yin (et al) (1977,19) point out that "the case study has had wide 
use because it can focus on an organizational change and cover the peculiar flavor, setting, and 
people that are likely to explain what happened and why. A good case study attempts to capture 
the unique blend of events occurring in an organization, much as the clinical approach in 
psychology is able to present the unique situation and personal background involved in 
analyzing an individual's behavior." See also R.K. Yin and Douglas Yates (1975, chapter 2). Yin 
(1994,1 ) makes the argument that the case study method is one of several ways to conduct social 
science research and that case studies are the preferred strategy to answer questions of "how" or 
"why." A note of caution about what passes for "science" was outlined by Nobel prize winning 
physicist Richard Feynman (1985, 340.) He coined the phrase "cargo cult science" and 
described it as follows: "In the South Seas there is a  cargo cult of people. During the war they 
saw airplanes land with lots of good materials, and they want the same thing to happen now. So 
they've arranged to make things like runways, to put fires along the sides of the runways, to make 
a  wooden hut for a man to sit in, with wooden pieces on his head like headphones and bars of 
bamboo sticking out like antennas-he's the controller-and they wait for the airplanes to land. 
They’re doing everything right. The form is perfect It looks exactly the way it looked before. But 
it doesn’t work. No airplanes land. So I call these things cargo cult science, because they follow all 
the apparent precepts and forms of scientific investigation, but they’re missing something 
essential, because the planes don’t land." More on the critical theory, phenomenological and 
historical perspectives will follow.
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Our romance with finding transhistorical principles and enduring patterns 
of behavior have blocked us from realizing the primary goal of science: 
making human action and interaction intelligible and understandable, in 
our efforts to explain why, we have been limited in understanding how. In 
a  search for general patterns and structures, we have lost sight of the 
world of contingencies, choices, and dilemmas that do not fall into 
structural patterns. Human beings are  simply not reducible to static 
properties. Human events are meaningful because of the possibility 
inherent in choiceful action, not because of inevitability (Barrett and 
Srivastva 1991, 234).
There is a  role for interpretation of historical events because “historical research 
is inevitably an interpretive enterprise, a  piecing together of contextual facts' 
selected by the historian to present a  narrative idea or argument" (Barrett and 
Srivastva 1991, 244). This interpretation implies that when engaging in 
organizational history, the analyst must take into account her subjective biases 
“because every history consists of moral decisions, an interpretive process that 
reveals as  much about the historian a s  it does the actors and events he 
interprets" (244).
Following the three hypothesis statements and a  brief look at historical 
decision-making ca se  studies, I will discuss the metatheoretical and 
metaphorical approaches developed by Burrell and Morgan (1979) and Morgan 
(1986). The Challenger case  study will then be analyzed by using the 
“imaging," or metaphorical perspectives, approach. My intent here is to critically 
examine the various theoretical perspectives to determine whether they may 
yield new insight to complex problems for managers in the future.
Hypothesis #1: Managers ignored information from em pioyees who
knew what was going on.4
My first dissertation hypothesis is that NASA managers were conditioned 
or “stuck” within a  theoretical orientation (or predetermined mode for action) 
described by Gareth Morgan (1986) as  the “machines metaphor" or what 
Adams and Ingersoli (1990) call “technical rationality 's  Efforts by subordinates 
holding vital information within the organization to stop the debacle were 
ignored by managers, s thus contributing to the deaths of seven astronauts in 
the Challenger incident.7 Being highly rationalistic in orientation, 
organizations such a s  NASA have extensive rules and regulations which 
attempt to determine the actions and behaviors of their members. There is a 
common tendency by some m anagers in these  organizations to ignore 
warnings by subordinates in order to accomplish their mission. For example,
4 Apologies are in order here to Maureen Hogan Casamayou (1993) In her book Bureaucracy in 
Cnsis: Three Mile Island, the Shuttle Challenger, and Risk Assessment. She takes a  more 
traditional political science approach to analyzing case studies from a management perspective. 
Her three hypotheses are (1) Communication Blockage, relying on Anthony Downs, Herbert 
Simon and Harold Wilensky; (2) Misperception of the Received Communications, using 
Festingers' cognitive dissonance conceptual analysis; and, (3) External Pressures Overrode 
Warnings, using a  perceptive political analytical framework.
5 See "Culture, technical rationality, and organizational culture," in American Review of Public 
Administration, 20:4. Adams and Ingersoli argue that the American political culture is dominated 
by a scientific-analytical mindset which consists of the belief in complete managerial control of 
organizational work processes, clear and concise organizational objectives, and complete 
efficiency and predictability which are paramount in importance within the organization. They are 
dubious about the consequences of this form of rationality which emphasizes classical 
individualism at the expense of the greater society. More explanation of Morgan’s other 
metaphors will follow. Mary Timney Bailey (1994) in "Do Physicists Use Case Studies? Thoughts 
on Public Administration Research* also points out that "The recent focus on narrowly defined 
positivist social science, because of its inherent biases, may impede [the research issue] by 
creating a  hierarchy for research and scholarship" (194).
6 R.P. Hummel (1994a, 208) offers significant insigfit here as  he describes "modem organizations 
separate the thinking function radically from working....[And the] problem for workers is that 
managerial minds, empty of working experience through which alone objects can be known, give 
them the orders as to how to do their work-and evaluate their success."
7 See M R. Schmidt, "Grout: Alternative Kinds of Knowledge and Why They Are Ignored," in 
Public Administration Review (November/December 1993), 53/6:525-530. Schmidt argues that 
science, engineering, and bureaucratic institutions, under a  common model of reality, often 
ignore and suppress insightful kinds of knowledge (that of the worker).
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Casamayou (1993, 3, 26) points out that as  early as  1977 a  NASA engineer 
had warned his supervisors about in a  crucial seal joint and predicted that the 
leakage of solid rocket fuel gases would result in “catastrophic failure.” 
Casamayou also demonstrated that the agency fell into a  mind sets in which 
the previous successful launches had justified the fateful flight, despite 
evidence of dangerous erosion (1993, 174).9
s  The deleterious effects of being stuck in a  paradigm, or mind set. was illustrated by Nobel prize 
winning physicist Murray Gell-Mann (1994, 264) as  follows: "Around 1970 I was one of a  small 
group of physicists, biologists, painters, and poets assembled in Aspen, Colorado to discuss the 
experience of getting creative ideas....We had each found a  contradiction between the 
established way of doing things and something we needed to accomplish: in art, the expression 
of a  feeling, a  thought, an insight; in theoretical science, the explanation of some experimental 
facts in the face of an accepted "paradigm* that did not permit such an explanation....Rrst, we had 
worked, for days, weeks or months, filling our minds with the difficulties of the problem in question 
and trying to overcome them. Second, there had come a  time when further conscious thought 
was useless, even though we continued to carry the problem around with us. Third, suddenly, 
while we were cycling or shaving or cooking (or by a  slip of the tongue...) the crucial idea had 
come. We had shaken loose from the rut we were in." I would like to thank Professor Ralph P. 
Hummel for making me aware of this particular "feeling" insight, which is also developed further in 
his recent article on practical knowled^ (1995).
9 Diane Vaughan (1996), a sociologist from Boston College, argues from a  Mertonian structural- 
functionalist and culture perspective that "mistakes are systematic and socially organized, built 
into the nature of professions, organizations, cultures, and structures" (415). Risky decisions 
have always been part of NASA’s culture (hence, interwoven into its fabric) and pressure from 
political leaders to cut funding to the agency while simultaneously demanding more launches 
exacerbated and complicated the situation. This runs counter to most analyses in that the usual 
(and more simplistic) political explanation involves the Reagan administration’s pressure to launch 
in order to make a  good showing for the State of the Union address. Vaughan’s thesis is 
interesting in that she makes the case that organizations cause irrational behavior incrementally by 
building higher levels of tolerance (what she calls the "normalization of deviance") and this 
inevitably leads to mistakes. In my view, however, she overstates her case when she determines 
that the organization itself is responsible for the disaster rather than the managers and engineers 
involved in the decision to launch. Furthermore, her solutions for resolving future "mistakes" are 
not helpful in that she advocates more structure, more rules, more control and more resources. 
Her solutions include: (1 ) managing better (416); (2) more rules and better "strategies for control" 
(though these solutions could backfire; rules cannot be made for every aspect of behavior in 
organizations) (417); (3) empower people, perhaps more democracy in decision-making (though 
she recognizes that there may be increase tension in hierarchical relationships) (419); and, (4) 
more money for the agency (problem of scarce resources was a  major cause of the disaster) (422).
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Hypothesis #2: Managers who ignore the usefui knowiedge of the 
workers wiii som etim es blame the workers when managements’ 
plans g o  awry. Also, organizations will g o  to great lengths to  
protect the managers and the organization until compelled to do
otherw ise.
My second dissertation hypothesis is that som e m anagers in 
organizations will not accept responsibility for decisions they have made, 
particularly under stressful conditions. They cite external factors or incompetent 
employees for the failure of the mission rather than themselves. This situation 
existed in the Challenger launch decision case study and NASA managers 
engaged in deceitful activities such as cover-ups and the blaming of victims. 
Sanger (May 11, 1986) of the New York Times reported that until two Morton 
Thiokol engineers testified, the Challenger disaster appeared to have been a 
freak accident rather than an accident that could have been prevented.
An important component of management is trust between managers and 
employees. Camevale (1995, 4-5) demonstrates that trust, which he defines as 
faith in people, their motivations, and their capacities, is essential to a  properly 
functioning organization. Without trust and truth in relations between workers 
and managers, the working situation deteriorates to the point that in low-trust 
organizations more is hidden than revealed. Because of the duplicity of human 
beings, it is often difficult to obtain the truth directly from people involved in 
events leading to a  decision in which mistakes in management were made, 
even when there may have been no conscious intent to mislead. Gendlin 
(1973 , 302-4) offers a  unique psychological and phenomenological framework 
in order to analyze experience and complex situations in organizations. 
Experience and situation are not separat)le and “are always already organized, 
but are capable of being further schematized and organized not only by
verbalization but also by actions" and "there are truth criteria not for a  single 
statement alone but for a  kind of process, a  kind of step, in relation to an earlier 
one” (303). Furthermore, Gendlin submits that "In phenomenological 
explication, as in ordinary action, you must not only interpret a  situation, but you 
must also apply your organization if you are to live in the situation further” (303). 
He raises the issue that people can falsely state their feelings and later correct 
them. This change in previously stated feelings can have an impact on truth. 
Accordingly, Gendlin has developed "signposts” to help us recognize when 
phenomenological explication is occurring and when it is not:
(a) Precise defined meanings of words and the defined aspects of 
situations are used, but they can be further structured and redefined in 
ways that would not follow from the extant definitions.
(b) Something more than what is defined is employed. A not yet 
cognitively clear sense, feeling, or experience is used....Something 
directly referred to is involved in addition to statements.
(c) Aspects, and aspects within aspects, of this experience can be found.
(d) Demonstrative words such as  "this” or "it” are used importantly, and 
yet such words alone convey little or nothing.
(e) Several different descriptive words may be used for the "same thing,” 
despite the fact that literally they mean different things. Such different 
words can have quite different effects even in regard to the present 
experience, and one may Ignore this, or pursue it
(f) Previous assertions which enabled important steps to go forward may 
later be flatly denied.
(g) Whatever one now says is held to be what the experience "was” all 
along.
(h) Earlier false steps are believed to have been in the right direction, 
despite the fact that they are flatly contradicted now.
(i) What is at first simply physically "felt” becomes explicated in words that 
are about situations and world (not in feeling-tone words such as "dull” or
“Sharp" or “intense”).
G) Despite revealing new aspects and despite its changing, what is 
talked about is held to remain “the sam e” (not literally “Vt\e same”; it is 
obviously capable of various organizations and aspects) (Gendlin 1973. 
304).
Gendlin’s  criteria for signposts in his phenomenological method “makes the 
process, relationships, and steps of explication (rather than any given 
statements) basic... This shift from what is said to how it is related to experience 
has basic applicability to many fields” (1973, 305). His method is useful for us 
to understand how people deal with truth and complexity, particularly when 
interpreting data in human organizations.
Hypothesis #3: Managers hold the sim plistic notion that they can 
control every aspect of their organization, and even those of other
organizations.io
My third hypothesis is that managers believe they can control every 
aspect of the minds and actions of people in organizations, especially of 
organizations tfiey are in conflict with. Other organizations were involved in the 
events which led to important differences in the outcome of the case study. 
These organizations had a significant impact on the ultimate decision-making 
process by the nature of their respective leadership and the limited ability of the 
workers (or lower organization participants) to be involved in the deliberation 
process. In the space shuttle case, Morton Thiokol engineers Allan J. 
McDonald and Roger M. Boisjoly were ignored by senior management when
10 fan Mrtroffs (1983) Stakehokiers of the Organizational Mind is instructive here. See. in 
particular, chapter 3 'External Influences on Managers.' (p. 47) T he  somewhat inevitable 
laundry-list character of our social science demonstrates the particular kinds of complexities that a  
social science of complex problems faces. The question that confronts us is whether this 
complexity will become even greater or paradoxically less as  we discover the even greater 
complexity of stakeholders [members of organizations.]'
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they expressed objections concerning safety hazards pertaining to the space 
shuttle launch. 11 There is an indication here of excessive manipulation by the 
managers towards the completion of a  symbolic act by getting the shuttle into 
space at almost any cost and by the pressure placed on NASA by the Reagan 
administration to launch.12  Symbolism and political pressures, from lower 
participants and external organizations, indicate that the "culture” and "political” 
metaphors (Morgan 1986) may be useful in analyzing the behavior of 
organizations associated with the Challenger disaster.
My strong suspicion is that the culture of the organizations being 
analyzed and the qualities of their management and leadership play a pivotal 
role in intra- and interorganizational conflict The primary government agency, 
NASA, and the peripheral, yet nonetheless critical, organizations will be 
examined both to explain and to provide insights to future administrators. The 
aim of this research is to analyze an historical case study through the lenses of 
each metaphor, focusing mainly on the decisions that were made by the 
respective organizations to launch the shuttle. A central theme to this analysis 
is the educational effects which managers encounter in an actual complex 
working environment and what knowledge can be learned from the experience. 
The hypotheses deliberated above will be considered in the overall analysis 
and are recounted here as: (1) managers ignoring employee warnings; (2) 
managers not taking responsibility, but rather blaming the employees, in the
11 According to David E  Sanger in the New York Times, May 11,1986, McDonald testified that 
the Challenger had been launched over the objections of its designers. Boisjoly had submitted a 
memorandum which warned that there "could be a  catastrophe of the highest order" if the 
company did not fix the rocket seals.
12 Casamayou (1993, 78-9) notes the pressures to launch the Challenger may have been 
exacerbated by (1) the State of the Union address; (2) Office of Management and Budget cuts for 
NASA since the late 1960s, leading to layoffs of technically competent employees and 
reductions in overall safety, reliability and quality; and, (3) Cost-conscious external forces, forcing 
NASA to accept an "unrealistic launch rate."
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name of protecting the organization; and, (3) managerial underestimation of 
other organizations and an intrinsic need of some managers to control every 
aspect of their own organization. The managers in this case study had to cope 
with complex problems of a  life-and-death magnitude, it is my position that 
there is cogent information to be learned from these  situations from the 
managers and workers involved in the case study. Also, the exploration of 
different theories a s  they pertain to and «(plain this case may yield insights for 
managers.
M anagers and  academ icians gain knowledge from historical 
experience, 13 and an attempt will be made here to investigate possible 
alternatives in complex situations for managers confronting similar problems In 
the future to consider. Historians are no more predisposed to agreement or 
œ nsensus than are other scholars when explaining complex or controversial 
events.i4 Historical analyses are more readily accepted by them as being 
subjective and artful and, for the most part, less scientific. Human beings in
13 A note of caution is in order here. Habermas (1988,27) in his essay on contemporary history 
and scxiiology notes 'the historian is hardly ever in a  position to explain an event on the basis of 
sufficient conditions, that is. to give a  full explanation of it As a  rule, he is limited to indicating a 
series of necessary conditions. He is left to judge when it makes sense to end the search for 
further "causes." He is methodologically compelled to make a  decision within an arena that is in 
principle one of uncertainty. Insofar as he has not made this decision unintelligently. he relies on 
the authority of his ‘historical judgment"; within a  positivist frame of reference, justifications of this 
kind are not susceptit)le of further analysis.'
14 A classic example of this concept is a small collection of essays edited by Barton J. Bernstein 
entitled The Atomic Bomb: The CriticsJ Issues, A traditional, or orthodox, interpretation as to how 
decision making was made to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was illustrated by 
Secretary of War Henry L Stimson. Stimson defended the action on the grounds that the 
bomtxng was life-saving for American troops and. therefore, justified and rational. A realist view, 
held by Hanson Baldwin of The New York Times, was that policymakers had behaved both 
immorally and naively. Historical revisibnists including a  litieral-leftist. David Horowitz, and a 
S(x:ialist-economist. Gar Alperowitz. interpreted the bomtxngs as a  means to deal with the Soviet 
Union (American leaders were not naive about power, but used the bomb for international 
purposes, i.e.. extracting concessions for the USSR in the post-Worid War II era.) The point here 
is that people in national security organizations made decisions affecting thousands of lives. In 
this collection of essays, there is virtually no consensus as to how or wriypolicy makers arrived at 
their decision. There is only their respective ultimately subjective interpretations about whatreaily 
happened.
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organizations make decisions that often have important consequences.
Therefore, it is important to recognize that scholars of organization theory and
public administration should, while avoiding mistakes of the past, contribute
ideas to practitioners which will prove to be helpful to them in the future. The
academic theorist should examine history and cross-disciplinary approaches.is
One of the classic works and historical accounts in diplomatic strategic
decision making was written by the political scientist Graham Allison (1971).
His work is important because it contributes to “framing,” a multitheoretical
approach developed to analyze case studies. Allison created three models: (1)
the rational actor (realist); (2) organization (pluralist); and, (3) bureaucratic
politics (pluralist) In order to develop an analytical framework to help policy
makers in the future, he used the historical example of the Cuban missile crisis
to illustrate what administrators faced in a  critical international crisis. Allison
admitted that the three “paradigms neglect or underplay a number of further
aspects of governmental t)ehavior. Additional paradigms focusing, for example
on individual cognitive processes, or the psychology of central players, or the
role of external groups, must be considered" (276-7). He also put forward the
notion “that analogues of the three models can be used to analyze outcomes in
areas of public policy outside foreign and military affairs” (272). In an earlier
work. Allison (1969) postulated that
At a  minimum, the intended implications of the argument presented here 
are four. First, formulation of alternative frames of reference and 
demonstration that different analysts, relying predominantly on different 
models, produce quite different explanations should encourage the 
analyst's self-consciousness about the nets he employs. The effect of 
these 'spectacles' in sensitizing him to particular aspects of what is going
15 Guy B. Adams (1992, 363) of the University of Missouri makes the point that public 
administration has been lacking a  ‘self-consciously historical approach to questions of knowledge 
and theory development* He further adds that our "culture of modernity” has led to an emphasis 
on technical rationality which combines individualism with ahistorical scientific analysis in the social 
sciences.
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on-framing the puzzle In one way rather than another, encouraging him 
to examine the problem in terms of certain categories rather than others, 
directing him to particular kinds of evidence, and relieving puzzlement by 
one procedure rather than another-must be recognized and explored 
(366).
Thus, Allison advocates a  comprehensive and inclusive theoretical approach to 
analyzing historical events. His work is an important starting point for scholars 
interested in pursuing a  more eclectic approach to understanding how policy 
makers in organizations reach crucial decisions.
Managers or decision makers in organizations must have analytical tools 
available to aid them in making important choices that could affect the lives of 
those within and outside of the organization. There are, of course, temporal 
and spatial limitations of which a  manager must take into account when 
engaged in making decisions. There are no decisions which are completely 
appropriate for every situation or circumstance. Allison’s  call for a  more 
comprehensive organization theory approach has initiated new thinking in the 
area of the theoretical nets which one employs in the decision making process. 
Before interpreting events as  to how decision makers arrived at their decisions 
in a theoretical sense, we will start with a preliminary chronological diagram 
(admittedly mechanistic) of how and when the incidents took place (see below. 
Table 1.1). It is my position that sticking to one paradigm for too long in a 
critical situation can lead to disaster. Following the decision making diagram, I 
will reiterate the metaphorical framework of Gareth Morgan (1986). It offers an 
important achievement in organization theory and, hence, an appropriate 
avenue for pursuing further research in case studies.
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TABLE 1.1: A BRIEF OUTUNE OF DECISION-MAKING IN THE CHALLENGER CASE
STUDY
1966 Space Shuttle Accident;
Result
Normal Every Day Activity--------- > Crisis--------- > Challenger Brplosnn January 28.1986
Decision Crilicai Ractors Affecting Rationalization and the
Options Considered ftw managers) Decision Considerations: Decision-Making Process (Deliberation)
(a) Launch/No Launch/Delay (a) 36 degree Fahrenheit (a) Relatively ittle emphasis was
Launch option selected antient temperature given to workers (engineers)
at launch; too cold. involved in the work;
previous coldest they were ignored at critical times in
temperature was 53 the deOberative process
(b) O-Rihg détérioration; (b) Belief that odds were in favor of
sheets of ice threatened success, based on mathematical 
shuttle orbKer; naval models and scienoe; decision to 
rescue operations within launch was "managerial" and not 
acceptat)le tolerance based on worker experience
Table 1.1 does not take into account feeling, thinking, judgment, and time and 
space limitations faced by human beings in the making of complex decisions in 
crisis environments (which will be developed in the analysis of the case study.) 
The table is highly linear, static and simplistic but serves as a starting point for 
further discussion in the next section. An important aspect of this dissertation is 
the analysis of the "crisis” situation faced by managers in the case study, how 
and why they arrived at their decisions, and of the alternatives which were 
realistically available to them at the tim e.is Managers and academicians can 
learn from these experiences through subjecting themselves to appropriate
16 Kelly and Moody (1994) make an interesting case for a  "postpositive" critique of conventional 
(or logical-positivism] policy analysis: "...the postpositivist role for the policy analyst is to facilitate 
rational deliberation, to bring together multiple perspectives, to assist in the process of exploring 
alternative courses of action, and to aid policy makers and. perhaps, citizens in understanding the 
possible limitations of their current perspectives. The policy analyst is not an expert but a 
facilitator, who lends his or her own subfective but outsider perspective to the evaluation process" 
(203).
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positive criticism/: 7
In the following chapters we will examine the Challenger launch decision 
through the lenses of images presented for interpretation of this complex event 
We will begin in the second chapter with a  critique of science and an 
investigation into metatheoretical assumptions and the usefulness of metaphors 
In organization theory. We will reveal the philosophical underpinnings of 
theories, represented by metaphors, that will be used to analyze the case study 
in order to understand what kinds of knowledge they may yield. In the third 
chapter we will examine a  history of events leading to the launch decision. The 
sheer complexity of the historical process leading to Challenger has 
encompassed volumes and will not be completely covered here. That task 
must be left to the interested reader and researcher to pursue on their own. 
Instead, a  short, chronological history touching primarily upon NASA 
documents and journalistic accounts from individuals inside and outside the 
NASA and Morton Thiokol organizations will be utilized to provide a 
background for putting the launch decision into context. The fourth chapter will 
include an examination of structural theories pertaining to the launch decision,
17 Bensman and Lilienfeld (1991,24-5) offer positive criteria for evaluating art criticism, which also 
serves well for evaluating the art of management: "First of all, the critic at his isest can serve as 
press agent for new techniques, styles, and forms of art [management]....Seccndly, the critic, 
within the framework of an estat)lished style or medium, provides an act of judgment which 
compares the art [management] work as technique with the conventional canons of the style or 
medium . tfie critic serves this function of maintaining standards. Thirdly, the critic may actually 
succeed in enlightening the artist [manager] as to what he is really doing.. ." The critic also can 
prevent "the artist [manager] from falling t>elow the best technical standards," provide judgments 
that "enable [the] audience to know whether they have enjoyed a work of art [management]’ and 
the "critic can serve as a  prospector' discovering new works and styles of art [management], and 
old works or styles of value which have been neglected." Vaill (1991, 118) also notes that 
"Performers often have very intense feelings about how the quality of what they are doing relates 
to standards of the wider artistic community....If management is a  performing art, the 
consciousness of the manager is transformed."
14
both functional and radical.'” We will discover that the Challenger launch 
decision has been studied extensively, especially by theorists oriented to the 
functionalist paradigm, and that there are numerous theoretical representations 
and interpretations of its events. The fifth chapter consists of an examination of 
theories from tfie radical humanist and interpretive paradigms. The fifth chapter 
will contain a  recapitulation of knowledges generated by theoretical 
explanations, culminating in the knowledge analytic. We will conclude our 
examination of the case study in the sixth chapter and reassess the knowledges 
and insights gained from the various images of the Challenger space shuttle. 
We will also look at the applicability and the usefulness of reframing a  single 
case study to organization theorists and managers.
The various theories which we will examine in this case study are not always "pure" 
representations from each paradigm. There are numerous examples of theories which have 
components of two or three of the paradigms considered. The categorization of theories in this 
case study will require a judgment by the author who will place them into context based on their 
dominant orientation.
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CHAPTER II;
A CRITIQUE OF SCIENCE, META-THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
AND THE METAPHORICAL FRAMEWORK
Meta-theoretical assumptions, or what Burrell and Morgan (1979) also 
call world views, are important to understand when one interprets or analyzes 
case studies.i9 Scholars pursue scientific research with preconceptions 
concerning the subject to be studied, about how it will be studied, and 
concerning what conclusions can be drawn. The key here is that what 
constitutes traditional "science" for many scholars has becom e the 
unquestioned, accepted norm for inquiry into organizational analysis. Science 
Is oftentimes taken prima facie without serious inquiry into whether its 
philosophical premises can adequately explain reality. There is considerable 
dissent from phenomenologists about the efficacy of traditional science In 
accounting for life-world experiences involving situations, language, and 
emotions which are important in understanding human events. From a 
psychological and phenomenological perspective, Gendlin (1973, 283) 
maintains that everyday-life experience is more complex than can be explained 
completely by any logical [scientific] or philosophical scheme. He also adds 
that In
...the Western tradition of philosophy, experience (and nature) has 
usually been interpreted a s  basically a  formal or logic-like system. This 
was done through a  philosophical analysis of the basic assumptions of 
knowledge or science. These assumptions were then attributed to 
experience.... Philosophers have not agreed on their analysis of science
19 Burrell and Morgan (1979, viii-x) show that social theory can be divided into four distinct and 
separate paradigms b a ^  upon mutually exclusive preconceptions of the social world. They also 
explain that there Is an established orthodoxy [i.e., functionalism] based on science and rationality 
which pervades academic inquiry into organgabons. Their primary aim is to take the student of 
organizations through the various paradigms to have him/her understand alternative points of 
view and to demonstrate that 'all theories of organisation are based upon a  philosophy of science 
and a theory of society.'
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or knowledge, and therefore also not what they attributed to 
experience....Since Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty, Ryle, and Austin, this [Western science approach] has 
gone out of s ^ e .  Instead, it is now widely held that experience need not. 
and in fact does not, have the sam e character as logic, science, or 
knowledge (Gendlin 1973, 281-2).
It is my position (and, hence, an indication of my world view and theoretical
bias) that the conscious choice of the subject being studied indicates a  value
preference, or judgment, of the individual engaging in the pursuit of
knowledge.20 There also arises the question as  to whether all or some of the
theoretical knowledge developed by the academician or scientist is useful to the
practitioner or manager in a real world situation, such as that which the NASA
managers and engineers faced in the days, weeks and months leading to the
loss of the space shuttle. Regarding modern or traditional science, Arendt
(1978), following the philosopher Immanuel Kant, explains its pitfalls:
...it is common-sense reasoning ultimately that ventures out into the 
realm of sheer speculation in the theories of the scientists, and the chief 
weakness of common sense in this sphere has always been that it lacks 
the safeguards inherent in sheer thinking, namely, thinking's critical 
capacity, which... harbors within itself a  highly self-destructive 
tendency....That modem science, always hunting for manifestations of the 
invisible-atoms, molecules, particles, cells, genes-should have added 
to the world a  spectacular, unprecedented quantity of new perceptible
20 Vickers (1995(1965]) provides some critical insight in The Art of Judgment In particular, his 
system of appreciation is defined as consisting of (1 ) Reality judgments-making judgments of 
fact atx)ut the 'state of the system.’ both internally and in its external relations. These include 
judgments about about what the state will be or might be on various hypotheses as well as 
judgments of what It is and has been; (2) Value judgmenta-making judgments atx)ut the 
significance of these facts to the appreciator or to the body for whom the appreciation is 
made(54)....f/ie dominance of goveming human values must t>e (aken for granted in any study of 
the process: and it is these vaUjes that select and in part create the'facts'tftat are to t)e observed 
and regulated (114). The relation between judgments of fact and of value is close and mutual; for 
facts are relevant only in relation to some judgment of value, and judgments of value are operative 
only in relation to some configuration of fact (54). (3) Instrumental Judgments-or'iv/iaf are we 
going to do?’ A problem has been posed txy some disparity between the current or expected 
course of some relation or complex of relations and the course that current policy sets as the 
desirable or acceptable standard. The otyect of executive judgment is to select a way to reduce 
the disparity (103). Managers, workers, practitioners and academicians can gain from Vickers’s 
insights when evaluating events.
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things is only seemingly paradoxical. In order to prove or disprove its 
hypotheses, its ‘paradigms' (Thomas Kuhn), and to discover what makes 
things work, it began to imitate the working processes of nature. For that 
purpose it produced the countless and enormously complex implements 
with which to force the non-appearing to appear (if only as an instrument- 
reading in a  laboratory), a s  that was the sole means the scientist had to 
persuade himself of its realify....No matter how far their theories leave 
common-sense experience and common-sense reasoning behind, they 
must finally come back to some form of it or lose all sense of realness in 
the object of their investigation ...Seen from the perspective of the 'real' 
world, the laboratory is the anticipation of a  changed environment; and 
the cognitive p rocesses using the human abilities of thinking and 
fabricating as means to their end are indeed the most refined modes of 
common-sense reasoning. The activi^ of knowing is no less related to 
our sense of reality and no less a  world-building activity than the building 
of houses....the intellect {Verstancf  ^ desires to grasp what is given to the 
senses, but reason ( VIsmunM) wishes to understand its meaning (Arendt 
1978. 56-7. italics hers).
Meaning, common-sense reasoning, and critical thinking are vital components
that reveal the speculative nature of science. Gendlin (1962. 8) defines
meaning a s  being form ed in the interaction of experiencing and something that
functions a s  a symbol.” Arendt (1978. 110), again following Kant.
demonstrates metapfiorically that "thinking” is based on sight (or the distance
between subject and object) and "judgment” obtains its metaphorical language
from taste. Furthermore. Arendt (1978,112-3) cautions that "Metaphors...can be
used by speculative reason, which indeed cannot avoid them, but when they
intrude, a s  is their tendency, on scientific reasoning, they are used and misused
to create and provide plausible evidence for theories that are actually
hypotheses that have to be proved or disproved by facts.” Hummel (1994b, 2).
a  phenomenologist, raises important concerns about the utility of traditional
theoretical (or what scientists refer to as  objective' or scientific") knowledge in
all research and academic endeavors:
1 -  The most foundational judgments of which we are capable -  
judgments about what is going on in reality -  cannot be made from
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within the proven propositions, hypotheses, or theories of science alone.
(If so then practitioners of life and work have a  role in knowledge 
acquisition.)
2 -  That judgments about formulating problems in such a  way that 
something can be done to solve them must be made from within the 
realm of practice. (If so practitioners, not scientists or theorists, have the 
predominant role in problem formulation, judging the appropriateness of 
theoretical m eans to solve them, and ultimately in judging the 
appropriateness of solutions.)
3 -  That therefore, a t two crucial moments of knowledge acquisition, in 
research design and in research  utilization, the judgments of 
practitioners are superior to the judgments of academicians.
4 -  That it follows that academe, to admit for the first time the 
dependence of its theoretical and scientific knowledge on practice, must 
institutionalize procedures by which knowledge from the field of human 
life and work is formally admitted to the classroom, the dissertation 
committee, funded research and other consultancies (Hummel 1994b, 2).
Hummel (1994b, 27) also questions the importance of the utility of scientific 
theories for the practitioner as "the position of a philosophy of knowledge as it 
focuses on the larger realm of knowledge beyond the narrow confines of 
science must be taken into account a t an points of the research process.” It is 
important to recognize here through an interpretive approach that organization 
theories and their underlying prem ises must be scrutinized in order to 
determine whether they offer any utility to practitioners.21
Phenomenology represents one school of thought within one meta- 
theoretical framework (Burrell and Morgan 1979) and is particularly important 
for exposing the shortcomings inherent in traditional science (i.e., Arendt's
21 See Hummel’s (1995) recent article ‘Why Wbrk and the Study of Wbrk Wont Mesh; Toward 
Standards for Practical Knowledge’ in Adm inistrait Theory & Praxis, 17/2:1-14. He makes the 
point that ‘If the philosophy of work can describe how those engaged in practical accomplishment 
make these kinds of judgments, then its salience for work and research is obvious. At two crucial 
moments of knowledge acquisition, in defining what is the matter and in formulating possible 
answers that can put the matter to rest, managers and professors must yield to their presumed 
inferiors: workers and practitioner students, respectively."
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demonstration above that scientific conclusions may be lacking in common 
sense). Organization theorists are. however, not of one mind and there is not 
likely to be a  consensus about what constitutes knowledge in the field for the 
foreseeable future (Shafritz and Ott 1992, 4). There are m eans available to 
incorporate various theoretical perspectives in the search for knowledge of what 
actually occurs in organizations. Burrell and Morgan (1979, 3) have recognized 
tha t there are distinct theoretical world views based on the philosophical 
assumptions of social scientists and have devised a  basic taxonomy outlining 
the sociological differences:
Table 2.1 (Source: Burrell and Morgan, 1979)
The subjective - objective dimension
The subfectivist approach The obfactiviat approach
to social scfanca to social scianca
Nominalism <----------------------------ontology--------------------------> Realism
Anti positivism <----------------------epistemology------------------------ >Positivism
Voiuntarism <-------------------------human nature------------------------> D^erminism
Ideographic <-------------------------methodology-------------------------> Nomothetic
Accordingly, selection of methodology by social scientists is influenced by a
predisposition to different ontologies, epistemologies and models of human
nature. Within the subjective - objective dimension, Burrell and Morgan (1979,
22) established four paradigms in which the “sociology of regulation” Is
juxtaposed to the “sociology of radical change,” in order to create a  useful
typology for contrasting philosophical orientations of social scientists.
“Philosophical orientations” are central to establishing the idea that various
scientific (or other) explanations are not merely givens when analyzing
organizational phenomena. The four paradigms for the analysis of social theory
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are reproduced here:
THE SOCKMjOGV OF RADICAL CHANGE
SUBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE
u
THE SOCIOLOGY OP REGULATION
F i0 ife 3 .i Four pam E gm  for die amlsfsis o f  socW Acory
Figure 2.1 Sociological Paradigms (Source: Burrell and Morgan 1979, 22)
* The Radical Humanist and Interpretive paradigms are based on 
conceptions of ‘German idealism' and are characterized as sharing a  
nominalist ontology, anti-positivist epistem ology, voluntaristic 
assumptions of human nature, and have a  tendency towards ideographic 
methodology. Radical humanism is distinguished by a  propensity for 
radical change from a  subjectivist standpoint. Branches of the radical 
humanism paradigm include French existentialism, anarchistic 
individualism, and critical theory. The interpretive paradigm attempts to 
explain society as to how it really is and to understand the fundamental 
nature of the social world a t the level of subjective experience (individual 
consciousness). The paradigm includes phenomenology, hermeneutics 
and phenomenological sociology (See Burrell and Morgan 1979: 7, 28-9, 
32, bold print is used for emphasis).
'  The Radical Structuralist and Functionalist paradigms represent 
sociological positivism’ and share common philosophical underpinnings 
such a s  a  realist ontology, positivist epistemology, deterministic 
assumptions of human nature, and nomothetic methodology. Radical 
structuralist theorists advocate a  sociology of radical change from an 
objectivist standpoint; emphasizing structural conflict, m odes of 
domination, contradiction and deprivation. Elements of the radical 
structuralism include contemporary Mediterranean Marxism, conflict 
theory, and Russian social theory. Functionalism  combines a
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sociology of regulation with an approach towards subject matter from an 
objectionist point of view. The functionalist paradigm encom passes 
much of social science and includes interactionism, social action tfieory, 
integrative theory, social system theory and objectivism (Burrell and 
Morgan 1979: 7. 25. 29. 33-4; Morgan 1980. 619, bold print is used for 
emphasis).
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 illustrate the metatheoretical perspectives 
predominant in sociology and in organizational analysis. Burrell and Morgan's 
analyses are useful for understanding and arranging the various theoretical 
perspectives (world views and paradigms) available to organizational theorists. 
Up to this point, we have been considering theoretical phenomena in a  rather 
static and descriptive manner. A more dynamic way to consider an element of 
the objective-subjective dimension of philosophical and scientific inquiry is to 
examine the temporal-spatial (natural world) matrix developed by Bensman and 
Ulienfeld (1991):
Table 2.3: Action-Time Matrix 
Action Time
Obiective Subiective
Rationally Scientific Planning
Calculated Attitude Attitude
Common
Sense Ritualistic and Attitude of
Rationality Ceremonial Everyday Life
Action
(Source: Bensman and Ulienfekl 1991. 25)
Time and action are the crucial elements in our understanding of complex 
situations. Bensman and Ulienfeld (1991. 16-7). following the philosopher
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Alfred Shutz, demonstrate that scientific attitude and attitude of everyday life 
represent different conceptions of time interpretation as  "In the scientific attitude, 
time is measured in the objective sense of the term with standardized units, 
independently of a  feeling of involvement [or rational detachment] which 
increases or decreases the experience of passing time." In the attitude of 
everyday life, "actions are  situationally egocentric in the sam e sense that 
psychological time is temporally egocentnd’ (Bensman and Ulienfeld 1991,16). 
The planning attitude incorporates the scientific and natural attitudes and 
reflects "an unselfconscious, nonreflective man who directly and immediately 
enters into social relations with others in terms of his immediate personal goals 
and his direct and intuitive apprehension of a  situation” (17). The ritualistic and 
ceremonial action cell "suggests ritual and ceremony as  means of organizing 
activity, especially in highly stylized or expressive ways [alternatives are not 
considered]" (18). Time is important for our understanding of the context in 
which decision makers in these case studies took action (made decisions) and 
under what conditions the decisions were made.
Paradigms and Metaphors
Morgan (1980, 606) identifies paradigms as "alternative realities” or as a 
"way of seeing.” Within these paradigms^z are "metaphors” which constitute a 
basis for schools of thought connected with particular kinds of scientific 
achievements. Metaphors are used for solving puzzles in organization theory
and have been developed most extensively in the the functionalist paradigm
22 Morgan, in a  sense, borrows from Kuhn (1970,10-11) who defines ‘'paradigms,' [as] a term 
that relates to ' normal science.’ [He suggests] that some accepted examples of actual scientific 
practice-ecamples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together-provide 
models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research....Men whose 
research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for 
scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites 
for science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a  particular research tradition.’
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(Morgan 1980, 619). The metaphorical conceptual framework offers a  useful
analytical tool to scholars of organization theory, public administration and has
been employed by the "hard sciences,” such a s  physics.23 Metaphors are by no
means strictly limited to scientific theories. Gendlin (1973) notes the following:
Metaphor involves novelty. Here words are used in such a  way a s  to 
create a new experience. The metaphor or simile is about this situation 
or experience....the metapftor involves a  further creative organizing, as  in 
direct reference. An aspect of experience emerges, and in the case of 
metaphor, a  new one. Many such new aspects could metaphorically t>e 
made to emerge, if one thought many other areas of experience to bear 
on the present one (295-6).
According to Gendlin (1962, 113) "A metaphor achieves a new meaning...by 
drawing on old experience and by using symtx)ls that already have some other, 
old familiar meaning. [And] old symbols and their meanings are employed in a 
new way to conceptualize the new meaning." Arendt (1978) further adds that 
“All philosophical terms are metaphors, frozen analogies, as it were, whose true 
meaning discloses itself when we dissolve the term into the original context, 
which must have been vividly in the mind of tfie first philosopher to use it. The 
metaphor, [bridges] the abyss between inward and invisible mental activities 
and the world of appearances [and] was certainly the greatest gift language
23 See Robert D. Behn, ‘Management and the Neutrino’ in Public Admini^ ration Review 
(September/ October 1992) 52-5: 409-19, and W. Graham Astley and Raymond F. Zammuto, 
‘Organization Science, Managers, and Language Games,* in O rganized  Sc/ence (November 
1992) 4-3: 443-459. Behn presents a  compelling argument in which ‘hard’ sciences such as 
physics rely on using metaphors to grasp elusive concepts which can never be conclusively 
proved. Behn (418) sulxnits the idea that ‘Just as neutrinos and quarks help physicists make 
sense of their subatomic world and gravity and force help us make sense of ours, so concepts like 
stick to the knitting' and ‘MBWA’ may help public managers make sense of their scientists need 
only employ metaphors of social science.* Astley and Zammuto (455) submit that managers need 
various conceptual devices such a s  ‘analytical categorôatibns. typologies, and metaphors' and 
that ‘Organization science may thus facilitate practice more through process than through 
content-instead of discovering empirically derived solutions to specific problems, it provides 
conceptual language that shapes managers’ perceptions and thoughts, thereby enhancing their 
problem-solving capabilities. Conceptual language may increase mental agility, allowing managers 
to redefine problems in ways that are amenable to resolution.’ They further advocate that there is 
a  need for managers *to see and understand organizational events from several, rather than 
single perspectives.'
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could bestow on thinking and hence on philosophy...” (104-5).
A significant contribution to the analysis of this dissertation's case study
is the metaphorical framework developed by Gareth Morgan in Images of
Organization (1986).24 Morgan (1983) defines metaphor as one of four types of
“tropes” (the others are  metonymy, synedoche, and irony) from the Greek
tropos, meaning “turn.” His definition of metaphor is as  follows;
Metaphor turns imagination in ways that forge an equivalence or identify 
between separate elements of experience. Specifically, metaphor 
creates meaning by understanding one phenomenon through another in 
a  way that encourages us to understand what is common. Thus the idea 
that “the organization is a  machine” finds machine-like qualities in 
organization, just a s  primitive people find anger of the gods in thunder 
and friendliness in sunshine. Metaphor makes meaning in a  primal way; 
its role is not just embellishment (602).
Morgan compiled eight “images” (also described as  metaphors, frames or 
perspectives) from various theoretical points of vieiv to help managers improve 
their m anagem ent skills. Morgan (1980, 611-2) acknowledges that 
organization theory is metaphorical and that the “im ages” approach is 
essentially a  subjective enterprise. He favors theoretical pluralism and 
maintains that no one metaphor can capture ttie total nature of organizational 
life. Each theoretical perspective has its limitations and can offer only partial 
explanations for understanding organizations. The images will be used to 
examine the Challenger case study and are as follows: (1) machines metaphor; 
(2) organizations as  organisms metaphor; (3) holographic metaphor; (4) culture
24 The development of Mohan’s ideas can be traced through his numerous works on the subject 
A few notable examples are "More on Metaphor: Why We Cannot Control Tropes in Administrative 
Science," in A(Aninistrative Sdence Quarterly, 28 (1983): 601-7; "Paradigms. Metaphors, and 
Puzzle Solving in Organization Theory." in Administrative Science Quarterly, (1980): 605-22; 
"Accounting as  Reality Construction: Towards a  new epistemology for accounting practice." in 
Accounting Organiza^ons and Society, 13 (1988): 477-85; Riding the Waves of Change, 1988 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass); and. Creative OrganizaSon Theory, 1989 (Newbury Park: Sage). 
He has also collaborated with Gibson Burrell in Socioiogical Paradigms and Organizational 
Analyas, 1979 (London: Heinemann) and with Linda Smircich in The Case for Qualitative 
Research," in Academy of Management Review 5 (1980): 491-500.
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metaphor; (5) political systems metaphor; (6) psychic prisons metaphor; (7) flux 
and transformation metaphor; and, (8) instruments of domination metaphor. All 
of these metaphors are found within the metatheoretical paradigms listed 
previously .25 a  brief synopsis of Morgan’s  images will follow. More detailed 
applications and explanations will come within the context of analyzing the 
three case  studies. Other important works from the framing literature will be 
utilized in my work to add support to Morgan’s multi-theoretical images
approach.26
25 There is, of course, an extensive body of literature that accompanies each of Morgan’s 
metaphors. Investigation into the case studies will bring out various classic works within 
organization theory. For example, Morgan attributes the origin of the "machines metaphor" to 
Frederick the Great and other military experts who developed armies into "military machines' 
which greatly influenced organization theorists well into the middle twentieth century (e.g.. Max 
Weber, F.W. Taylor, and Henri Fayol). Frank J. Barrett and Suresh Srivastva (1991 ) in "History as a 
Mode of Inquiry in Organizational Life: A Role for Human Cosmogony,” in Human Relations, 44/3: 
231, criticized most organization theory which "has been characterized largely by a  structural- 
functionalist orientation to social life.” Haridimos Tsoukas (1993), in "Analogical Reasoning and 
Knowledge Generation,” in Organization Studies 14/3:331, is generally sympathetic to the 
metaphorical approach, txjt states that Morgan (1986) favors the metaphorical approach, but adds 
that Morgan (1986) "favors one particular type of discourse (and the machine, organismic and 
holographic metaphors) when he talks about effective management, improving current 
organizational practices, and enhancing the alxlity of organizations to solve problems through 
their emphasis on cultural socialization and decentralized control. [Also] Morgan finds himself in 
the contradictory position of theoretically proclaiming the usefulness of all metaphors (and their 
associated mode of discourse), while practically privileging some of them at the expense of 
others.” Despite these criticisms. Morgan does distinguish between the various metaphors and 
places them in context within the sociological paradigms outlined by Burrell and Morgan (1979, 
see above). Images of Organizadon (1986), and "Paradigms, Metaphors, and Puzzle Solving” 
ASQ 1980. The functionalist perspective is dominant, consisting of the machines, organisms, 
brains, political systems, and flux and transformation metaphors. The radical humanist paradigm is 
limited to the psychic prisons (ideological) metaphor. Radical structuralism is encompassed by the 
domination metaphor and the interpretive perspective is addressed in the culture metaphor. By 
sheer volume, then, Tsoukas makes a  valid point. In defense of Morgan, however, the 
functionalist school has had a  dear advantage over the other perspectives in terms of the number 
of scholars involved in and maintaining the "orthodoxy” throughout this century and the ready 
acceptance of most organization theorists.
26 See, for example,Lee G. Bolman and Terrence E. Deal in Reframing Organizations: Artistry. 
Choice, and Leadership, 1991 and Robert E. Quinn's Beyond Rational Management Mastering 
the Paradoxes and Competing Demands of High Performance, 1991, both are excellent treatises 
on the subject.
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The Machines Metaphor
Much of the classic literature in organization theory is encompassed by
Morgan's (1986) "machines metaphor,” essentially classic management theory
and scientific management.^/ Belonging to the functionalist (scientific)
metatheoretical world view, th e  metaphor has numerous strengths and
weakness for understanding how organizations actually work. Morgan’s
analysis is a s  follows:
Images or metaphors only create partial ways of seeing. For in 
encouraging us to see  and understand the world from one perspective 
they discourage us from seeing it from others. This is exactly what has 
happened in the course of developing mechanistic approaches to 
organization.
The strengths can be stated very simply. For mechanistic approaches to 
organization work well only under conditions where machines work well:
(a) when there is a  straightforward task to perform; (b) when the 
environment is stable enough to ensure that the products produced will 
be appropriate ones; (c) when one wishes to produce exactly the same 
product time and again; (d) when precision is at a  premium; and (e) when 
the human "machine” parts are compliant and behave as they have been 
designed to do.
[Limitations:] (a) can create organizational forms that have great difficulty 
in adapting to changing circumstances; (b) can result in mindless and 
unquestioning bureaucracy; (c) can have unanticipated and undesirable 
consequences a s  the interests of those working in the organization take 
precedence over the goals the organization was designed to achieve; 
and (d) can have dehumanizing effects upon employees, especially 
those a t the lower levels of the organization hierarchy (Morgan 1986, 35-
6).
The machines metaphor, though essentially limited in its ability to interpret or
27 The origins of the machine metaphor are traced by Morgan (1986, 24) back to the era of 
Frederick the Great (1746-1780) of Prussia. The military armed forces he and others created were 
meant to resemble efficient war machines capable of defeating opponents. Other contributors 
include Adam Smith and his Wealth of Nations (1776) which celebrated the division of labor and 
increased efficiei^ by subordinating workers to their machines and supervisors (Morgan 1986, 
23). This increasingly scientific or bureaucratic form of organization was described by Max Wetier, 
who was interested in the social consequences of bureaucratization. Representatives of the 
‘classical management school” cited by Morgan Include F.W. Mooney. Lyndall Urwick and Henri 
Fayol. F.W. Taylor’s scientific management principles are also included in the machines metaphor 
(30).
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analyze organizations. Is nevertheless a  useful descriptive tool for 
administrators and academicians.
Organizations a s  Organisms
This metaphor consists of the human resources management school,
systems theory, contingency theory and organizational ecoiogy.28 Features of
the organisms metaphor include:
Strengths; (1) emphasis is placed on understanding relations between 
organizations and their environments; (2) belief that management of 
organizations can often be improved through systematic attention to 
survival needs; (3) characteristically distinguishes or identifies different 
species of organizations; (4) stresses the virtue of organic forms of 
organization in the process of innovation; (5) contributes to the idea of 
associating theory with practice in organization theory; and, (6) 
contributes to the study of ecology,' or interorganizational relations.
W eak n esses: (1) we are led to view organizations and their
environments in a  way that is far too concrete; (2) there is an assumption 
of 'functional unity,' [and that] the system is unified and shares a  common 
life and a  common future; and, (3) the danger of the metaphor becoming 
an ideology...where images or theories come to serve a s  normative 
guidelines for shaping practice (Morgan 1986, 72-6).
Like the machines metaphor, this metaphor is derived from the functionalist 
paradigm. Much organization theory literature has come from this image. This 
metaphor may be useful for understanding how organizations attempt to survive 
in a  biological (scientific) sense. What can happen, for example, is that "the 
population-ecology view of organizations revives the ideology of social 
Darwinism, which stressed that social life is based on the laws of nature and
28 See Morgan (1986) Chapter 3 for more information. For human resources management, 
Morgan includes the Hawthorne studies of Mayo and Roethlisberger, as well as Trist and 
Bamforth, Maslow, Argyns. Herzberg and McGregor. Systems theory is represented through the 
works of Bertalanffy and Parsons. Contingency theory is comprised of an extensive variety of 
views by Kast and Rosenzweig, Bums and Stalker, and Lawrence and Lorsch. Boulding and Trist 
are representative of the organizational ecology approach.
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that only the fittest will survive” (Morgan 1986, 76). Morgan warns that if this 
metaphor is taken too seriously (as to whether there are exact parallels 
between nature and sociefy), then fail to see that human beings in principle 
have a  large measure of influence and choice over what their world can be”
(76).
Holographic Metaphor (or Organizations a s Brains)
Morgan uses this image to convey his idea that organizations are
information-processing "brains,” which consist of processes including
communications, information and decision-making systems (1986, 81). Key
concepts include Herbert Simon's "bounded rationality," and "single-loop”
versus "double-loop” learning based on communications theory. The most
important elements of the image are the facilitation of self-organization (what
Morgan calls "principles of holographic design”) and learning through; (1)
getting the whole Into the parts; (2) creating connectivity and redundance of
functions; (3) creating simultaneous specialization and generalization; and, (4)
creating a  capacity to self-organize (1986, 97-8). The metaphor has the
following limitations:
Strengths: (1) holographic and other organization designs that break 
free of bureaucratic controls show that organizations can deal with 
uncertain and complex problems in ways that go well beyond the 
capacities of any single individual; (2) increased cognitive capacity as 
the holistic, analogical, intuitive, and creative capacities of the brain's 
right hemisphere are  used [which could] provide further m eans of 
extending and transforming organizational capacities for rational action; 
and, (3) it provides a  valuable m eans of thinking about how 
developments in computing and other microprocessing technology can 
be useful to facilitate new styles of organization.
W eaknesses: (1) there is a  danger of overlooking important conflicts 
between the requirements of learning and self-organization on the one 
hand, and the realities of power and control on the other (the process of
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learning requires a  degree of openness and self-criticism that is foreign 
to traditional modes of management); and. (2) since any move toward 
self-organization must be accompanied by a  major change in attitudes 
and values, the realities of power may be reinforced by an inertia 
stemming from existing assumptions and beliefs (Morgan 1986,107-9).
This metaphor is representative of the functionalist, or scientific, paradigm 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979). It attem pts to interject science with human 
characteristics in order to account for behavior limitations of human beings in 
organizations.
Organizations a s  Cuitures
Morgan (1986, 112) defines culture as “the pattern of development
reflected in a  society’s  system of knowledge, ideology, values, laws and day-to-
day ritual.” Organizations are an integral part of society and are important
components in tfie culture’s  milieu. Morgan describes organizations as cultural
phenomena which vary from one society to another and that cross-national
variations “may be understood by exploring patterns of corporate culture and
subculture between and within organizations” (1986, 112). Furthermore,
members of organizations oftentimes end up being wfiat tfiey think and say as
their Ideas and visions are realized in daily human interaction (133). Some of
the characteristics of the image are a s  follows:
Strengths: (1) it directs attention to the symbolic or even magical’ 
significance of even the most rational aspects of organizational life; (2) It 
contributes to our understanding organizational change and points 
towards another means of creating organized activity: by influencing the 
language, norms, folklore, ceremonies, and other social practices that 
communicate the key ideologies, values, and beliefs guiding action (135-
7).
Trouble: (1) management has always been to some extent an 
ideological practice, promoting appropriate attitudes, values and norms 
as means of motivating and controlling employees; and (2) to tfie extent
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that the insights of the culture metaphor are used to create an Orwellian 
world of corporate newspeak, where the culture controls rather than 
expresses human character, the  metaphor may thus prove quite 
manipulative and totalitarian in its influence (Morgan 1986, 138-9).
Analyzing organizations a s  cultures can bring critical insight as to what is 
occurring in complex organizations. The "organizations a s  cultures" image 
recognizes the variance of attitudes, values and beliefs in organizations as well 
as between organizations. This is a  significant departure from the previous 
scientific (or functional) paradigms in that subjective human behavior and 
artifacts are taken into account when analyzing distinctive organizations. 
Changing an organization’s  culture can have deleterious consequences and 
even cause decay, 29 when used by managers against people dependent upon 
the organization for comfort, stabili^ and identification. The organizations as 
cultures metaphor trancends and affects the four major paradigms (i.e., 
functionalist, interpretive, radical humanism, and radical structuralism) of Burrell 
and Morgan (1979). Along with “organizations as political systems” (see 
below), the culture metaphor takes into account the normative behavior of 
individuals within organizations and between organizations, transcending 
traditional science in organizational analysis.
29 An instructive tome on this sutqect is Howard S. Schwartz’s  (1990) Narcissistic Process and 
Corporate Decay: The Theory of the Organization Ideal. Schwartz descriijes his first 
understanding of narcissistic process, organizational totalitarianism, and the organization ideal...in 
moral terms, in terms of the psychological damage done to the individuals involved and in terms of 
the damage that could be wrought outside of the organization....! give the name organizational 
decay \o the multidimensional degeneration that results when the nature of the organization shifts 
from doing work in the real world to presenting a  dramatization of its own perfection in a  fantasy 
world" (49). While Schwartz’s  work Ijest represents the psycho-analytical perspective (see the 
"organizations as psychic prisons” metaphor tielow), Schwartz's analysis addresses the cultural 
aspects of organizational totalitarianism.
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O rganizations a s  Poiiticai S ystem s
Morgan (1986) points out here that organizations have political
interactions (organizations are  intrinsically political). There are various
coalitions among people within an organization (organizations are coalitions
themselves) and that "most approaches to organization actually foster the
development of cliques and coalitions” (154). Conflict is the norm In
organizations and make take on a  variety of different forms: (1) personal; (2)
interpersonal; (3) between rival groups or coalitions; and, (4) explicit or covert.
Morgan (1986 159) also outlines various types of power in organization as
formal authority, control of scarce resources, use of organizational structure,
rules and regulations, control of decision processes, control of knowledge and
information, control of boundaries, the ability to cope with uncertainty, control of
technology, interpersonal alliances, control of counter-organizations,
symbolism, gender relations, structural factors, and the power one already has.
And, a s  most political scientists are aware, political power is ambiguous,
asymmetrical and essentially difficult to define. Morgan believes that
acknowledging power within organizations can be helpful to managers if they
accept the inevitability of organizational politics. Characteristics of the political
system image are as  follows:
S treng ths: (1) organizational politics becomes a  taboo subject which at 
times makes it extremely difficult for organization members to deal with 
this crucially important aspect of organizational reality; (2) it encourages 
us to see how all organizational activity is interest-based; (3) it helps to 
explode the myth of organizational rationality [rationality is always 
political]; (4) it points to disintegrative strains and tensions in an 
organization; (5) it obliges us to recognize that tensions between private 
and organizational interests provide an incentive for individuals to act 
politically; and, (6) it encourages us to recognize the sociopolitical 
implications of different kinds of organization and the roles that 
organizations play in society.
32
Potential danger: when we understand organizations as political 
systems we are more likely to behave politically in relation to what we 
see. We begin to see politics everywhere, and to look for hidden 
agendas even when there are none (Morgan 1986, 194-7).
Like the culture metaphor, the political systems image takes into account the 
more irrational aspects (subjective impulse) of human political behavior vis 'a 
vis more traditional scientific analyses. The political systems metaphor is useful 
in understanding human power relationships in organizations and offers 
another crucial insight into organizational behavior.
Psychic Prisons
Under this metaphor, using the image of Plato’s cave, Morgan describes
organizations as psychic phenomena. Reality is constructed from known
images that have always been explicitly taken a s  the explanation of the world.
In its essence, individuals and organizations can become cognitively trapped,
or involved in deleterious psychological actions such as  “groupthink" (Janis
1971). Drawing on the scholarly works of Freud, Jung and Foucault, Morgan
defines the strengths and weaknesses of the image a s  follows:
Strengths: (1) it directs attention to the fact that human beings can and 
do create social worlds that many may experience as problematic and 
confining; (2) it presents a  se t of perspectives for exploring the hidden 
meaning of our taken-for-granted world; (3) it shows us that we have 
over-rationalized our understanding a s  rationality and irrationality 
appears to be central to the human condition; (4) it draws specific 
attention to the ethical basis of organization by reinforcing the view that 
organization is human in the fullest sense; (5) it encourages us to 
recognize and deal with the power relations shaping the enactment of 
organizational life; and (6) it identifies many of the barriers standing in the 
path of innovation and change.
W eaknesses: (1) people are often locked into cognitive traps because 
it is in the interests of certain individuals and groups to sustain one 
pattern of belief rather than another; (2) it can be criticized for placing too 
much emphasis on the role of cognitive processes in creating, sustaining,
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and changing organizations and society; (3) it often encourages utopian 
speculation and critique; and, (4) it raises the specter of an Orwellian 
world where we attempt to manage each other's minds (Morgan 1986, 
228-31).
The psychic prisons metaphor b es t represents the "radical humanism" 
paradigm as depicted by Burrell and Morgan (1979) and the pfienomenological 
theoretical perspective, which I would include in both the radical humanism and 
interpretive world views [see Gendlin, Hummel, and Arendt above].
Flux and Transformation
Morgan uses this metaphor to demonstrate that organizations should get 
away from linear thinking and adopt logic systems based on more open-ended 
thinking. He adopts the theory of autopoiesis (from the Chilean biologists 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela) that "encourages us to understand 
the transformation or evolution of living systems as the result of internally 
generated change [and] autopoiesis places principal emphasis on the way the 
total system of interactions shapes its own future” [or the antithesis of Darwinian 
theory] (Morgan 1986, 240). Hegel [originally] and Marx’s  dialectical analysis 
[thesis/antithesis, not the economic determinism of Engels] of society is 
combined with the autopoeisis perspective to create the basis of the flux and 
transformation metaphor in which "social arrangements generate inner 
contradictions that defeat the purposes for which they were se t up leading to 
negation and counter-negation" (Morgan 1986, 258). Image characteristics are 
a s  follows:
Strengths: (1) it attempts to fathom the nature and source of change, so 
that we may understand its logic [through description and analysis]; (2) it 
exposes assumptions used in organizations that are rooted in layers of 
ideology that encourages us to accept them at face value [e g., capitalism 
versus communism, whereas these  different systems are  usually
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presented as  a  matter of ideological or political choice. (And) the 
detailed consequences and inner logic of the alternative systems are 
rarely subjected to critical analysis].
W eaknesses: (1) [it] may be too idealistic, the ideology supporting a  
particular logic of change may eliminate the possibility of adopting others;
(2) it is that a  full understanding of logics of change always depends on 
hindsight (though all theories share this feature (267-72).
This metaphor also encom passes "systemic wisdom,” including Vickers's 
(1995) "appreciative system” and Taoist Eastern philosophical methods (see 
Morgan 1986, 371-6). Morgan (1986, 382) attributes much of his framing 
method to the "general principles of dialectical thinking.” The flux and 
transformation image may be included in the radical humanism or interpretive 
metatheoretical paradigms (Burrell and Morgan 1979). It also appears to 
resemble somewhat traditional systems theory but in essence stands systems 
theory on its head.
Instruments of Domination
This metaphor uncovers the seamier side of organizations. The general
idea is that organizations, as instruments of domination, are often employed "to
further the selfish interests of elites at the expense of others” (Morgan 1986,
275). Morgan draws on the analyses of Max Weber, Robert Michels and Karl
Marx to show that organizations use rationality (even in more democratically
oriented organizations) to dominate individuals through hierarchical or class-
based arrangements. Limitations of the metaphor are as follows:
Strengths: (1) it draws our attention to [the] double-edged nature of 
rational action, illustrating that when we talk about rationality we are 
always speaking from a  partial point of view....what is rational from one 
organizational standpoint may be catastrophic from another; (2) it shows 
us a  way of creating an organization theory for the exploited; and, (3) it 
helps us to appreciate the issues that fuel this radical frame of reference 
in practice.
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W eaknesses: (1) fit] can be used to provide a crude conspiracy theory 
of organization and society; (2) there is a  danger that in asserting an 
equivalence between domination and organization we may blind 
ourselves to the idea that non dominating forms of organization are 
possible; and. (3) the perspective is ideological, but it is certainly no more 
ideological than any other (Morgan 1986, 315-9).
This particular metaphor represents the radical structuralist paradigm (Burrell 
and Morgan 1979). Of all the preceding images presented by Morgan, the 
instruments of domination metaphor illustrates the bourgeois/jsroietariat and 
elite/partisan exploitation of those at the top of organizations and society. This 
Image effectively offers the manager or academic anotfier critical insight into 
organizational behavior, this time viewing the organization from the worker’s 
perspective.
The advantages of the metaphorical approach (as opposed to a  single or 
more limited theoretical analytical framework) will be demonstrated when we 
examine and interpret the case study. Morgan (1986) maintains the idea that 
“our theories and explanations of organizational life are based on metaphors 
that lead us to see and understand organizations in distinctive yet partial ways 
[and] the use of metaphor implies a  way of thinking and a way of seeing that 
pervade how we understand our world generally” (12-13, his emphasis). There 
is no single, simple catchall theory which explains how all organizations 
behave.30 There are, however, perceptions which human beings carry with 
them when ttiey work in or manage organizations. Managers use what works 
best for them, oftentimes using analogy in situations where prior experience
30 Astley and Zammuto (1992) make a  strong case that much of the research puiXished in 
scholarly journals Is ignored by management practitioners because it focuses too narrowly on 
particular operationalizations of single theories. Shafritz and Ott (1992. 4-5) note in their 
introduction that there is no general consensus on what constitutes knowledge in organization 
theory. Moreover, theories within tfie field exist as "intellectual constructs and as mutual support 
networks of organization theorists. They have one primary purpose; to organize and extend 
knowledge about organizations and how to study them."
36
may not exist Practical improvement in managing organizations may occur if 
administrators have more metaphorical tools available to them.si The overall 
idea is th a t at b e s t there are only partial paradigms available to the scholar of 
organization theory. Perhaps the best way to engage in the understanding of 
organizations is to use  these images in order to make sense  of complex 
phenomena.
We will be exploring the possibilities and potential usefulness for 
knowledge generation of theoretical explanations of the Challenger launch 
decision in more detail in chapters four and five. In the next chapter, we will 
examine a  history of events leading to the launch decision. This brief historical 
analysis will trace the development of the NASA organization and the affected 
subcontractors and publics from its early beginnings through the Rogers 
Commission hearings.
31 See Behn’s  (1992) ‘Management and the Neutrino’ article in PAR. He equates metaphors 
with provert)s and compares management with physics. 'Light's waves and light’s particles. Both 
are metaphors-proverbs, if you will. They are valuable to scientists not because they represent 
reality, but because they help scientists think [and] managers want to have as  many provert)s as 
possible in their tool kit For proverbs help them to think" (415-6).
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CHAPTER III:
Events Leading To The Challenger Accident
NASA Deveiopment and the Eariy Years: The 1950s and 1960s
An examination of the history of events leading to the Challenger 
explosion also involves simultaneously looking at the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration in a  broader context After the accident in 1986, the 
Presidential Commission under the chairmanship of William Rogers found a 
number of causes:
1. The joint test and certification program was inadequate. There was no 
requirement to configure the qualifications test motor as  it would be In 
flight, and the motors were static tested in a  horizontal position, not in the 
vertical flight position.
2. Prior to the accident, neither NASA nor [Morton] Thiokol [the Solid 
Rocket Booster manufacturer] fully understood the mechanism by which 
the joint sealing action took place.
3. NASA and Thiokol accepted escalating risk apparently because they 
“got away with it last time.” As Commissioner [Richard P.] Feynman 
observed, the decision making was:
‘a  kind of Russian roulette [The Shuttle] flies [with O-ring erosion] and
nothing happens. Then it is suggested, therefore, that the risk is no 
longer so high for the next flights. We can lower our standards a  little bit
because we got away with it last time You got away with it, but it
shouldn't be done over again like tha t’
4. NASA’s  system for tracking anomalies for Flight Readiness Reviews 
failed in that, despite a  history of persistent O-ring erosion and blow-by, 
flight was still permitted. It failed again in the strange sequence of six 
consecutive launch constraint waivers prior to 51-L permitting it to fly 
without any record of a  waiver, or even of an explicit constraint Tracking 
and continuing anomalies that are outside the data tiase’ of prior flight 
allowed major problems to be removed from, and lost by, the reporting 
system.
5. The O-ring erosion history presented to Level I at NASA Headquarters 
in August 1985 was sufficiently detailed to require corrective action prior
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to the next flight
6. A careful analysis of the flight history of O-ring performance would 
have revealed the correlation of O-ring damage and low temperature. 
Neither NASA nor Thiokol carried out such an analysis; consequently, 
they were unprepared to properly evaluate the risks of launching the 51- 
L mission in conditions more extreme than they had encountered before” 
{Report 1:148).®
The Report’s findings indicate a  number of important issues for scholars 
interested in how an  organization and its members, with virtually spotless 
reputations, could have committed such an egregious error in judgment The 
question arises as to why did NASA not take action to prevent the O-rings from 
failing, especially since the members of the organizations involved in the work 
knew about the problem well in advance of the accident In order to make 
sense of the decision to launch the space shuttle, I will engage the reader in a 
thorough historical analysis which will hopefully a  better understanding as to 
why decision-makers made choices leading to the accident 33 As we 
discovered earlier, scholars interpret which events will be selected thus making
^  In the interest of brevity. I have condensed the title of the five volume work Report to the 
Present by the Presidentiaf Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident to Report I. 
II, III, IV, orV, respectively.
33 See Malcolm McConnell, Chall&ig&: A Major MsJfunction, 1987 (Garden City. NY: Doubleday 
and Company) for an interpretation of events leading to the accident. This work is widely cited by 
researchers, is authoritative, and is especially useful examining the political intrigue involved in the 
NASA procurement process and personalities within the NASA organization itself. Joseph J. 
Trento's Prescription for Disaster: From the Glory Days of Apollo to the Betrayal of the 
Shuttle.^ 987 (New York: Crown Publishers) is particularly useful for its interviews of agency 
executives and analysis of political intrigue in various White Houses and other governmental 
agencies since NASA’s  inception. Trento shows the seamier side of leadership at NASA and 
recounts personal animus between rivals at the highest levels of organizations involved in th^ 
space pj^ram . Richard S. Lewis’s Challenger. The Rnal Voyage, 1988 (New York: Columbia 
University Press) gives the reader an excellent technical account as to why the Challenger 
accident occurred from a  more traditional perspective, largely reinforcing the Presidential 
Commission's findings. Diane Vaughan’s  The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, 
Culture, and Deviance at NASA, 1996 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) is a  provocative and 
thoughtful theoretical and revisionist historical analysis of the decision to launch the Challenger. 
Vaughan questions the findings of the Presidential Commission and uses extensive interviews of 
the principes involved to draw her conclusions. All four of these works along with the Report of 
the Presidential Commission must be consulted by anyone seriously interested in pursuing 
scholarly research about the Cba//enger launch decision.
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an impact on the overall historical analysis and indicating something of the 
analyst himself. Furthermore, the organizational participants portrayed are 
complex human beings and there is always a  danger that their actions may be 
oversimplified or taken out of context from their original historical meaning. 
There are numerous historical accounts and theoretical interpretations about 
this incident available to scholars, some of which will be recounted in this 
research project
Several important themes recur throughout NASA’s relatively brief 
history. Firstly, NASA as  a  government organization is subject to budget 
fluctuations and, as a  result, finds itself competing with other federal 
government entities for scarce resources, particularly the Department of 
Defense. As we will see, costs were important especially in the initial critical 
stages of the shuttle’s  development Research scientists also questioned 
whether spending money on expensive projects like the space transportation 
station is an appropriate use of limited NASA funds.34 The highly charged 
procurement process will be examined and is an important aspect of the 
budgetary process. Secondly, from 1958 through 1986 the United S tates 
government was in the midst of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. The space
34 See James A. Van Allen’s  criticism of manned space flight ‘Space Science, Space Technology 
and the Space Station,’ Sd&itific American, January 1986, ‘...to the ordinary person space flight 
is synonymous with the flight of human things. The simple taste for adventure and fantasy 
expressed in that sentiments has tteen elevated in some quarters to ttre quasi-religious belief that 
space is a  natural habitat of human beings....The directions embodied in NASA's budgetary policy 
ignore the basic history of space flight in the more than 28 years since ttie launching of Sputnik I 
the overwhelming majority of scientific and utilitarian achievements in space have come from 
unmanned, automated and commandatWe space craft" (32). While Allen's criticism of manned 
space flight was not voiced until just prior to the Ctiallenger launch in 1986, this attitude of 
astronomers such as Allen was indicative of some of the opposition throughout tfie history of the 
space program. McConnell (1987, 15) also observed that academic scientists had criticized 
NASA's meager effort to study Hailey's comet Shortly after the Challenger acatient, scientists 
Ruth A. and John S. Lewis in ‘Getting Back on Track in Space," Technology Review, 
August/Septemljer 1986, pp. 30 - 40, point out that ‘NASA's history of pursuing costly dead-end 
programs [like the space shuttle] to ensure its own survival has undermined any attempts to 
develop long-term goals in space (30).
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program was part and parcel of the space race between the two superpowers.
The competition gave impetus to NASA’s  creation and growth as the United
States was engaged in a  contest for international supremacy with the Soviet
Union after the launching of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 (Vaughan 17). The
original NASA culture “did not rise from the sands of time wfien the space race
began in 1957. It was formed out of a  set of loosely supervised government
laboratories and development centres already engaged in aeronautical
research and rocketry” [the old National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics
(NACA)] (McCurdy 1989, 304). The space race led to an initially strong interest
in matters pertaining to space and national defense, but the U.S. government
policy towards NASA fluctuated throughout the Cold War years, even during the
peak years of interest in space flight and NASA:
Although administration concern about how th e  space  agency's 
accomplishments affected the national interest w as continuous, 
historically its willingness to fund tfie agency waxed and waned in rtiythm 
to national and international events and political swings...Apollo received 
abundant resources.. .NASA created an innovative system and rapidly 
progressed toward accomplishing a  mission right out of science fiction: 
in 1969, astronauts planted an American flag on the bleak terrain of the 
moon....ln the mid 1960s, however, international and domestic factors 
caused uncertainty about the future direction of tfie space program and a 
consequent decline in congressional appropriations for NASA....NASA. 
which had for so  long enjoyed budgetary certainty grounded in 
consensus about its mission, suddenly experienced tfie uncertainty of 
other agencies (Vaughan 18).
Thirdly, domestic political factors, such as  the development of President 
Johnson’s  Great Society programs and the Vietnam War, played a  significant 
role in the development of NASA and the subsequent production of the space 
transportation system. NASA complicated its own budgetary situation by 
advocating the development of a space station, although the development of 
the station was also used as a  justification for the expenditure of funds for the
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space shuttle system.3s Fourthly, and finally, the sheer complicated nature of 
the technology used in space flight and the space shuttle in particular caused 
constant réévaluation and design of complex components for purposes of 
economy, efficiency and safety concerns. NASA administrators would advocate 
advanced systems from "off-the-shelf and state-of-the art technology” (Lewis 
1988, 356), sell them to the public, Congress, White House or other government 
agencies and later have to return to the budgetary well for further funding 
consideration. Heimann (1993, 429) points out that levels of experience were 
seriously jeopardized due to a  lack of funding a s  manpower was cut at the three 
major centers for manned space flight dunng the period of 1970 to 1985 
(Johnson, Kennedy, and Marshall) "by 38, 54, and 84%, respectively.” There is 
also the question which will be explored both in this chapter and in subsequent 
chapters concerning organization theory a s  to whether idealisnnP^  gets in the 
way of reality a s  to when the shuttle flies (i.e., is it an experimental aircraft or 
fully operational?), a s  to how many flights will take place and as  to who will fly in 
the shuttle. All four of these themes will be examined in a  chronological order 
as an historical analysis of NASA and the decision to launch the Challenger.
35 A good, brief chronological synopsis of the shuttle program up to the disaster Is provided by 
Blot Marshall in T he Shuttle Record: Risks, Achievements’ Science, 14 February 1986, pp. 664 
- 666. According to Marshall ’On 20 July 1969, American astronauts walked on the moon, taking 
the Apollo program through its final paces. The logical next step, NASA said, was to build a  space 
station, and its support vehiCle-the shuttle-would come firsT (664).
36 Idealism here can mean several different things: (1) It could mean someone having an overly 
optimistic, unrealistic or utopian view of technological capabilities; (2) It could mean having a 
narcissistic view of one's self in the context of one’s  organization; or (3) idealism can mean 
someone or some organization having unrealistic expectations or goals of monetary or power 
rewards beyond what one would normally earn. All of these variations of idealism will be explored 
further in the following chapters of this research project
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Early Shuttle Development: The 1970s, the S eed s for Disaster Are
Sown
We have seen in the previous section that from the end of the 1950s 
through the 1960s NASA had little trouble getting adequate funding for 
spaceflight initiatives such a s  the Apollo program which had successfully 
placed men on the moon. Satellite technology and transportation also made 
significant headway. NASA was interested in obtaining a  space transportation 
system to achieve a  permanent presence in space. By 1970, “early plans called 
for a  complex double shuttle with a  plane-like orbiter on top and a  piloted, 
reusable launch vehicle beneath” (Marshall 664). Max Faget37 of the NASA 
Manned Spacecraft Center argued for his design of the new space shuttle 
system;
The wing on this vehicle supports subsonic cruise flight and landing 
maneuvers. Because entry takes place at a  sufficiently high angle of 
attack to discount concern over high leading-edge temperatures, the 
wing planform can be selected solely on the basis of optimization for 
subsonic cruise and landing. The straight wing with a  reasonable aspect 
ratio is clearly the lightest way to produce the requisite lift a t conventional 
landing velocities, and it is also the ideal wing for subsonic cruise flight. 
E nt^  at high angle of attack also nullifies any desire to fold the wings: 
Weight estimates indicate that the lower surface can be given heat 
protection for about 10% of the weight required to fold the wing into the 
fuselage" (Faget 1970, 57).
Faget's design was favored by NASA but was by no means the only design 
available to all interested parties in the area of space flight. Marshall (664) 
notes that “In 1971, the White House gave NASA the bad news that its budget 
would not grow much. NASA decided the new space vehicle would fly better in 
Congress if it had military support.” NASA would have to make compromises to
37 Faget was one of the original 35 members of the NASA Space Task Group, served on the 
Project Mercury steering committee and was instrumental in the conception of the Mercury 
spacecraft.
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its original straight-wing design. The Air Force had developed its own design
with features different from those of NASA's version .*  “After long negotiations,
NASA agreed to Air Force specifications for a  huge payload bay 15 by 60 feet,
60,000 pounds of lift capacity, and the ability to land on eitfier the West or East
Coast” (Marshall 664). Debate over which version of the shuttle should be put
in production was carried out in the early 1970s, partly in the pages of
Astronautics & Aeronautics, a s  to how the space shuttte should look. As noted
above, NASA (through Faget) advocated a fixed-wing or “straight” version
whereas the Air Force, through its Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory
(AFFDL), promoted a  "delta wing” version:
A delta lifting body has the flexibility to provide either high cross range for 
the Air Force or low cross range at higher payload for NASA by changing 
its method of reentry. We view flexibility as a  necessary feature of a  new 
Space Transportation System (STS) to assure maximum utility to future 
users-flexibility not only a s  a  payload carrier but also in maneuverability 
and performance. Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory (AFFDL) studies 
of how to best obtain this flexibility have shown an evolution to delta 
lifting bodies.. .Experimental studies have shown that peak temperatures 
and temperature gradients are less for the delta than a  straight-wing 
configuration. And by following a  re-entry mode different from the 
conventional, the delta would experience a  lower heat load and still 
achieve high cross range.
The over-all new space-transportation system must have the potential 
for major economic and operational benefits to future national space 
programs. Payload delivery to low Earth orbits currently costs on the 
order of $500 - 1000/lb; for synchronous equatorial orbits, $5000 - 
10,000/lb. Payloads, a t $3000 - 7000/lb, add significantly to costs.
38 See also Vaughan (1996,19). Factors for decline of the Space Transportation System include; 
(1) NASA had to combine resources with the Air Force to procure erxxjgh funding for the Space 
Transportation System program. This led to design compromise to meet military requirements 
(sending military payloads into space); (2) Budgetary constraints. Air Force refused to pay for a 
high-performance shuttle . in 1971 NASA called in a  think tank, Mathematica. Inc., to come up 
with a  cost-effective rationale which resulted in "a launch rate of more than 30 flights per year." 
which would allow for the shuttle program to pay for itself [which NASA never met] (Vaughan 19- 
20); (3) "Power struggles between NASA, 0MB, Congress, and the administration directly 
affected [initial] shuttle design. Compromise was necessary to get the program going" (Vaughan 
20). This led to: (a) low development costs; (b) a  smaller Orbiter and SRBs which had to be 
reusable; (c) design decisions which led to safety compromise and loss of escape rockets on the 
Orbiter (Vaughan 20-22).
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Consequently, some sort of reusable launch system  which would 
substantially decrease these costs becomes quite attractive ..[l]f we truly 
want to maximize the applicability of the lessons learned from STS arxJ 
advance the frontier of technology to assure a  national technical 
capability for other future systems, then concepts with reasonable levels 
of aerodynamic performance are required.
Over 10 years of investigating recoverable and reusable launch 
systems has brought forward many candidates, each judged best when 
measured against a  different criterion. If, however, we are to reach 
defensible decisions, we must establish a  single set of criteria for making 
rational comparisons with qualitative judgments. Nevertheless, any 
concept selected should most likely be assessed  relative to (1) 
economics, (2) flexibility, (3) growth potential, (4) design sensitivity, and 
(5) technical confidence (28). (Draper, Buck, and Goesch 1971, 26 • 28; 
italics added for emphasis).
The Air Force was able to ensure that Its design prevailed. The Air Force was
also aided by NASA’s  need to have a  senior partner to continue its survival In
the long-term future. The increase In payload for the new shuttle necessarily
created a  need for larger rockets in order to propel the ortxter into space
Once the basic shuttle concept was negotiated between NASA and the
Air Force, the next step in the developmental process consisted of requesting
bids from private contractors in order to actually produce the shuttle. McConnell
(1987) depicts the seamier side of the awarding of government contracts In
Challenger: A Major Malfunction as to how administrators and elected officials
went through the bidding process in an unethical, if not illegal, fashion. In
McConnell’s chapter entitled "July 1971 to 1973: The Politics of Procurement,"
political intrigue and greed by North American Rockwell dominated the early
phases of shuttle development:
The process of awarding the prime contracts for the space shuttle’s  
principal elements~the main engines, the orbiter, the solid rocket 
boosters, and the external tank-occurred during that period of political 
turmoil we remember as the Watergate years ...The President [Nixon] saw 
the shuttle, like the Apollo moon landings, as a  clear demonstration to the 
world of America’s technological superiority over the Soviet
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Union ...While the White House and the 0MB debated NASA’s  plans for a 
space shuttle, aerospace contractors lobbied for approval of the project. 
NASA actively encouraged the contractors in these efforts, which often 
took the form of feasibility and economic impact studies. And one 
company. North American Rockwell (later to becom e Rockwell 
International), was especially active. Rockwell had been the prime 
contractor for the Apollo project and needed a  big shuttle contract to 
guarantee the survival of its civilian aerospace operations....One of the 
first priorities was securing a  position of influence within the NASA 
bureaucracy where the contract decisions would be made. In 1970, 
when it became dear NASA was pressing ahead with the shuttle project, 
Rockwell intensified its lobbying efforts a t the White House. That year the 
company managed to place Dale D. Myers, the Vice President and 
Manager for the com pari/s Space Shuttle Program, a s  NASA Assodate 
Administrator for Manned Space Flight Next to the Administrator, Jam es 
Fletcher, Mr. Myers would have the most power in awarding contracts 
(McConnell 1987: 44-6).
President Richard Nixon offidally endorsed the big shuttle on January 5, 1972,
although the launch system was still undefined (Marshall 1986, 664). Events
leading up to the realization of the shuttle proceeded quickly, though technical
issues pertaining to how the shuttle propulsion system should look remained to
be resolved. Two of the primary issues induded questions a s  to whether there
was to be a piloted launcher and whether there was to be a  solid or liquid
fueled rocket system:
In March 1972, the technical debate on the propulsion system ended. 
The piloted launcher was dropped; it would have been difficult to certify 
two vehicles. In a  compromise, it was agreed that the propulsion would 
be part solid and part liquid, part recoverable and part throwaway. (The 
liquid hydrogen-oxygen system tfiat has proved so troublesome and 
hazardous was included because it permitted greater specific impulse at 
lift-off and greater pilot control. Liquid motors can be throttled down; solid 
ones cannot) (Marshall 1986, 664).
The president's endorsement was followed by the announcement on March 15,
1972, by NASA that it would build the modified or partially reusable version of
the shuttle with the price tag marked down to $5.15 billion. The first manned
orbital flight was initially scheduled for March 1978. Then, following six flight
46
tests, the vehicle would become operational in March 1979. As many a s  sixty
flights a  year were contemplated (Lewis 1980, 358). Prior to the awarding of
government contracts, NASA, in essence, was influenced by Associate
Administrator Dale Myers.39 According to McConnell, Myers had interests at
odds with those of NASA and subsequently went back to Rockwell International
shortly after the awarding of major contracts to Rockwell. Safety apparently was
compromised and the best space shuttle and orbiter designs were not selected
for ostensibly political and economic reasons:
...In July 1971 new NASA Administrator Fletcher announced that he had 
made his choice. The Rocketdyne Division of North American Rockwell 
would develop the space shuttle's main engines, under a  program to be 
administered by the Marshall Space Flight Center . Pratt and Whitney 
[Rockwell's competitor] did not take the announcement passively...[Pratt 
and Whitney appealed to the Source Evaluation Board and the GAO, but 
the Board did not have the final say in the matter. Jam es Fletcher made 
the decision to go with Rockwell ] When the appeals were exhausted, 
Rocketdyne was home free with a  contract worth a  minimum of $450 
million (McConnell 47 -46).
On July 26, 1972, Jam es Fletcher announced his choice [for the 
space shuttle orbiter] [other competitors included Grumman Aerospace, 
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company and McDonnell-Douglas 
Corporation’s Astronautics Company]: Rockwell. The contract was worth 
a  total of $2.6 billion over six years....Although the McDonnell-Douglas 
Astronautics orbiter proposal did not score high in the engineering 
competition, it must be noted that this design incorporated a  practical 
abort capability that would have protected the shuttle crew during all
39 Trento (1967,238*9) adds the prophetic actions and insight of Rocco Petrone, wtio in the early 
1970s was in charge of manned ^aceflight for NASA: "During 1975, as Petrone spent long 
nights at Federal Office Building Six studying shuttle design plans and looking at the projected 
launch rates and costs, he understood where the trade-offs to make it all work would come from. 
His rule-the rule tfiat von Braun and Gilruth passed on to him-wasttiat when you build machines 
for man to fly, you put your own life aboard that spacecraft As he looked at the shuttle des^n, 
Petrone understood that this was a  vehicle dictated by political and economic considerations. 
Yes, Low and Fletcher and Myers were right when they called it the most sophisticated spaceship 
man has ever built They were right wfien ifiey said it was tfie most complicated machine ever 
built But they never said that it was also the most dangerous to fly of any manned rocket ever 
built....Petrone argued that Low and Fletcher were wrong when they said no escape system 
existed on airplanes and therefore the shuttle did not need one. Because of the success in 
NASA's track record. Petrone argued that Americans would have great difficulty accepting the 
loss of astronauts....Petrone brought in outside experts to look at the shuttle system. Their 
findings confirmed his views for the record. Then he left NASA."
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phases of the  mission, including initial ascent..../ncred/h/y, the 
McDonnell-Douglas proposal actually anticipated the cause of the 
Challenger accident Their abort system provided for a  bum through 
wire' that would have sensed ‘0-ring leakage,' then triggered booster 
thrust termination and the orbiter's abort rocket escape system. 
However, this system added several thousand pounds of weight to the 
orbiter in the thrust neutralizes the abort rocket, and airframe 
reinforcement so that the orbiter could withstand the stresses of the abort 
sequence. And NASA in the early 1970s was not about to trade weight 
for insured safety (McConnell 49-50, italics added for emphasis).4o
Rockwell International had won the shuttle design contract. The design was 
ready in May 1973 and construction began in June 1974. The Enterprise, an 
unpowered flight test vehicle, rolled out in September 1976 (Marshall 1986,
664). Payload had been of paramount importance when the final shuttle model 
was selected. Cost considerations, while crucial to obtaining initial government 
approval, were primary in importance to spacecraft safety.4i in 1980, well
before the Challenger aoaderX, critics of the space shuttle transportation system 
were uncovering pitfalls in the procurement process. Lewis (1980, 358) 
compared the shuttle development program with government procurement of 
airplanes and discovered that the whole process was an act of deception:
40 Richard S. Lewis (1968,235) also notes that ‘ In 1971, Rockwell International had considered 
three launch escape modes: ejection seats, encapsulated Section seats and a separable crew 
compartment Compared to a  $10 million ejection seat weighing 1,760 pounds, the separable 
crew module would weigh 7 to 81/2 tons and cost $292 million (in 1971 dollars), ttie commission 
reported. The commission said that conventional ejection seats do not appear to be a  viable 
option because they limit crew size and thus restrict shuttle missions. Other options examined 
were the separable crew compartment or escape module that would be detached from the orbiter 
and descend by parachute; rocket-assisted extraction from the crew compartment using small 
rockets to boost occupant and parachute out and away from the orbiter; and a bail-out system 
enabling crew persons to make an unassisted exit through a  hatch during gliding flight and 
descend by parachute."
41 This was despite the fact tfiat safety was being emphasized in NASA documents insofar as  the 
initial design was concerned. In a  report entitled Technical Status of the Space Flight Shuttle Main 
Engine: A Report of the Space Shuttte Engine Development Program, March 1978 (produced by 
the Assembly of Engineering National Research Council and National Academy of Sciences), it 
states ‘Safety must always take precedence over scheduling concerns. Because no flight test of 
the space shuttle main engine is planned prior to the first manned ortxtal flight, confidence in the 
safety and reliatxiity of the engine in manned flight must be based upon: Safety and reliability 
designed into the engine..." (19).
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Hindsight reveals that NASA and its contractors miscalculated the 
development cost and order of difficulty. They portrayed the shuttle’s 
development as a  straight-forward process. It was well within the state of 
the art, relying on off-the-shelf components. So ran the illusion. These 
assumptions, which Congress accepted, rationalised the adoption of a 
development strategy that was supposed to control costs by minimising 
testing and redurKfancy in parts. It was a  strategy a  manufacturer might 
use in building a  new aeroplane. Indeed, that is how the public 
perceived the shutUe-as a  new type of aircraft modified to fly above the 
atmosphere. That perception tended to conceal its exotic features-such 
as the engines and the heat-shield-and to gloss over the difficulty in 
creating them.
As it turned out, the space shuttle main engines and the heat shield 
were beyond the state of the art. They required a  detailed development 
process which the bare-bones’ funding did not cover. As a result, the 
shuttle was under-financed from the start-the success-oriented strategy 
adopted for its development failed. This strategy assumed that difficulties 
would be minimal, but instead the shuttle’s development has 
experienced the most conspicuous sequence of breakdowns, delays and 
failures since the Vanguard rocket programme in 1957 (Lewis 1980, 
358).
Not all interpretations of NASA and the development of the space shuttle 
transportation system (STS) were negatively centered on the procurement 
process. Former NASA Associate Administrator Or. George E. Mueller42 
(1972, 20) was highly optimistic about the future of manned space flight and 
believed the STS was “designed for routine service” and that its development 
would allow for “a  workhorse means of leaving the Earth, performing useful 
tasks routinely in space, and returning to an airliner-type landing, all in an 
economical and safe manner, costs and physical stresses of space flight [will 
be] greatly reduced~[we] will travel beyond our planet [and] open up [space
42 See "Space Shuttle: Beginning a New Era in Space Cooperation’ Astmnautics & Aeronautics, 
Septemt)er 1972 (20 • 25) by George E  Mueller. According to the brief biography accompanying 
the article. "Mueller heads S^tem  Development Corporation as president and chairman of its 
Board. He is a  member of the AIAA International Cooperation in Space Committee and a vice- 
president of the International Astronautical Federation. Dr. Mueller directed the U.S. manned- 
spaceflight program from November 1963. at the beginning of Gemini flight operations, to the first 
manned lunar landing. He resigned as NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight to 
join General Dynamics as  vice-president of the corporation for system programs and 
developments."
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travel] to many men and women, of all nations.” Mueller's Ideas about the future 
of the space shuttle seemed boundless. His notions of what the space shuttle 
ought to become are critical in understanding the attitude of NASA decision 
makers to have the shuttle becom e fully operaO'onal a s  opposed to being 
merely experimental, or in the research and development stage. Mueller (1972. 
20) articulated and anticipated by ten years NASA’s desire for routine 
operational service a s  he noted that “In truth, the coming space-shuttle era will 
present not only opportunities but also necessities for international cooperation 
on an increasingly broad basis. Looking ahead, we can expect that this era will 
evolve phases of successive cooperative developments, wide-ranging 
passenger services, and then mature operations-large-scale space works and 
expeditions." Mueller's phases for the development for shuttle utilization are as 
follows:
-1 . initial cooperative phase: one nation takes responsibility for 
developing and operating a  shuttle system (thus opening opportunities 
for other nations).
-2 . passenger phase: fostering world cooperation and human 
understanding.... International crews for the shuttle can help advance the 
growing perception of the Earth a s  tfie single habitat of mankind rattier 
than an arena of confrontation between a  haphazard aggregation of 
national interests.
- 3 .  mature operations phase: large scale  space works and
expeditions. ...Truly effective space shutties . must be fully tested and 
proven like airliners before entering service, and should not require 
much more extensive support and checkout facilities than exist at today's 
airports” (Mueller 1972:21 - 4).43
One of the questions researchers fiave contemplated was whether there was a
43 Mueller, apparently concerned with presenting the shuttle as an operational vehicle and with 
labor costs stated, "A key challenge which must be met if we are to realize the potential of the 
space shuttle will be denning the vehicle with control and checkout systems on tnard so that 
the shuttle will not need the support of the thousands of technicians presently required for 
manned space launches, but more like the dozen or so required to turn around a 747 
jetliner{^972,24, his italics).
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rush to operationalize the status of the Space Transportation System tjefore the 
program was ready.
Part of the shuttle selection process involved the issue a s  to wfio would
get the subcontract for the development of the solid rocket boosters (SRB). This
issue has been retrospectively scrutinized by McConnell (1987, 54-5) a s
Administrator Jam es Fletcher, a  Mormon, was alleged to have been leader of
the “Mormon Mafia," bringing “home” to Utah and Morton Thiokol the SRB
contract along with Utah congressional support McConnell described Thiokol
as a  “medium-sized contractor with experience in munitions" and “the Minute
Man and Trident missiles' solid rocket motors. But they were by no means the
industry leaders in producing large, sectional solid boosters” necessary for a
space shuttle (1987, 52). McConnell remarked that the Thiokol design was
rated lower by the NASA Source Evaluation Board in comparison to Lockheed
(1987, 53-4). In the Report of frie Presidential Commission on the Space
Shuttle Challenger Accident (1987, 120), one of the issues was that Thiokol's
design was rated fourth and its management first The Issues of economy and
efficiency were also examined:
Thiokol was selected to receive the NASA contract to design and build 
the Solid Rocket Boosters on November 20, 1973. The booster was the 
largest Solid Rocket Motor ever produced in the United States; it was 
also the first solid motor program managed by NASA’s  Marshall Space 
Flight Center in Huntsville. Alabama.
Costs were the prim ary concern of NASA’s selection board, 
particularly those incurred early in program. In a  December 12, 1973, 
report, NASA selection officials said Thiokol’s  ‘cost advantages were 
substantial and consistent throughout all areas evaluated.' They also 
singled out Thiokol’s  joint design for special mention. ‘Cost 
consid^ation overrode any other objections, they decided’....Ih e  cost- 
plus-award-fee contract, estimated to be worth $800 million, was 
awarded to Thiokol...The design of the Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster was 
primarily based on the Air Force's Titan III solid rocket, one of the most 
reliable ever produced. Thiokol hoped to reduce new design problems, 
speed up the development program and cut costs by borrowing from the
51
Titan design . .Despite their many similarities, the Thiokol solid Rocket 
Booster and the Titan motors had some significant design differences. 
For example, the joints of the Titan were designed so that the Insulation 
of one case fits tightly against the insulation of the adjacent case to form 
a  more gas-tight fit than the Thiokol design. One O-ring bore seal was 
used in each Titan joint to stop any hot gas pressure that might pass by 
the insulation overlap, but in the Titan design the O-ring was able txjt not 
intended ta take the brunt of the combustion pressure. In contrast, the 
Thiokol O-rings were designed to take the brunt o f the combustion 
pressure, with no other gas barriers present except an insulating putty. 
Also, the Solid Rocket Motor joint had two O-rings, the second to provide 
a  backup in case the primary seal failed” (Report 1:120 - 21, italics added 
for emphasis).
Other critical differences between the Titan and Thiokol O-ring designs are as 
follows;
1. Thiokol used asbestos putty to compress the air between the putty and 
primary O-ring, which would then cause the primary O-ring to extrude 
into the gap between the clevis and tang in order to seal the opening. If 
the primary O-ring did not seal, the intent was that the secondary would 
pressurize and seal the joint be extruding into the gap behind its groove.
2. ...The tang portion of the Thiokol joint was longer in order to 
accommodate two O-rings instead of one [making it] more susceptible to 
bending under combustion pressure tfian the Trtan joint. ..
3. ...The Thiokol design [has] a  vent, or port, on the side of the motor case
used after assembly to check the sealing of the O-rings this leak cfieck
eventually becam e a  significant aspect of the O-ring erosion 
phenomenon.
4. The manufacture of the O-rings themselves constituted another 
difference between the Titan and the Thiokol Solid Rocket Motor. While 
both O-rings were Viton rubber, the Titan O-rings were molded in one 
piece. The Solid Rocket Motor O-rings were made from sections of 
rubber O-ring material glued together
5. Finally, unlike the Titan, the Thiokol Solid Rocket Motor was designed 
for multiple firings. To reduce program costs, each Thiokoi motor case 
for the Shuttle was to be recovered after flight and reused up to 20 times 
{Report!: 121-22, italics added for emphasis).
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Figure 3.1: A Comparison of SRB Joint Pesions (Source: Report 1:12n
The Solid Rocket Motor design function was described by Leonard H. 
Caveny, Kenneth K. Kuo and Benjamin Shackelforcpw in an article they 
published In the Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets entitled Thrust and Ignition 
Transients of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor” (November/December 
1980). The Solid Rocket Motor was described by Caveny et al. a s  “segmented 
motors consist[ing] of a  series of sections which when joined together form 
circumferential slots” and
Flame spreading is governed by couplings between the main 
chamber flowfield, convective heating rates and the propellant 
temperature distrubution....Flame spreading down the port Is Implicitly an 
output of the model. i.e.:
1 ) The hot gases from the igniter, as they flow down the port, heat the 
propellant.
2) The rate at which the propellant is heated rapidly decreases In the 
direction of flow because Igniter gases give up their heat as they flow 
toward the nozzle.
3) After the head end of the motor ignites, the flow rate of hot 
combustion gases along the port begins to accelerate and thereby
^  Caveny was described in the article as being a  Senior Professional Stafff Member from 
Princeton University; Kuo, an Associate Professor from Pennsylvania State University; and, 
Shackelford was an Aerospace Engineer in the Propulsion Division, NASA Marshall Space Flight 
Center.
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accelerates the heating of the preheated (but unignited) propellant
4) As the flow rate increases, the acceleration of the combustion 
gases becomes one of the limiting factors and flame spreading rate 
becomes largely a  cfiaractenstic of tfie motor and not the igniter.
5) As the hot combustion gases are driven down the port, the 
propellant is progressively heated to its ignition point, which is to say that 
flame spreading is described by successive ignitions (Caveny, Kuo and 
Shackelford 1980, 490; see Figure 3.2 below).
The technology involved in the firing of the SRM included a  complex series of 
controlled flaming and hot gases. The system itself was inherently dangerous 
and was subject to various vagaries which becam e apparent after the design 
was actually put into effect
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Figure 3.2: Solid Rocket Motor Heating-to-lqnition (Source: Caveny, Kuo and
Shackelford, 1980, 490)
The differences between the designs were shown clearly after the 
Challenger accident in 1986. However, the groundwork for the fiasco was laid 
well in advance of January 1986. The seeds for tfie shuttle's destruction were 
sown, as we have seen, in the 1970s. The Report's findings and McConnell’s
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reporting of the procurement process Illustrate what can happen when
economic and political considerations take effect in forming an expensive and
complex machine. Also, a s  shown by an examination of the SRB deliberation
process, safety considerations can be relegated to secondary importance. The
ideal of a  safer space shuttle can be compromised when the reality of human
action takes effect
Prior to the Challenger accident NASA had an excellent reputation for
safety relative to the risky technology involved. As early as “1974 the Program
Office established a  formal Space Shuttle Crew Safety panel as  a  mechanism
for analyzing all activities of the Shuttle program to identify conditions which
may be hazardous to onboard personnel and orbiter systems....N.A,S.A.'s
overall safety plan for the Space Shuttle has been continuously to identify
potential hazards early in development programs and to ensure that each
hazard is eitfier eliminated or reduced to acceptable safety levels” (Brown 1977,
17). Nelson E. Brown (1 9 7 7 ),45 a  mechanical engineer for McDonnell-Douglas,
wrote in an essay for Technology Review, that “Certain serious failures during
launch would almost certainly eitfier seriously damage or destroy the Shuttle
system. These include;
-External tank rupture or explosion,
-Solid rocket booster burning through its casing,
-Mafor structural failure,
-Complete loss of guidance or control,
-Failure to ignite one solid rocket booster,
-Loss of thrust from one solid rocket booster,
-Shuttle main engine or thrust vector control locked in an abnormal 
attitude,
-Engine nozzle failure,
-Failure of external tank to separate from Orbiter,
-Premature separation of either or both solid rocket boosters.
45 Brown had directed research and applications programs relative to manned extravehicular 
activities, crew flight safety and human factors design in spacecraft systems.
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The possibility of such serious failures is, of course, being minimized by 
Incorporating appropriate safety margins and redundancy^ in the design 
of Orbiter systems, functions, and operations critical to crew safety. 
Extensive tests urider all feasible failure conditions are also being 
conducted on the critical systems ..^ s  with commercial aircraft flights, 
there will be critical times during any Shuttle fliglrts in which very little 
escape or rescue capability exists regardless of the safety provisions 
incorporated. No space program can be risk-free. To eliminate or control 
all hazards identified in the shuttle Program is a  major program in itself.
A certain level of risk must be accepted to achieve the Space Shuttle 
objectives; N.A.S.A. accepts these minimum risks in return for the 
potential beneTitsf (Brown 1977, 20-21, italics added for emphasis).
Risk was an accepted norm of NASA in all calculations involving the Space 
Transportation System. Balancing risky space flight, using huge and 
dangerous rockets, and trying to maintain safety standards for astronauts over 
an extended period of years are key to understanding how basic attitudes can 
change over time. Even so, there is the promise of safety for the astronauts 
whose lives are placed in jeopardy each time the shuttle lifts off from Kennedy 
Space Center. There is a  problem concerning safety margins when a  basic 
design for a  critical component, in this case the Solid Rocket Booster design. Is 
flawed from the beginning.47
46 We saw an example of ‘redundancy” above in Figure 3.1 with the intention of using a double 
bore seal in order to insure that hot gasses would not pass through the joints of the Solid Rocket 
Boosters.
47 Hans Mark, former NASA deputy administrator, commented in his memoirs entitled The Space 
Station: A Personai Journey, 1987, that There were some engineers knowledgeable in the area 
of seals and joints who, as early as 1977...raised some questions regarding the design of the o- 
rings....At the time a  judgment was made that these objections were not serious enough to 
warrant changes.... What is dear is that the seed for the ultimate tragedy nine years later had been 
sown” (218-9).
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Figure 3.3: The Space Shuttle System (Source: Report IV. 73^
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Figure 3.4: The Solid Rocket Booster Assembly (Source: Report IV: 110)
The end of the 1970s and the early 1980s: Knowing About a 
Problem and Doing Little About It?
We have seen in the previous section that the initial design and 
development of the SRBs, particularly in the area of the casing joints and O-ring 
seals, were poorly executed. It should be remembered, however, tfiat the SRBs 
were just one complex system on one of tfie most complicated technological 
structures ever built. The Space Transportation System, as  is to be normally 
expected, experienced many delays in actually getting the program underway. 
Critics such as Richard Lewis, writing in the journal New Sdentist (1980:356 - 
9), pointed out discrepancies between words and deeds regarding tfie shuttle 
project:
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The pattern of delays first appeared early in 1977 with turbopump 
failures in the shuttle’s  main engine system. It is a  new. high-pressure 
rocket engine, burning liquid hydrogen with liquid oxygen. Since 24 
March, 1977, there have been 17 engine test failures caused by faulty 
seals, bearing loads, turbine t)lades and fuel injection, and failures in the 
heat exchanger, main oxygen valve, main hydrogen valve, hydrogen line 
and other parts. It became apparent early in 1977 that the shuttle could 
not meet the initial launch schedule of 30 March. 1978.
Since then, the launch date has slipped to December 1978; to 28 
Septemt)er. 1979; to 30 November. 1979; to 30 March. 1980. to June- 
July 1980; to September-October 1980 and to November 1980-March 
1981. With each slip. NASA has been less specific in setting a  ‘not 
before’ launch date, but that has not repaired the widening credibility gap 
in its predictions about the shuttle ...NASA adapted by fostering a  public 
impression that from a  technological viewpoint, developing the shuttle 
was a  piece of cake’. It was all off-the-shelf state-of-the-art stuff. The 
fiction had the effect of giving the project a  profile about a s  low as that of 
an interstate highway, but with an even lower priority. In a  time of rising 
criticism about the costs and utility of manned space flight, an apparent 
lack of challenge seemed the safe way out (Lewis 1980. 356 - 359).
During this era of development problems involving the SRBs began to emerge.
The effects of the complexity of the entire project began to become apparent.
Differences between NASA and its contractor Morton Thiokol over the SRBs.
the joints and the O-rings especially, demonstrated that while engineers and
managers share a  particular interest in the same work, they do not necessarily
share the same meaning and intensity about a  potential problem:
Early tests conducted by Morton Thiokol (1977). particularly a  ‘hydroburst 
test’ showed that while the case strength requirements were met. the 
tang and inside clevis bent away from each other instead of toward each 
other and by doing so reduced-instead of increased-pressure on the O- 
ring in the milliseconds after ignition. This phenomenon was called “joint 
rotation.” ...Thiokol reported these initial test findings to the NASA 
program office a t Marshall. Thiokol engineers did not believe the test 
results really proved that “joint rotation” would cause  significant 
problems, and scheduled no additional tests for the specific purpose of 
confirming or disproving the joint gap behaviof (Report 1:122-3).
Thus began the differences in perception of reality where engineers at NASA
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recognized that a  potential safety problem (joint rotation) existed whereas the 
engineers at Thiokol perceived no significant discrepancy observing the same 
pfienomena.
Engineers from Marshall Space Center objected to the Thiokol design. 
Glen Eudy,48 Marshall's Chief Engineer of the Solid Rocket Motor 
Division, informed Alex McCool, Director of the Structures and 
Propulsion Laboratory, that the assembly of a  developmental motor 
provided early indications that the Thiokol design;
'Allowed O-ring clearance. . . . some people believe this design 
deficiency must be corrected by some method such as shimming and 
perhaps design modification to the case machined. . . .  I personally 
believe that our first choice should be to correct the design in a  way that 
eliminates the possibility of O-ring clearance. . . . Since this is a  very 
critical SRM issue, it is requested that the assignment results be 
compiled in such a  manner as to permit review at the S&E Director's 
level as  well as project manager.'
After seeing the data from the September 1977 hydroburst test, Marshall 
engineer Leon Ray submitted a  report entitled Solid Rocket Motor Joint 
Leakage S tu d / dated October 21, 1977. It characterizes no change' in 
the Thiokol design a s  unacceptable' -  tang can move outboard and 
cause excessive joint clearance resulting in seal leakage. Eccentric 
tang/clevis interface can cause  O-ring extrusion when case  is 
pressurized.' Ray recommended a  redesign of the tang and reduce 
tolerance on the clevis' a s  the best option for a  long-term fix '
Subsequently (1978 and 1979) Marshall engineer Leon Ray and John Q. 
Miller, chief of the Solid Rocket Motor branch at Marshall sent a series of 
memoranda to Eudy and G e o r^  Hardy, then Solid Rocket Booster 
project manager at Marshall, criticizing the joint design which could lead 
to a  failure of the O-rings not sealing and resulting in catastrophic failure.
[During the Commission hearing on May 2,1986, Ray was asked why the 
1978 and 1979 memoranda were written]:
Mr. Ray: The reason they were written was as a  result of test data that 
we had, and I have to go back to. I guess, a  little bit further back in time 
than these memos. When the joint was first designed, the analysis 
produced by Thiokol says the joint would close, the extrusion gap would 
actually close.
48 See the organization charts in Appendix A for clarification of the position of members in their 
respective organization for NASA, Morton-Thiokol and other relevant organizations.
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We had quite a  debate atx>ut that until we did a  test on the first 
couple of segments that we received from the manufacturer, which in fact 
showed that the joint did open. Later on we did some tests with the 
structural test article, and this is mentioned in the memo as STA-1 
[Structural Test Article].
At that time, we really nailed It down. We got some very 
accurate numbers on joint rotation, and we know for a  fact that during 
these tests that, just what the memo says, the joint rotated. The primary 
O-ring was extruded up into tfie joint The secondary O-ring did in fact 
detach from the se a t
No records show Thiokol was informed of the visits, and the O-ring 
design was not changed....Thiokol’s  phase 1 certification review on 
March 23, 1979, mentioned leak check failures, and forces during case 
joint assembly that resulted in devis O-ring grooves not conforming with 
tang sealing surfaces. However, this was not listed as a  problem or a 
failure (Report 1:123-4).
Clearly by the late 1970s there was an acknowledged recognition tfiat the O- 
rlngs and the SRB joint design were flawed and that the managers and 
engineers involved knew there was a  problem with them. The Commission 
report implicated managers at NASA with primary responsibility for knowing 
about the failure of tfie Solid Rocket Boosters.
Marshall (1986, 664) chronicles the evolution of the shuttle as being 
troublesome well beyond the param eters of the SRBs. Other Space 
Transportation System components were having unexpected problems. Also, 
“the years 1978 and 1979 were the season of engine fires" (664). Regarding 
the liquid rocket portion of the STS, Marshall noted that “no one had built 
throttled liquid rockets of this size before, and the problems of pressurizing, 
heating, and containing the explosive fuel were (and still are) formidable. 
Leaks, fires, and turtx>-pump failures occurred repeatedly-once during tests in 
September 1977, twice in December of 1978, and again in May, July, and 
November 1979. Tfie first successful, full-duration firing of all three engines 
occurred in December 1979” (Marshall 1986, 664). In Octot>er 1979, NASA
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Administrator Robert Frosch declared that the shuttle program was 
‘fundamentally technically healthy," though the aforementioned safety risks 
involving the shuttle systems were raising concerns by former astronauts and 
critics of NASA. In January 1980, Frosch told Congress that the first launch of 
the shuttle would have to t)e put off anottier year, until early 1981. The delays 
had become increasingly noticeable to shuttle government and media critics, as 
the original launch date had been March 1978. Work on the insulating tiles and 
the engines continued (Marshall 1986, 664).
The Report of the Presidential Commission (1986) noted that "In 1980, 
NASA empanelled a  Space Shuttle Verification/Certification committee to study 
the flight worthiness of tfie entire Shuttle system. A subdivision of that group, 
the Propulsion committee, met with NASA Solid Rocket Motor program 
personnel and raised several concerns atxiut the joint design” (124). The 
Committee made the determination "that tfie booster's leak test pressurized the 
primary O-ring in the wrong direction so tfiat tfie motor ignition would have to 
move the ring across its groove before it sealed” (124). The report from the 
Propulsion committee stated that "tfie Committee understands from a  telecon^s 
that the primary purpose of the second O-ring is to test the primary and that 
redundancy is not a  requirement" (124). George Hardy, who was then SRB 
Project coordinator, testified that the Committee's statement conflicted with his 
understanding:
The discussion there or the reference tfiere to a  telecon-and I don't know 
who that was with—that implies there was no intent for the joint to be 
redundant is foreign to me. I don't know wfiere they would have gotten 
tfiat information because tfiat was tfie design requirement for the joint 
{Report!: 124,Report V: 1629).
Another critical aspect in tfie interaction of the inner/tang clevis and the SRB
49 Note: “telecon" is bureaucratese for telephone conversation.
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field joints was whether the O-rings were capable of providing an adequate
seal, especially at temperatures between 40 and 90 degrees Fahrenheit. The
temperature range was established by NASA in order to ensure that all system
com ponents would be functioning properly (Report I: 124). The
Verification/Certification Committee w as empanelled by NASA, which had
concerns about the integrity of the rocket motors to investigate the flight
worthiness of the entire shuttle system. The committee was concerned about
the proper functioning of the O-rings in particular and asked NASA to:
Perform [a] case burst test with one O-ring removed. During the burst test 
for final verification of the motor case safety factor, one of the two O-rings 
failed by extrusion and leaked. The analysis used for additional 
verification did not include further gap openings caused by joint 
deflection at pressurization or any deflections caused by bending loads.
The panel considers the above to be inadequate to provide operational 
program reliability, and marginal to provide adequate safety factor 
confidence on [Shuttle flight] one.’ (Report I: 124-125).
The O-rings and SRB joints were considered by NASA to be in the category of 
"Criticality 1R,” defined by NASA as  being “redundant hardware, total element 
failure of which could cause loss of life or vehicle” (Report 1:125). Furthermore, 
the use of the letter “R” meant “that NASA believed the secondary O-ring would 
be pressurized and seal if the primary O-ring did not,” although the Critical Items 
List (OIL) of November 24,1980 stated that “Redundancy of the secondary field 
joint seal cannot be verified after motor case pressure reaches approximately 
40 percent of maximum expected operating pressure” (Report 1:125). Even with 
all these acknowledged problems and apparent contradictions associated with 
Thiokol's SRBs, the first shuttle Columbia had what was then generally 
considered a  successful liftoff as it orbited the earth for two days with astronauts 
John and Robert Crippen, though sixteen insulating tiles were lost during the 
flight (Marshall 1986, 664).
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The numerous instances of SRB failures in the initial design stage and
subsequent testing were not enough to prevent the first shuttle launch on April
12 -14, 1981. In shuttle space flights following the initial launch, more
problems began to emerge. The Columbia flew again as STS-2 on 12
November 1981. Official technical problems concerning the launch included a
nitrogen tetroxide spill, a  low reading on the oxygen tank, and over pressure in
the hydraulic system (Marshall 1986, 665). But more importantly in terms of the
Solid Rocket Boosters and its eventual failure on STS mission 51-L (the
Challenger accident launch in January 1986), the O-rings in the SRBs had
shown significant erosion:
The Achilles heel of the shuttle system showed up on STS-2, the second 
test flight of Columbia, during its launch, November 12, 1981. When the 
boosters were recovered, inspectors found that hot gas had penetrated 
the putty and damaged the primary O-ring in the aft field joint of the right 
booster....lt was one of the worst cases of seal damage in the shuttle 
program. The commission found that this anomaly was not reported in 
the Level 1 (headquarters) flight readiness review for Columbia’s  third 
test flight and was not reported to the Marshall Space Flight Center's 
problem assessm ent system. Following high-pressure O-ring tests In 
May 1982, shuttle management at Marshall concluded that Thiokol's dual 
O-rings did not provide a fully redundant system because the secondary 
O-ring would not always function after joint rotation following ignition. It 
paraphrased the conclusion reached five years earlier by the Marshall 
engineers who were critical of the Thiokol seal design (Lewis 1988, 74).
For official public consumption, in 1982  the Columbia made three successful 
flights arxj the crew carried out a  number of biological spaceflight tests. As with 
almost any relatively new complex technological system, there were problems 
with the auxiliary power unit; 36  insulating tiles were lost, and two recoverable 
booster rockets sank in the ocean, so in July 1982, a  new, lighter fuel tank 
designed to help increase payload lift was readied for use (Marshall 1986, 665).
so Lewis (1988) points out "the boosters on STS-4, launched June 27, 1982, were lost when 
their parachutes failed to open and they plunged into the Atlantic Ocean and sank” so that there 
was no subsequent analysis on the SRBs for that mission (76).
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The O-ring erosion problem did not disappear as a  cause for concern at 
the Marshall Space Flight Center. Lewis (1988, 74) noted that the problem had 
become so severe that Ih e  criticali^ 1-R designation was changed at Marshall 
on December 17,1982, and the O-ring seals of the field joints were reclassified 
a s  criticali^ 1.” Marshall solid rocket motor managers believed, with Morton- 
Thiokol engineer Howard McIntosh, that the secondary O-ring seal actually was 
redundant despite joint rotation in all tH Jt exœptional cases, even though this 
tjelief held life and death consequerK:es (Lewis 1988, 74).
And,
the SRB critical items list defined criticality 1 items a s  those subject to a  
single-point failure. Leakage of the primary O-ring was classified as a  
single-point failure due to possibility of loss of sealing at the secondary 
O-ring because of joint rotation after motor pressurization.’ The list 
summarized the effects of the failure a s  loss of mission, vehicle and crew 
due to metal erosion, burn through and probable case burst resulting in 
fire and deflagration. The shuttle criticality list covered 748 items for 
which there was no backup or redundancy. Only the primary structure 
and thermal protection system were exempted. The critical items list 
compiled by the National Space Transportation System and made public 
March 17, 1986 listed 335 items in the orbiter that were subject to a  
single-point failure. Most were simple items of hardware. On the solid 
rocket boosters there were 114 criticality 1 items, of which 59, including 
the O-ring primary seals, had been granted waivers. In substance, a  
waiver meant that a  crib'calify 1 item could be tolerated as a  flight risk. In 
any event, the shuttle was flown with hundreds of such items whether 
waivered or n o t L  Michael Weeks, NASA associate administrator, 
approved a  waiver on the criticality 1 joint, March 28, 1983. That settled 
the issue of whether the shuttle should continue flying in this condition.
He told the commission that he signed the waiver because ‘We felt at the 
time, all of the people in the program, I think, felt that this solid rocket 
motor in particular was prot)ably one of the least worrisome things we 
had in the program" (Lewis 1988. 74-5, italics added for emphasis).
As shown above, the upper management up to the associate administrator at 
NASA were cognizant of the problems concerning the SRB joint Hans Mark, 
former deputy administrator, recalled in his autobiography The Space Station: A
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Personal Journey0967) that
My own part in the chain of events that led to the accident began when I 
returned to NASA early in 1981. I first became aware of the fact that we 
had a  problem with the o-ring seals on the Solid Rocket Motor at the time 
when our engineering people w ere questioning whether these field 
joints’ on the SRM were really fail-safe. During the design of the space 
shuttle, an effort was made to make as  many of the subsystems as 
possible fail-safe.' The idea was to design them in such a way that a 
single point failure would not have catastrophic consequences. In the 
case of the field joints,’ this was accomplished by putting two o-rings in 
the joint on the theory that if the first one failed, then the second one 
would do the necessary job.
My memory Is that questions a s  to whether the <Jout)le o-ring system 
was really fail-safe began to be raised sometime in 1982.5  ^ In February 
or March 1983 Mr. L  Michael Weeks, the deputy associate administrator 
of NASA for space flight, signed out a  memorandum waiving the fail-safe 
requirements for the field joints in the Solid Rocket Motor. I remember 
discussing that matter with him a t the time and concluding that such a 
step was justified. I argued at the time that we had more than a hundred 
firings of the Titan Solid Rocket Motor with a  seal of somewhat similar 
design containing only one o-ring. I thought because of the Titan 
precedent that the precedent w as small. As things turned out, this 
judgment was not correct because there are significant differences 
between the Titan and the SRM joints. I did not look a t these differences 
with sufficient care a t the time (Mark 1987: 219, italics added for 
emphasis).
The O-ring damage caused by “blow-by” and burning of O-ring surfaces 
“increased each year after 1981, except in 1982 when Columbia was launched 
three times without evidence of seal damage....ln the six years of shuttle flight 
operations, evidence of O-ring erosion and blow-by of soot was found in 15 of 
the 25 shuttle launches, including Challenger (76). According to Lewis’ 
calculations “joint seal damage occurred in 63 percent of the shuttle launches”
51 This account is somewhat at odds with Vaughan’s (1996) version of events. Vaughan writes 
about the erosion analysis in the aftermath of STS - 2 (which flew in November 1981); This 
erosion was the most extensive prior to the fatal Challenger flight, but it was not discussed in 
FRRs [Flight Readiness Reviews] for the next launch, STS-3, nor was it reported in the Marshall 
Problem Assessment System (MPAS), a  computer system for tracking serious problems. After 
the Challenger tragedy, this reporting failure was interpreted as tfie first of many attempts t>y Level 
III Marshall managers to keep bad news about the joint from top NASA officials Indeed, the STS-2 
erosion was not discussed in FRR until erosion occurred again nearly three years later. However, 
it was working engineers, not managers, who were responsible for the failure to report” (122-3).
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prior to the 51-L mission (76) [See Figure 3.4 below for the Commission STS
breakdown below. Also note that the O-ring analysis covers the time period
from the initial launch up to Challengei]. Lewis writes that this knowledge was
not passed to those directly affected:
In 1981, seal damage showed up in one of two launches; in 1983, in one 
of three launches; in 1984. in three of five launches; in 1985, in eight of 
nine launches; and in 1986, in two of two launches. This progression 
plainly pointed to a  flaw in the solid rocket booster sealing system. But 
although Marshall and contractor engineers became concerned enough 
about it by summer 1985 to propose various fixes, no effective action was 
taken. NASA flight readiness reviews stx)w that it w as rationalized as 
tolerable because nothing terrible had happened.
An astonishing aspect of üiis situatKjn was that so far as the public 
was concerned, it was one of the best kept secrets of ttie space age. The 
documents describing it were not classified and did not need to be. They 
were buried in ttie files a t NASA headquarters in Washington and the 
Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama.
Along with die general public, the astronauts who were flying die 
shuttle were unaware of die escalating danger of joint seal failure. So 
were the congressional committees charged with overseeing the shuttle 
program.
NASA never tokS them diet the shuttle had a prMem  (Lewis 1988, 76).
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While technical difficulties were being experienced in the Space 
Transportation System program, the issue of NASA effectiveness was being 
promoted. In an article published in Astronautics and Aeronautics, February 
1983 (60 - 67, 72) t>y Paul E. Fitzgerald, Jr. (Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace, 
Michoud Division) and Edward A. G abris (NASA Office of Aeronautics and 
Space Technology), the authors made a  case for efficiency and economy: “As 
the ‘60s drew to a  close, and even before the flight of Apollo 11, the United 
States’ first manned lunar landing, it became obvious relative to the future of 
our space programs, that
-1 . The U.S. was in space to stay.
-2 . The cost of expendable, single-use launch systems could not be 
sustained.
-3 . Technology ‘existed* to develop a  reusable Space Transportation 
System (STS) that could assure item 1 and solve the problem posed by
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single-use systems in Item 2.
With respect to (1), U.S. determination to maintain technological 
leadership in the world assured the pressing of military, scientific, and 
commercial advantages of space. With respect to (2). extensive studies 
of potential space users underscored the wastefulness of expendable 
launch vehicles.
Regarding (3), most technology for most Shuttle subsystems did exist 
and had been demonstrated; however, for some systems we could claim 
critical technology only in concept and had not demonstrated it even in 
laboratory prototype....
Program Structure: One of NASA's great strengths-one not readily 
apparent in many government organizations-is its facility to respond 
rapidly to new program needs, opportunities, or problems with agency- 
wide organizational flexibility, cooperation, and sensitivity.
When the 1969 Space Task Group identified a  reusable STS 
(compatible with the economics of space use in the 1980s and beyond) 
as a  goal and determined that the technology ‘existed’ to build it, there 
was a  critical need to determine how much of that existence" had to be 
demonstrated. ...The job of overseeing this [technological] work fell to the 
Space Shuttle Technology Steering Committee.
This Steering committee was created by the NASA Administrator in 
1969...[It] had no budget, [and] no working staff ....(Fitzgerald and Gabris 
60-1).
In the same month as the publication of the Fitzgerald and Gabris article, NASA 
ordered a broad review of quality control, to be directed by Air Force Lieutenant 
General Jam es Abrahamson. Abrahamson noted that an oxygen leak on an 
earlier Challenger mission could have created a  “blow torch” in the engine 
area, had it not been detected fortuitously. “If it had gone undetected the leak 
could have resulted in a  devastating explosion between 1 and 2 minutes after 
the Challenger had lifted off (Marshall 1986,665).
The year 1983 was an important one for NASA as a  number of 
milestones were reached. Columbia and Challenger made four trips. Sally 
Ride became the first U.S. woman to travel in space, thus paving the way for 
others. Several satellites were launched. One was recovered from space for 
the first time and another (TORS) limped to orbit when its booster failed.
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Spacelab experiments were begun, and other ‘firsts” occurred (Marshall 1986,
665). Other significant developments included the use of more powerful solid 
rockets which were aided by the removal of “inhibitor material” which allowed 
the rocket fuel to bum faster. According to Marshall (1986, 665), the need for 
power caused the inhibitor material to be removed in an attempt to increase 
payload lift The year was not without its share of trouble for NASA, however. 
By Octot)er 1983 NASA officials discovered another problem with the SRB 
insulation material in the nozzle of the booster. Marshall notes that “had it not 
been replaced, rocket flames could have burned through the metal, possibly 
leading to an explosion or sending the craft into a  lethal spin” (1986, 665).
Significant events in 1984 included the announcement by NASA to solicit 
manufacturers for less troublesome engines. NASA indicated that it would 
spend up to $1 billion fixing the problem, making the engines more durable and 
reliable (Marshall 1986, 665). Also on August 24, 1984, President Reagan 
made the announcement that the first private citizen to fly on the Space Shuttle 
would be a  teacher. Vaughan (1996, 27) points out that selecting a teacher was 
done for political reasons and that Reagan wanted to be seen as pro-education 
because of the previous National Education Association endorsement of Walter 
Mondale. Almost one year later, in July 1985, Vice President Bush stated from 
the White House that Christa McAuliffe and Barbara Morgan had been selected 
as primary and backup candidates for NASA's Teacher in Space Project (29).
Insofar as NASA's image was concerned publicly, “the year 1985 was by 
far the best for the program, with three shuttle arbiters in use and nine 
successful flights” (Marshall 1986, 666). However, nine relatively successful 
missions were insufficient for tfie NASA organization. Fiscal problems for the 
space agency made their appearance again when “in July 1985 the House cut
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5 percent ($375 million) from NASA’s  fiscal year 1986" (Vaughan 1996, 29; see
also McConnell 1987, 30). Engine problems were cropping up again as
A near accident occurred with Challenger on 29 July 1985 when a  
sensor indicated that a  tuhbopump was overheating, making a  computer 
shut down one of three main engines 6 minutes into an 8-minute lift-off. 
The shuttle barely made it into orbit, flying a t an initial altitude of 122 
miles rather th a r  400. Had the engine cut out sooner, a  NASA official 
said, the craft would have landed near Greece. Observers noted that a  
landing on water might well kill the crew (Marshall 1986, 666).
Given the aforementioned problems with the budget and the recurrence of
engine problems, NASA wanted to increase its number of flights to 24 per year
by 1990 (Vaughan 1996, 28). The increase in the number of flights effectively
added stress to fatigued NASA maintonance crews and shuttle contractors to
produce more. The work by 1985 was already more than the combined public
and private space shuttle resources could handle. Vaughan (1996) detected a
shift in the mood of NASA administration:
When the shuttle was declared operational, the emphasis shifted from 
applying resources to a  single flight, which was the during its 
developmental stages, to applying tfiem to several flights concurrently. 
Human and material resources devoted to any single flight were diluted. 
The attempt to reach 24 missions per year was limited by lack of spare 
parts and resulted in compression of training programs. Resources 
became concentrated around short-term, not long-term problems... Also, 
flight manifests were changed, which resulted in last-minute changes, 
cost overruns and new crew assignments (28-9).
Labor resources were diluted throughout 1985 and well into 1986, thus 
contributing to unsafe and stressful work conditions [See Figure 3.5 below]. 
The Commission Report noted that
Any discussion about the safety implications of shiftwork must also 
address the situational aspects of human error in the workplace. Industry 
today is well aware that it is important to minimize the potential for such 
error in the design of industrial equipment and procedures. This 
requirement becomes even more critical when individuals are required to 
perform In a  high technology environment with the added demands of
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shiftwork.
Shiftworker fatigue, high workload and faulty equipment design are a  
combination ttiat can produce unnecessarily high safety risks (Report / 
1986, G-4).
The Report went on to point out that managers had been deieterkxjsly affected 
by lack of sleep, which may have contributed to poor engineering and 
management judgment and which culminated in making the ill-fated decision to 
launch in January 1986 (G-5).
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Figure 3.6: Successive Davs Worked (Source: Report I: G-31.
As shown above, 1985 was a  harbinger of things to come for NASA's space
transportation program. A recapitulation of 1985 shows ominous trends for the
beginning of 1986. Problems endemic to NASA began take on greater
significance and were exaceibated by the agency’s attempt to take on more
missions and work well beyond what it could handle. Budgetary restraints and
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the omnipresent problematic high-risk techrx)logy combined to put pressure on 
all organizations involved in the shuttle program.
The Year 1986 and the Challenger Accident
Nineteen eighty-six did not get off to a  good start as far as  NASA was 
concerned- On January 12, 1986, Columbia began a  successful 6-day flight 
after seven launch delays, making this the most-delayed launch on record. The 
primary cause was bad weather (Marshall 1986, 666). Academic scientists and 
critics of NASA pointed out that the Space Transportation System was 
expensive, unreliable and that “the trouble-plagued shuttle had siphoned off so 
much of the agency's budget that America was reduced to taking an 
embarrassing and distant third place behind the Soviets and the Europeans 
when it came to observing [Hailey's comet]" (McConnell 1987, 14). The 
prestige of the agency was called into question directly by the famous 
astronomer James Van Allen through an essay  in the January issue of Scientific 
American, which was a  scathing attack on the space shuttle [see footnote 34 
at)ove]. Van Allen pointed out that NASA was, in essence, wasting precious 
research funds on what he determined were expensive fiascoes such as 
manned-space flight In a  box entitled “Slaughter of the Innocents" [see Figure 
3.6 below]. Van Allen struck a  blow at the concept of manned space-flight In 
favor of other scientifically based programs which did not require the high level 
of funding nor the risk to human life as the Space Transportation System.sz
52 See Robert Bless’ ‘Space Science: What’s  Wrong at NASA” in Issues in Science and 
Technology, Winter 1988-89. This essay is after Challenger but the Astronomer Bless of the 
University of Wisconsin is critical of NASA’s management of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 
debacle. Bless notes that ‘Despite the expected rewards...the story of the HST is also the story 
of what’s wrong with how NASA conducts space science. Experience with the project has 
revealed three particuiar policy areas that render scientific programs less effective and mor costly 
than they ought to be. There are overreiiance on the space shuttle, a  predilection for big projects, 
and poor management" (67).
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According to McConnell (1987) "such criticism coming from a  pioneering 
American space scientist rankled NASA officials” (15). When the STS 
experienced delays, research satellites and all other space projects were put on 
hold. NASA was particularly anxious to meet its March 6, 1986 launch date for 
the Columbia-ASTRO flight In order to beat the Russians, who eventually sent a 
spacecraft to encounter Hailey's comet on March 9 (McConnell 1987,1G).S3
The precedent had been se t for sending civilians Into space with the 
launching of STS 61-C which was originally slated for early December and 
launched a  month late. STS 61-C "carried a  crew of seven. Including an 
ambitious young Florida Congressman, Democrat Bill Nelson, who happened 
to be the Chairman of the House Space S cience and Applications 
Subcommittee that approves NASA's budget" (McConnell 1987.14).
53 McConnell also points out ttiat "Launctiing ttie March ASTRO flight on time would require a 
smooth turnaround for Columbia after the 61-C mission and a  trouble-free Challenger flight” by 
January 23. McConnell notes that ‘the original purpose of Challenger’s 51-L mission was the 
deployment of an important communications satellite. NASA’s  TORS, the I  racking Data and Relay 
Satellite" (16).
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Figure 3.7: Van Allen's Slaughter of the Innocents' (Source: ‘Space 
Science. Space Technology and the Space Station,’ Scientific American,
January 1986, p. 37)
Following Congressman Nelson on the next flight. Challenger 51-L, was
Teacher-in-Space and private citizen Christa McAuliffe. McAuliffe was
scheduled to fly on Challenger at a  time to coincide with President Reagan's
State of the Union M essage. McConnell (1987) notes that “With such a
disparate group of nonastronauts flying aboard the shuttle, the public’s
perception of the system’s  routine reliability only increased....The Soviets might
risk a hapless woman and foreign “guest" cosmonauts aboard dangerous
equipment to achieve propaganda coups, but NASA would never sacrifice
safety for political gain” (14).
Final preparations for the Challenger mission 51-L t)egan January 15,
1986. NASA routinely goes through a  “ritual of certification" known as the Flight
Readiness Reviews (FRR) in order to insure success of the mission:
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On the afternoon of January 15. technicians at the Cape were busy 
refurbishing Pad 39A and servicing Challenger on Pad B. Senior NASA 
officials at the Cape, in Washington, a t the Marshall Space Flight Center, 
and at the Johnson Space Center in Houston assembled for a  meeting 
that was an important milestone in the preparation of Challenger for its 
January flight and for the success of this busiest year in space. This was 
the Level I Flight Readiness Review, the management and engineering 
conference that would guarantee that Challenger was ready for flight. 
The "FRR" procedure, a s  these conferences were called, had been 
designed at the start of the shuttle program as a  formal, disciplined ritual 
of certification...
The original rationale for these formal reviews was to create a  logical, 
smooth flow of information, from the hardware engineers among the 
various contractors-'Level IV"-to the prpfect offices in the NASA centers- 
-"Level lir - to  the center directors and the National Space Transportation 
System office that supervised all shuttle missions-"Level ll"-and finally to 
the agency’s  senior management in NASA’s  Washington headquarters, 
"Level I.” Challenger’s  January 15 Level I FRR was the culmination of this 
process...(McConnell 1987:17).
Thus, the normal course of events for the launch were in place. However, the 
51-L launch was to experience weather and technical delays that had plagued 
the previous launch, 61-C.
The focus of flight 51-L was on a  thirty-seven year-old high school
teacher from Concord. New Hampshire, Christa McAuliffe. William Broad of
The New York Times, on January 26, 1986 reported that the launch had been
postponed because of the weatfier:
The dear focus of the six-day mission is the citizen crew member, Christa 
McAuliffe, a  37-year-old high school teacher from Concord, N.H. Mrs. 
McAuliffe is to broadcast school lessons from space and keep a  diary of 
her experiences aboard the $1.2 billion winged spaceship.
NASA officials said tonight that the delay in the launching would 
postpone until Thursday her broadcast of a  coast-to-coast school lesson 
that had been scheduled for Wednesday.
In addition, the astronauts a re  to carry out several scientific 
experiments and to launch two satellites, a  small $5 million one to study 
Hailey’s  comet and a  large $100 million one to relay spacecraft 
communications around the Earth. ..
The chance to see Mrs. McAuliffe go into space has drawn crowds of 
tourists, teachers and reporters to the Kennedy Space Center. In 1984,
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amid the election campaign. President Reagan announced that the first 
person in nation's Space Flight Participant Program would be a teacher, 
and more than 11,400 educators subsequently applied.
When the winner, Mrs. McAuliffe, was recently asked what she 
wanted to bring back from the mission, she replied: ‘Just the message 
that space is for everytxxiy, that Its  a new world out there, a new frontier, 
and that (here are a lot of people who we have In our dassrooms who 
are going to be living and working In space. ’ (January 26. 1986, "Cloudy 
Forecast Delays Teacher’s Space Flight," italics added for emphasis).
McAuliffe symbolically represented the promise of tomorrow and the future of 
NASA manned spaceflight. With her went every person that ever dreamed of 
fulfilling a  quest in space. McAuliffes participation on board Challenger was 
also used symbolically for NASA that space was for everyone, as  we have seen 
in numerous rationalizations by members of the NASA organization [see 
Mueller’s phases' section above in this chapter].
The shuttle launch was again delayed subsequently on Monday. January 
27, before it was switched to Tuesday, January 28 for the third time. The skies 
were clear on Sunday, January 26, but Air Force weather forecasts predicted 
trouble in the days ahead:
A forecast of threatening weather forced space agency officials to 
postpone this morning’s scheduled launching of the shuttle Challenger 
until 9:37 A M. Morxlay.
It was the second weather-related postponement of the launching of 
the Challenger.. . As if to torment the crew, the skies were clear today at 
the time the shuttle was to have taken off. The expected storm came 
along soon afterward, however, and things became even gloomier this 
afternoon when the latest Air Force weather forecasts raised the 
possibility of heavy clouds at the Monday launching time.
...Vice President Bush was to attend today’s liftoff, but his schedule 
would not permit him to attend Monday’s  attempt space agency officials 
said.
...If the Challenger is not launched Monday and the flight is 
rescheduled again, the delay could upset later shuttle launchings. 
Thirteen more launchings are scheduled this year ( The New York Times, 
January 27, 1986).
And,
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High winds and a  balky bolt on a  spaceship door combined today to 
force yet another 24-hour postponem ent for the space shuttle 
Challenger. It was the third such delay in as many days, and the crew is 
scheduled to try again Tuesday moming....The hatch itself, or rather a 
small bolt in its handle, was the main culprit this morning, although a 
series of human, technical and natural misfortunes came to play a  part 
before the day was over.
...Officials of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
tentatively reset the launching for Tuesday at 9:38 A.M. barring new 
problems with the weather. Below-freezing temperatures are forecast for 
the new launching time, and that could force the liftoff to be postponed 
yet again, until Thursday....today's [Jan. 27] weather was perfect a t the 
scheduled launching time, 9:37 A.M. But technicians hit a  snag with the 
bolt. And by the time they fixed the problem, winds were blowing too 
hard for a  safe launching....Around 12:30 P.M. officials called the whole 
thing off for the day...
When they eventually get off the ground, the Challenger astronauts 
are to launch two satellites and Mrs. McAuliffe is to teach two lessons that 
will be watched by millions of students across the country.
For T uesday 's launching attempt, the major concern is low 
temperatures. The forecast calls for the mercury to dip below freezing at 
around midnight, and to continue falling into the low 20’s. Such cold 
could inhibit the proper operation of the shuttle and its ground support 
equipment.
Its going to be close,’ Mr. Sieck, the director of shuttle operations, 
said at a  news conference after the scrub.
If Tuesday’s  attempt is called off before the shuttle is fueled, a 
launching could be tried again on Wednesday. But if Tuesday's attempt 
is called off after the shuttle has been fueled, it would mean a  48-hour 
delay as ground technicians check shuttle systems for damage after two 
back-to-back days of fueling. (The New York Times, January 28,1986).
Delays for the shuttle launches had become a  nuisance for all involved. The 
weather had played havoc with NASA’s  launch schedule which had been 
increased in 1986.
The final days before the launch of STS 51-L were grueling for NASA 
decision makers. Charles (1996),S4 using primarily the Report of the 
Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, analyzed
54 Charles (1996) is used here based on his excellent synopsis of events leading to the launch on 
the days closest to the launch.
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the meetings of management and engineers in order to understand the 
circumstances behind the decision. The first two meetings of the mission 
management team on January 27 did not include discussions about the effect of 
the cold weather on O-rings. But on the afternoon of January 27, Robert 
Ebeling, Thiokol Manager of the Ignition System and Final Assembly, held a  
meeting at the Wasatch [Utah] facility where misgivings were expressed 
concerning the affect of cold weather on the O-rings of the SRBs. Allen 
McDonald, Thiokol Director of the SRM Project, then contacted the Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC) in order to collect temperature data for review by Mr. 
Ebeling (Charles 115). At 5:45 p.m. (EST) a  teleconference meeting was set up 
with project managers from KSC, Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and the 
Thiokol-Wasatch facility where Thiokol representatives explained their concerns 
about the performance of the SRB O-rings at low temperatures. They presented 
O-ring failure data, but the report was poorly organized and put together in a  
short amount of time. The Thiokol representatives believed that the launch 
would wait until the tem peratures were warmer (Charles 115). The 
“penultimate," or fifth meeting, which began a t 8:45 (EST), resulted in numerous 
charts from Roger Boisjoly, a  senior scientist and memt)er of the Seal Task 
Force at Thiokol, consisting of information about the history of O-ring blow-by 
and erosion in the SRBs of previous flights and subscale testing an static tests 
on the O-rings (Charles 116). Boiqoly opposed the launch arKi most of the data 
he presented supported a  no-launch decision. Reasons given by Mr. Boisjoly 
included:
(1) if there was erosion of the primary O-ring seal there would be a  high 
probability that the secondary O-ring seal would be incapable of seating 
properly; (2) Given the weather forecast for the morning of January 28 
(low 20s Fahrenheit), the launch would not be conducted under ‘normal 
circumstances.' The lowest temperature that the shuttle had been
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launched previously was 53 degrees Fahrenheit. The thrust of Mr. 
Boisjoly’s argument, therefore, was that there would be a change in the 
O-ring timing function....the possibility of joint failure was increased 
considerably. The analogy used by Mr. Boi^ ’ofy b^ore the Commission 
to explain this phenomenon was. ‘..it would be  likened to trying to shove 
a brick into a crack versus a sponge.’ and (3) "it was also pointed out by 
Mr. Boiqoly that there had been evidence of blow-by found in the Solid 
Rocket Motor joints on previous shuttle flights” (Charles 1996, 117).
Boisjoly could not prove quantitatively to all the participants' satisfaction that he 
had the data to support his conclusions. It was pointed out to Mr. Boisjoly in the 
meeting that previous missions (61-A, for example) had flown at 75 degrees 
Fahrenheit, and that that flight had soot blow-by a s  well. The implication was 
that the temperature of the O-rings was not a salient factor, but "Mr. Boisjoly did, 
however, point out to the members of the teleconference that by far the worst 
blow-by to occur in the Shuttle’s history was on flight 51-0, and that this was an 
indication that temperature was a  factor of O-ring resilience" (Charles 1996, 
117). Boisjoly was not alone in voicing his concerns regarding the effect on the 
O-rings as  he was supported by Mr. Robert K. Lund (Vice President for 
Engineering at Thiokol). Mr. Lund recommended with the concurrence of the 
other engineers that the launch should not proceed until the O-ring temperature 
reached 53 degrees Fahrenheit He also indicated that the launch was t)eing 
considered at the lowest temperature of any previous flight (117).
Resistance to the no-launch decision was raised primarily from the
managers from Marshall Space Flight Center as
S tan ley  R. Reinartz was asked  to com m ent on the  Thiokol 
recommendation. Mr. Hardy recounted that Reinartz was appalled" by 
the recommendation, but that he would not go against the contractor's 
no-launch recommendation. Mr. Lawrence B. Mulloy (Manager, SRB 
Projects Office, Marshall Space Right Center) made a statement that 'My 
God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?' Mulloy and 
Hardy were not convinced that the cold weather would result in a slowed 
O-ring, blow-by or ultimate disaster of the Challenger' (Charles 1996,
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118).
The Thiokol-Wasatch Caucus went off-line in order to come up with a  
"management" decision. Mullo/s and Hardy's comments added to the overall 
confusion. Mr. Joe Kilminster of Thiokol and others were confused furtfier by 
Mr. McDonald's statements regarding the O-rings "...in the proper position to 
seal if blow-by of the primary O-ring occurred.” While many members of the 
teleconference perceived Mr. McDonald's comment a s  a  supporting statement 
for a  launch go ahead, Mr. McDonald did not intend to communicate that 
message [and] was totally opposed to a  launch at such cold temperatures” 
(118). For the most part, the engineers were ignored in the Thiokol-Wasatch 
caucus as
The caucus began with Mr. Jerald Mason (Senior Vice President. 
Wasatch Operations) ...saying that a  management decision was 
required.’ During the caucus the Thiokol engineers and management 
people continued to discuss the issues presented during the 
teleconference....[Mr. Boisjoly and Mr. Arnold R. Thompson (Supervisor, 
Rocket Motor Cases) continued to argue vigorously against the launch 
because of the cold temperature...[and] were the most vocal participants 
of the caucus opposing the launch of 51-L, not one engineer in a non- 
management position made any positive statement SLpporting a launch.
In fact, Mr. Boisjoly stopped arguing only ...when it was apparent that I 
couldn’t get anybody to listen ' At that point a  final 'management review 
was conducted among executives at Thiokol-Wasatch. Those managers 
involved in the management discussion included, in addition to Mr. 
Mason and Mr. Lund, Mr. Joe Kilminster and Mr. Calvin Wiggins (Vice 
President and General Manager, Space Division, Thiokol-Wasatch) 
(Charles 1996, 118).
After the Thiokol-Wasatch meeting was concluded, the entire 
teleconference reassembled to conclude discussions involving the SRBs, O- 
rings and the decision a s  to whetfier to launch STS-51L The conference 
ended in the following manner:
The final management decision was presented to all members of the
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teleconference by Mr. Kilminster when the meeting resum ed at 
approximately [11 p.m.] EST. Mr. Kilminster recommended that ttie STS 
51-L laufKttt proceed on January 28. 1966. This new recommendation 
was supported by Thiokol management in the following manner: (1) the 
temperature data was not conclusive in predicting primary O-ring blow- 
by; (2) the demonstrated sealing threshold of the O-ring was 0.038, which 
was three times greater than the erosion experienced on STS 51-0; and 
(3) if the primary seal fails to seat the secondary seal will.
The teleoonference ended with Mr. Stanley R. Reinartz asking for any 
final comments from anyone on the n e t No concerns were voiced at this 
time; even though none of the engineers at Thiokol-Wasatch supported 
the launch decision. Mr. Kilminster was then asked by Mr. Mulloy to send 
a  copy of his flight readiness rational arxJ recommendation, via telefax, to 
Marshall Space Flight Center.
At this point in the meeting Mr. Allen McDonald informed NASA 
officials at Kennedy Space Center that ...I felt that I was the one who was 
going to have to sign it [the Thiokol flight readiness recommendation], 
because I was at the Cape; and I said I wouldn’t  sign it. I couldn't; it 
would have to come from the plant" (Charles 1996,118-9).
Even with the problems involving the SRBs, other problems on the day of the
launch occurred which, perhaps, should have had an impact on preventing the
launch of 51-L on January 28, 1986. Mr. McDonald presented three reasons
why the shuttle should not have been launched:
(1) the concern for cold O-rings; (2) the booster recovery ships were in a 
survival mode, with seas as  high as 30 feet and winds of 50 knots and 
gusts of 70 knots. Recove^ ships were heading for shore. Under those 
conditions it would be highly likely that the Solid Rocket Booster 
parachutes or the thrustums would be recovered; and (3) the formation of 
ice on the launch pad.. . Mr. Aldrich did not feel that the launch should be 
scrubbed because of high seas. The loss of parachutes and thrustums 
was acceptable, and it was felt the the Solid Rocket Boosters would not 
be put in undue jeopardy (Charles 1996, 119).
Rnaily, there was the problem of ice forming on the launchpad (39B) and
on the shuttle itself. Other organizations involved in the shuttle launch process
were in a  position to prevent the launch from occurring:
During the late night of January 27, and the early morning of January 28, 
the ice problem at Kennedy Space Center was causing concern for 
NASA and Rockwell representatives. Due to the imminent launch of SI-
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L it was decided that water should be left running through the water 
pipes to prevent their freezing. This caused  considerable ice 
accumulation to form below tfie 240 foot level of the Shuttle's fixed 
service structure. The ice accumulation was discovered at approximately 
02:00 on January 28, and was assessed  periodically throughout the 
morning. A Mission Management Team meeting was called for [9 a.m.] 
a t Kennedy Space Center, and Rockwell was to provide its assessment 
of the ice condition relative to the safe ty  of the launch.. . Mr. 
G laysher...described  how th e  Rockwell no-fly decision w as 
communicated. 'My exact quote-and it comes in two parts. The first one 
was, Rockwell could not 100 percent assure that it is safe to fly which I 
quickly changed to Rockwell cannot assure tfiat it is safe to fly....’ 
Unfortunately, the non-committal communication from Rockwell 
representatives was not perceived by NASA officials to be a  no-launch 
recommendation. Horace Lambarth (Director, Shuttle Engineering, 
NASA) reported to Commission investigators a t Kennedy Space Center 
that the language used by Rockwell, 'we can’t  give you 100 percent 
assurance,’ did not mean to him that the shuttle should not fly the 
morning of January 28 (Charles 1996, 119 - 20).
The launch of 51-L was thus scheduled to liftoff a t 11:38 a  m. (EST) on January 
28,1986. The New York Times had a  recorded transcript of tfie event:
The last Flight of the shuttle Challenger lasted atx)ut 74 seconds. 
Here is the transcript, as recorded by The New York Times, of its final 
moments, before and after liftoff.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER: Coming up on the 90-second point in 
our countdown. Ninety seconds and counting. The 51-L Mission ready 
to go...
T minus 1 0 ,9 ,8 ,7 ,6 , we have main engine start, 4 ,3, 2 ,1 . And liftoff. 
Lift-off of tfie 25th space shuttle mission and it has cleared the tower. ..
MISSION CONTROL CENTER: Watch your roll. Challenger.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER: Roll program confirmed. Challenger 
now heading down range. [Pause.] Engines beginning throttling down 
now a t 94 percent. Normal throttle for most of flight 104 percent. Will 
throttle down to 65 percent shortly. Engines a t 65 percent. Three 
engines running normally. Three good cells, three good ABU’s. [Pause.] 
Velocity 2,257 feet per second, altitude 4.3 nautical miles, down range 
distance 3 nautical miles. [Pause ]
Engines throttling up, three engines now at 104 percent.
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MISSION CONTROL: Challenger, go with throttle up.
FRANCIS R. SCOBEE, CHALLENGER COMMANDER: Roger, go with 
throttle up.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER: One minute 15 seconds, velocity 2,900 feet 
per second, altitude 9 nautical miles, down range distance 7 nautical 
miles. [Long pause.]
Obviously a  major malfunction. We have no downlink 
[communications from Challenger]. [Long pause ]
We have a  report from the flight dynamics officer that the vehicle has 
exploded {The New York Times, January 29,1986 [no author]).
The year 1986 had not begun on a  high note for the National Space and
Aeronautics Administration and ended suddenly and unexpectedly on January
28, 1986. As we have seen, a  number of factors came together which did not
bode well for STS 51-L Firstly, NASA was on a  tight budget, having had funds
cut by Congress in negotiations the previous July. This factor contributed to a
public fight over the scarce resources of NASA, as indicated by the open
political struggle as  to where the funding should go. This battle over funding
was manifested symbolically and publicly in the bitter criticism by the
astronomer Van Allen. The press was also quick to point out the agency's
problems. Behind the public annoyance lurked a  more serious problem. That
problem was the initial design of the SRBs which, through a  combination of
economic and political circumstances, were prone to mishap and not adequate
for the serious task for which they were intended. Secondly, the Cold War
competition influenced decision makers. For example, NASA wanted to be first
to have a  space vehicle in position to obtain scientific observations and data
from Hailey's com et The strain of the Cold War began to show in the budget
battles between the Department of Defense and NASA in the design of a  bigger
payload shuttle. Thirdly, NASA administrators sent confusing signals to budget
decision makers by the administrators desire for a  space station well before the
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administrators could effectively manage the STS. The shuttle program was 
declared to be fully operational in 1986 even though it was clearly 
experimental. Fourthly, the agency wanted high-cost items such as the STS, 
but NASA sold the idea that t h ^  could use preexistent technology. This tactic 
is typical of administrators in agencies where they start a  project in the hopes 
that necessary funding will come later. These factors, limited though they are, 
provide a  backdrop for understanding the rationale for decision-makers in an 
historical context Most importantly, the question as to why the decision to 
launch was made is complex and consists primarily of human interaction. 
Various organization theories have been proposed to provide an explanation 
for this case study. We will explore them in the following chapters to determine 
what kinds of knowledge they yield.
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Chapter IV: Functionalism and Radical Structuralism
The Machines. Organisms and Brains Metaphors: Building a Better
Mousetrap
Most of the analyses of the Challenger space shuttle disaster are from
the “machines metaphor.” “organizations as organisms,” or “organizations as
brains” perspectives. These metaphorical categories may be summed up more
broadly as  being part of the “functionalist” paradigm (Burrell and Morgan,
1979).55 Logically the work of getting the space shuttle into space successfully
would involve a  serious, unified, coordinated effort, or what Germans may call
gleichschsJtung, to achieve the goal of orbiting the earth safely, successfully
and on time. At its most basic level, the Challenger was obviously a  very
complex machine with complicated components necessary for the mission it
was designed to accomplish. Hence, the very nature of the shuttle would lend
itself to a  more mechanistic or scientific analysis. The primary motivating force
of the machines metaphor is what Burrell and Morgan (1979; 127-8) call the
golden rule of scientific management: “Get the situation right, and the
appropriate human behaviour and organisational performance will follow.” The
weakness of this metaphor is apparent in that human beings cannot be counted
upon to behave in a  structured or highly rational fashion. Deborah Stone
(1997) in Policy Paractox: The Art of Political Dedsion Making captures the
deficiencies of assumptions made in the overall paradigm:
First, I argue that the rationality project misses the point of politics. 
[According to Stone, the rationality project is progressive reformer 
induced, with notable advocates such a s  Herbert Simon and his search 
for a  science of administration, Harold Lasswell and his dream of a
55 See Burrell and Morgan (1979:120) who explain that ‘most [theories] are located within the 
context of what we have called the functionalist paradigm. The other social science paradigms 
remain almost completely unexplored as far as theories of organization are concerned ...Despite 
the apparent diversity reflected in current debate, the issues which separate the parties in 
academic controversy often tend to be of minor rather than of major significance.”
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‘science of policy forming and execution,’ and the current effort of 
universities, foundations, and government to foster a  profession of policy 
scientists]. Moreover, it is an impossible dream. From inside the 
rationality project, politics looks messy, foolish, erratic, and inexplicable. 
Events, actions, and ideas in the political world seem to leap outside the 
categories that logic and rationality offer. In tfie rationality project, politics 
looks m e ^ ,  foolish, erratic, and inexplicable. Events, actions, and ideas 
in the political world seem to leap outside the categories that logic and 
rationality offer. Rationality purports to offer a  correct vantage point, from 
which we can judge tfie goodness of the real world.
I argue, instead, tfiat the very categories of thought underlying rational 
analysis are  tfiemselves a  kind of paradox, defined in political struggle. 
They do not exist before or without politics, and because they are 
necessarily abstract (they are categories of thought, after all), they can 
have multiple meanings. Thus, analysis is itself a creature of politics; it is 
strategically crafted argument, designed to create ambiguities and 
paradoxes and to resolve (hem in a particular direction (Stone,7, italics 
added for emphasisj.se
Stone’s assessm ent demonstrates the pervasiveness of scientific or rational
thinking by purveyors of tfie rationality project Politics is omnipresent in every
aspect of society and is often, though not always, ignored by logical positivists.
When politics is taken into account, it is frequently subsumed by mechanistic
theoretical conceptions. Stone uses the mechanistic metaphor to explain the
impulsive tendency (or dominant orthodoxy) of American managers to discover
“processes” in the Challenger explosion:
When the space shuttle Challenger exploded. President Reagan 
appointed a  commission to determine what went wrong. After months of 
investigation, the commission determined tfiat the immediate cause of 
the accident was a faulty O-ring seal, the kind of rubber gasket in the 
bottom of your kitchen blender. Not a  very dramatic explanation for a 
major tragedy, but fortunately the commission found a  more interesting 
contributing cause: a flawed decision-making process’ within NASA, tfie 
space agency. Of course, the commission recommended changing the 
design of tfie seals, but tfie bulk of its report concerned reforming NASA’s
56 See also Burrell and Morgan, (1979: 220) T h e  upshot of our argument...is that the 
conservatism or ideological and managerial bias which many theorists have suggested 
characterises social system theory and objectivism is built into the models which are used as a 
basis of analysis. For this reason many theorists are not conscious of being biased one way or 
another...’
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decision making: add an independent committee to oversee future rocket 
design, redefine and strengthen the program manager’s authority, and 
represent astronauts in the program in management
This [book] is about policy solutions that entail reforming a decision­
making process, or what might be called constitutional engineering. 
They are based on the ideas that different types of collective decision­
making processes yield different kinds of outcomes. Advocates of 
process reforms usually argue that a  new process will produce better 
policies-ones that are more just, more efficient more consistent with 
lilDerty. or. a s  in the case of NASA, more safe. These arguments are 
based on the metaphor o f mechanism: the content of decisions is 
shaped by the structure of a process in a seemingly automatic fashion.
The impulse to restructure authority in order to solve problems goes 
all the way back to the founding of the nation. The American 
constitutional debates w ere about how to prevent tyranny and 
oppression by designing a  system for making political decisions. 
Perhaps because Americans had an open choice about how to structure 
our government, we perceive structure as  something eminently 
changeable rather than fixed, and we debate continuously about the 
merits of different decision-making structures. From the Founding 
Fathers' constitution making to Vice President Gore’s “reinvention” of 
government, Americans have shown a deep faidi in the possibility of 
creafing decision-making structures that will render good decisions.
...Battles over the qualifications of officeholders are as intense as  the 
ones over voters. Officeholders, be they legislators or administrators, 
theoretically represent the interests of their constituents. Therefore, the 
theory goes, by changing either the identity of representatives or the 
ability of constituents to control them, we can change the kinds of 
decisions they will render. The Space Shuttle Commission's 
recommendation to include more astronauts in program management 
exemplifies this logiC: astronauts, more than any other group of people, 
have an interest in shuttle safety and so will make decisions in a way that 
gives priority to safety (Stone 1997.351-6. italics mine for emphasis).
Stone's analysis of the American culture demonstrates how imbued we 
are with things “structural.” History has led Americans to believe that they can 
build a  better mousetrap. S7 it is a s  if one could merely change or improve a part 
and the whole would then be fixed. Based on this logic, an adequately 
functioning decision making process and a structurally sound organization will 
necessarily lead to a  correct solution, or to the making of good decisions. An
57 'Mousetrap* is used here as a  metaphor for organizational structures.
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executive or manager can correct a  problematic area objectiveiySQ in an 
organization by restructuring or changing its components (getting the right 
people, the right tools or objects, changing the organizational chart, etc.) in 
order to improve the decision making process. The basic problem with the 
machines metaphor (and functionalism, generally) is that as long as  the 
machine is performing normally the operators of the machinery, the executives 
and managers, generally do not question the operating process until something 
goes awry (the machinery breaks down).
Functionalism as  a  world view takes as a  given basic philosophical
assumptions that are founded upon "science" and a  theory of society whether
the theorists are aware of it or not (Burrell and Morgan 1979, 119).
Functionalism is not simply one perspective but rather a  series of systematic
theoretical approaches to understanding complex phenomena.
The functionalist paradigm generates regulative sociology in its most fully 
developed form. In its overall approach it seeks to provide essentially 
rational explanations of social affairs. It is a  perspective which is highly 
pragmatic in orientation, concerned to understand society in a  way which 
generates knowledge which can be put to use.. .It is usually firmly 
committed to a philosophy of social engineering as a  basis of social 
change and em phasises the importance of understanding order, 
equilibrium and stability in society and the way in which these can be 
maintained. It is concerned with the effective 'regulation' and control of 
social affairs ...The functionalist approach to social science tends to 
assume that the social world is composed of relatively concrete empirical 
artifacts and relationships which can be identified, studied and measured 
through approaches derived from the natural sciences. The use of 
mechanical and biological analogies a s  a  means of modeling and 
understanding the social world is particularly favoured by functionalist 
theories (26).
58 See Berger and Luckmann (1966,82 - 3) for a  discussion on the extremes of the ‘otqectified 
world’ and ‘reification.’ According to Berger and Luckmann, The objectivity of the social world 
means that it confronts man as something outside of himself. The decisive question is whether 
he still retains the awareness that, however otyectivated, the social world was made by men-and, 
therefore, can t>e remade t*y titem. In other words, reihcation can be descrit)ed as an extreme 
step in the process of objectivation, whereby the objectivated world loses its comprehensibility as 
a  human enterprise’...(83).
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We will pursue the theoretical variations involved as we trace the scholars 
attempting to explain the events leading to the shuttle disaster and subsequent 
attem pts to eliminate future explosions. Following the examination of 
functionalist metaphors, the knowledge from the theories generated by the 
functionalist paradigm will then be summarized and compared
The Machines Metaphor
Before pursuing the functional theoretical interpretations of the 
Challenger àisasHBr specifically, I must briefly review both the work of the father 
of scientific management, Frederick Winslow Taylor, and the work of the 
German sociologist Max Wet)er as to the characteristics of a  bureaucracy. A 
major distinction between the two scholars is in order here. Taylor was a  strong 
advocate of scientific management whereas Weber feared the potential 
implications of his “ideal-type" bureaucracy.sG Before a  U.S. House of 
Representatives committee in 1912, Taylor advocated his new method over 
previously known practices, such a s  management by initiative and incentive. 
Taylor's (1987) four principles of scientific management are recounted here;
1.The duty of deliberate gathering in on of all of this great mass of 
traditional knowledge [and skill of workmen],..reducing it to laws, rules 
and even mathematical formulae, is voluntarily assumed by the scientific 
managers.
2. [The management should engage in] the scientific selection and then 
the progressive development of the workmen. It becomes the duty of 
those on the management's side to deliberately study the character, the 
nature, and the performance of each workman with a  view to finding out 
his limitations....[This would then allow the manager to train the worker to]
59 See Shafritz and Ott (1996:35-6) Classics of Organization Theory, Fourth Edition for more on 
Weber. Max Weber's sociology intersects nearly all of the weltanschauungen in organization 
theory. His seminal essays in sociology cannot be ignored and have an impact to this day. 
Weberism is developed at length in the "radical structuralism," "interpretive" and "radical 
humanism” world views below. Functionalists have also incorporated his ideas into their work.
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do the highest and most interesting and the most profitable d ass  of work 
for which his natural abilities fit him.
3. The third [prindplej is the txinging of the science and the sdentifically 
selected and trained workmen together.
4. [The] most difficult of all of the prindples....consists o f an almost equal 
division of the actual work of the establishm ent between the 
workmen...and the management (Taylor 1987,158-60).
Scientific management (or Taylorism as  it is sometimes referred to) embodies 
much of what managers tend to idealize when analyzing or restructuring their 
own organizations in order to make them more “rational.” “Rational” in this 
sense means more cost effective, efficient, or also, a s  in the case of the 
Challenger, safe. There is, too, the paternalistic implication that management 
has the exclusive right to “knowing” what is best as to how to do the work. 
Since the Challenger was an obvious failure, the scientific management 
explanation for the disaster lies in the failure of how the science was applied to 
the task, in this case of the launching of the shuttle. This failure is not 
necessarily the fault of anyone in particular but is primarily a  fault of the 
breakdown of the management system that had been put into place.
Max Weber's characteristics of bureaucracy as  outlined in From Max 
Wetter: Essays in Sociology (1946) delineate the primary structural and 
functional features of organizations. His analysis shares tenets with the works 
of the Frenchman Henri Fayol and the British economist Adam Smith.eo 
Elements of Weber’s theory of bureaucracy (the organizational pyramid) are 
recounted here:
60 See. for example, Henri Fayol (1949) General and Industrial Management (C. Storrs, Trans.) 
(originally published in 1916) and Adam Smith (1984) An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of 
the l4/ba/t/7 of/Vaftdns (originally published in 1776).
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I. There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are 
generally ordered by rules, that is. by laws or administrative regulations.
II. The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority 
mean a  firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there 
is a  supervision of the lower offices by tfie higher ones.
III. The m anagem ent of the modern office is based upon written 
documents ("the files”), which are preserved in their original or draught 
form.
IV. Office management, a t least all specialized office management-and 
such management is distinctly modem-usually presupposes thorough 
and expert training.
V. When tfie office is fully developed, official activity demands the full 
working capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that his obligatory 
time in the bureau may be firmly delimited.
VI. The management of the office follows general rules, which are more 
or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned (Weber 
1996: 80-1).
This idealized tiieory of bureaucracy is generally considered to encompass the 
development of most subsequent functional theories. Early functionalist 
theorists are referred to as "classical” or "traditional" organization theorists (see 
Shafritz and Ott 1996) share some common characteristics:
1. Organizations exist to accomplish production-related and economic 
goals.
2. There is one best way to organize for production, and that way can be 
found through systematic, scientific inquiry.
3. Production is maximized through specialization and division of latrar.
4. People and organizations act in accordance with rational economic
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principles. (Shafritz and Ott 1996, 3 0 -3 1  ).6i
Classical organization theory serves as the basic model for other theories in the 
functionalist paradigm (see “organizations as organisms" and “organizations as 
brains" metaphors below.)
Insofar a s  understanding changes in an organization predominated by 
functionalism is concerned, I have chosen to begin the analysis of the machines 
metaphor as it applies to the Challenger case study with an examination of what 
structural changes were made, or were attempted to be made, after the fatal 
decision to launch. Recommendations to fix the NASA organization and make 
the Space Shuttle program more structurally sound are apparent in the Report 
to the President Actions to Implement the Recommendations of the Presidential
61 See George Sores' T he Capitalist Threat" in The Atlantic Monthly, February 1997 (48) for an 
account of the excesses of rational economic principles. The main scientific underpinning of the 
laissez-faire ideology is the theory that free and competitive markets bring supply and demand 
into equilibrium and thereby ensure the best allocatidn of resources. This is widely accepted as 
an eternal verity, and in a  sense it is one. Economic theory is an axiomatic system; as long as the 
basic assumptions hold, the conclusions follow. But when we examine foe assumptions closely, 
we find that they do not apply to foe real world. As originally formulated, the theory of perfect 
competition-of the natural equilibrium of supply and demand-assumed perfect knowledge, 
homogeneous and easily divisible products, and a  large enough number of market participants 
that no single participant could influerx» the market price. The assumption of perfect knowledge 
proved unsustainable, so it was replaced by an ingenious device. Supply and demand were 
taken as independently given. This condition was presented as a  methodological requirement 
rather than an assumption. It was argued that economic theory studies foe relationship between 
supply and demand; therefore it must take both of them as given." I believe that a  similar principle 
holds for organizations imbued with doing things for the sake of having done them. Even when 
events occur that contradict closely held assumptions of what ought to occur, they are dismissed 
as aberrant occurrences or new structures (givens) arise to explain away discrepancies 
(anomalies). Stone (1997, see above) has put her finger on a  related concept with her notion of 
constitutional engineering.
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Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (July 14, 1986).62 
Lewis (1988: 216) notes that the recommendations were adopted unanimously 
*10 help assure the return to safe flight" The recommendations are as follows:
1. Recommendation 1 called for the redesign of the faulty solid rocket 
motor joints-either a  new design eliminating the joint or a  redesign of the 
current joint and and seal. It stated that no options should be precluded 
because of schedule, cost, or reliance on existing hardware .Joints 
should be fully understood, tested, and verified. The integrity of the seals 
should not be less than that of the case walls. The integrity of the joints 
should t)e insensitive to dimensional tolerances, transportation and 
handling, test procedures and inspections, environmental effects, 
recovery and reuse, and flight and water impact loads.
2. Recommendation 2 deals with the management of the shuttle program.
It said that a  new definition of the program manager's responsibility Is 
essential, noting that the project managers for the various elements of the 
shuttle felt more accountable to their center management than to the 
shuttle program organization.' As a  result, vital information frequently 
bypasses the national shuttle program manager. Program funding and 
all program work at the centers should be placed under the program 
manager's authority. [Also, astronauts were to be placed into other 
positions in the agency' Report to the President: Actions to Implement 
(1986:2).]
62 For more elaboration of changes in management structure pertaining to safety see the report 
prepared by the Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit of the 
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board entitled Post-Challenger Evidua^n of Space Shuttle 
Risk Assessment and Management National Academy Press, January 1988. NASA policy 
regarding safety is established by the Administrator (who is ultimately responsiiile) through NASA 
policy Directive 1701.1 and is to: "a. Avoid loss of life, injury of personnel, damage and property 
loss; b. Instill a  safety awareness in all NASA employees and contractors; c. Assure that an 
organized and systematic approach is utilized to idenUfy safety hazards and that safety is fully 
considered from conception to completion of all agency activities; and. d. Review and evaluate 
plans, systems, and activities related to establishing and meeting safety requirements both by 
contractors and by NASA installations to ensure that desired oi^ectives are effectively achieved" 
(1 • 2). The report also defines "risk assessment" as "A comprehensive method for identifying 
potential failure modes and hazards associated with the system" and "A specific, quantitative 
methodology for identifying and assessing (or estimating) the safety risks of the system." "Risk 
management" is defined as "A management process by which the safety risks can be brought to 
levels or values that are aoceptaisle to the final approval auttxxity. Risk management includes 
establishment of acceptable risk levels; the institution of changes in system design or operational 
methods to achieve such risk levels; system validation and certification; and system quality 
assurance. The basic organizational elements are in place within NASA for assessing and 
managing risk; however, there is a  need for a  change in the scope of functions and the way that 
they are carried out. The Committee laelieves that the management of the STS must be the 
responsibility of line management..nof the safety organizationsT (3).
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3. Recommendation 3 called for a  review of the critical items list ...T he 
review should identify items that must be improved before flight to ensure 
safety, it was proposed that an  audit panel, appointed by the National 
Research CounciI.should be installed to verify the adequacy of the 
criticality and hazard review. The panel would report directly to the 
administrator.
4. Recommendation 4 called for the establishment of the office of safety, 
reliability and quality assu rance  to be headed by an associate 
administrator, reporting to the administrator.
5. Recommendation 5 demanded an end to what the commission called 
“management isolation” at the Marshall Space Flight Center. It said that 
the commission found that Marshall project managers failed to provide 
full and timely information bearing on the safety of flight 51-L to other vital 
elements of shuttle program management. The recommendation said 
that NASA should take energetic steps to eliminate this tendency toward 
management isolation at the center ‘whether by changes of personnel, 
organization, indoctrination-or all three.'
6. Recommendation 6 urged NASA to improve landing safety.
7. Recommendation 7 called upon NASA to make all efforts to provide a  
crew escape system for use during controlled gliding flight’
8. Recommendation 8 stated that NASA must establish a flight rate 
consistent with its resources' and establish a  firm payload policy with 
controls on manifest changes to reduce pressure on schedules and crew 
training. It urged NASA to avoid reliance on a  single-launch capability in 
the future, because The nation's reliance on the shuttle as its principal 
space launch capability created a  relentless pressure on NASA to 
increase the flight rate.’ The recommendation implied that NASA should 
shift commercial payloads to expendable rockets to relieve pressure on 
the shuttle.
9. Recommendation 9 called for the establishment of a  system of 
analyzing and reporting performance trends for criticality 1 items. 
Maintenance procedures for th e se  nonredundant items should be 
specified in the critical items list especially for the shuttle main engines. 
Also recommended for the orbiter was a  comprehensive maintenance 
inspection plan, periodic structural inspections that could not be waived, 
and cessation of cannibalizing parts from one orbiter to repair another. 
The spare parts inventory should be restored and maintained (Lewis 
1988, 216-8).
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These recommendations primarily constitute structural repairs by the Rogers 
Commission for a  perceived malfunctioning organization (or machine). Lewis 
(1988, 219) argues that two of the recommendations were not fulfilled: one was 
the Commission’s  warning against precluding design options for reasons of 
schedule, cost, or reliance on existing hardware [Recommendation 1 above]; 
and, vertical testing to recreate normal launch conditions for the newly 
redesigned booster joints [also included under Recommendation 1]. Lewis 
points out that NASA immediately skirted the recommendation because the 
costs were prohibitive (estimated a t $30 million), and because the engineers 
were divided over "the efficacy of vertical vs. horizontal rocket testing." While 
not all of the recommendations may be directly attributed to the machines 
metaphor, some of the Commission recommendations reflect tenets of the 
image. Recommendation 1 is directly concerned with economic costs, though 
the commission advocated the principle that costs should not be a  primary 
concern when astronaut safety is involved. Under the new administrator James 
Fletcher, NASA decided not to implement, however, the vertical testing 
procedures partly because of the costs and expert engineering assessm ents.
Recommendations 2, 3, 4 and 5 deal with increasingly centralized 
management and accountability, the establishment of new divisions of labor 
(establishment of a  shuttle safety advisory panel, an audit panel, and an office 
of safety, reliability and quality assurance). These actions are  designed 
simultaneously to strengthen the bureaucratic pyramid (Weber) and to strike a 
balance between the managers and the workmen (Taylor). The tendency in 
NASA shortly after the Challenger debacle to make structural changes in order 
to solve organizational problems may be summed up in the Report to the 
President: Actions to Implement the Recommendations of The Presidential
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Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (1986) “The NASA 
Administrator has announced a  number of Space Station organizational and 
m anagem ent structural actions designed to strengthen technical and 
management capabilities in preparation for moving into the development phase 
of the Space Station program” {Report to the President ^ 986, 5).
The organizations as machines metaphor is limited in assessing 
problems. Situations that arise such a s  the Challenger explosion cause 
proponents of the machines metaphor to reexamine how decisions are made in 
organizational structures. As shown above, leaders of the NASA organization 
paused only to retool by taking structural actions to move on to new programs.
The Machines Metaphor: Analyses Outside of NASA
Scholarly renditions have been offered from the machines metaphor 
image to correct the  perceived deficiencies the NASA organization. In 
“Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure and the 
Design of Reliable Systems” in the American Political Scienœ Review the 
political scientist C. F. Larry Heimann (1993) of Michigan State University 
makes the assessm ent that the “traditional public administration focus on 
organizational design has involved the pursuit of efficiency in the sense of 
minimizing costs for a  given level of level of outpuL....As a  result, the policy 
recommendations from this traditional line of thinking have been to streamline 
administrative system s and reduce organizational redundancy as much as 
possible” (421). Heimann believes that “redundancy” is the key to developing a 
safer system to increase organizational reliability. Heimann posits that one can 
improve an organizational system with the adoption of a parallel system (versus 
a serial configuration) based on engineering principles or a  circuit board
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(similar to basic electronics). The system would then result in a  subsequent
increase in redundancy. Management by redundancy is inherently more
expensive because it involves another layer of bureaucratic oversight, thus
costing more to implement through the hiring or retaining of individuals in the
organization. Heimann maintains that prior to the Cfiallenger accident NASA
changed changed its organizational configuration from parallel to serial which
contributed to failure. “Structural design” is the operative phrase here:
This theoretical approach to structural design can now be used to 
examine the institutional failures at NASA that ultimately led to the 
destruction of the Challenger. I will show that during the 1970s and 
1980s, NASA altered its organizational structure in order to achieve 
different reliability goals. I examine changes within two specific areas of 
the NASA’s  structure that the Rogers Commission mentioned in its report 
on the Challenger accident in 1986. The first area of concern involves 
the organization of NASA's reliability-and-quality-assurance (R&QA) 
functions. The second area involves changes that took place in the 
agency’s  launch decision structure (Heimann 1993, 428).
Heimann’s conclusion of the R&QA [reliability-and-quality assurance] function is 
“As this analysis has shown, streamlining the R&QA function increased the 
probability that a  type I failure such a s  the Challenger would eventually occur" 
(430). Relatively scarce resources and the reduction in force initiatives 
occurring at NASA in the 1970s and 1980s exaceribated an already precarious 
situation. On the decision launch structure Heimann postulates that the 
“organizational structure can have an important impact on administrative 
reliability. I have demonstrated, both in theory and for the case of NASA, that 
changes in the number and alignment of administrative components alters the 
probability than an agency would commit [an]...error” (433). Also, Heimann 
notes that “This work helps us to understand how agencies may adjust their 
structural design to m eet the demands for different forms of reliability. The 
question of why agencies make the choices they do is one that would be of
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great interest to political scientists” (Heimann 1993, 433).
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Figure 4.1 (Source: C.F. Larry Heimann, “Understanding the Challenger 
Disaster” American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, June 1993, p. 423)
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Figure 4.2 (Source: C.F. Larry Heimann. “Understanding the Challenger 
Disaster” American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, June 1993, p. 424)
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 above illustrate the principle of “organizations a s  
machines,” or circuit boards, and one can readily see the inherent superiority of 
the parallel system. In the event that one of the components fail, the whole
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system does not fail because of the other components t>eing in parallel with
each other. Heimann (1993, 425) states that “Holding component reliability
constant, the addition of redundancy in a  parallel fashion will raise the reliability
of the overall system, while creating serial redundancies decreases total system
reliability. It is not surprising, therefore, that many scholars in this area have
spurned serial system s and focused, instead, on parallel linkages when
discussing this issue." Heimann’s  analysis parallels that of the second
recommendation made in the Report to the President: Achons to Implement the
Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident with the establishment of the Shuttle Safety Panel :
A Shuttle Safety Panel will be established by the Associate Administratt)r 
for Space Flight not later than September 1, 1986, with direct access to 
the Space Shuttle program manager. This date allows time to determine 
the structure and function of this panel, including an assessm ent of its 
relationship to the newly formed Office of Safety. Reliability, and Quality 
Assurance, and to the existing Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (1986,
2).
Heimann posits that increased redundancy is a  key to aid in preventing future 
catastrophes like the Challenger in the future, though he admits that “we must 
recognize that a  theory of organizational reliability is not sufficient to eliminate 
risks altogether. Space exploration is still a  risky business-it always has been 
and always will be" (1993, 433).
Organizations a s  Organisms Metaphor
The organizations a s  organisms metaphor is one of the most common 
paradigms used in organizational analysis. There are several theoretical 
examples from scholars using the organisms approach in their analysis of the 
Challenger shuttle disaster. Most of the analyses are, however, influenced by
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elements from the German idealist tradition of social thought (Burrell and
Morgan 1979, 27) and are composites of theoretical perspectives with a  basic
structural-functionalist approach.
...fr]bis approach reflects assumptions about tfie nature of social science 
which stand in oppositidn to those of sociological positivism. As a  result 
of the work of such tfieonsts as Max Weber, George Simmei and George 
Hertiert Mead, elements of this idealist approach have been utilised 
within the context of social theories which have attempted to bridge the 
gulf between the two traditions. In so doing they have forged tfieoretical 
perspectives characteristic of the least objectMst region of the paradigm, 
at its junction with the interpretive paradigm. Such theories have 
rejected the use of mecfianical and biological analogies for studying tfie 
social world and have introduced ideas which place emphasis upon the 
importance of understanding society from the point of view of the actors 
who are actually engaged in the performance of social activities.
Since the 1940s there has been also an infusion of certain Marxist 
influences characteristic of the sociology of radical change. Tfiese have 
been incorporated within the paradigm in an attempt to radicalise' 
functionalist theory and rebuff the general charge that functionalism is 
essentially conservative and unable to provide explanations for social 
change. These attempts underwrite the debate , as to whether a  theory 
of 'confiicf can be incorporated within the bounds of a  theory of 'order* to 
provide adequate explanations of social affairs.
Put very crudely, therefore, the formation of tfie functionalist paradigm 
can be understood in terms of the interaction of three sets of intellectual 
forces....Of these, sociological positivism has been the most influential.
The competing traditions have been sucked in and used within the 
context of the functionalist problematic, which emphasises the objectivist 
nature of tfie world and a  concern for explanations which emphasise 
regulation' in social affairs (Burrell and Morgan 1979; 27 - 8; see Figure 
4.3 below).
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THE tO C K H O av OF RAOICAl CHANQE
Figure 4.3 (Source: Burrell and Morgan 1979. 27 [Figure 3.2])
In terms of the images developed by Morgan (1986 and 1997), combinations of 
metaphors which can either enrich theoretical analysis or add to theoretical 
obfuscation are oftentimes used simultaneously.
The incorporation of aspects of other theoretical approaches into
structural-functionalism is important for us to understand many of the
explanations of the Cha//enger disaster. Romzek and Dubnick (1987) promote
an interpretation of the incident primarily from an “institutional perspective”"
based on the work of Talcott Parsons and James O. Thompson (227). As such.
there are three levels: the technical (organization focus on the effective
performance of specialized and detailed functions), managerial (an
organization provides for mediation among its technical components and 
” See W. Richard Scott’s  article entitled "The Adolescence of Institutional Theory" in 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 32 1987): 493-511 for a  more thorough elatwration of 
institutional theory. Topics in the essay include institutionalization as (1) a  process of instilling 
value; (2) a  process of creating reality; (3) a  dass of elements; and. (4) distinct societal spheres. 
The main thrust of the institutionalist approach is with organizational structure as "Institutional 
theorists have directed attention to the importance of symbolic aspects of organizations and their 
environments....Ail social systems-hence, all organizations-exist in an institutional environment 
that defines and delimits social reality" (507). The primary component of institutionalism is 
structural-functionalism. Human values being brought into the theoretical mix to support various 
conceptions of institutionalism exemplify the argument illustrated by Burrell and Morgan (see 
figure 4.3 above).
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between its technical functionaries and those customers' and suppliers' in the 
organization's 'task  environmenf). and institutional (the organization deals with 
the need for being part of the wider social system which is the source of the 
"meaning," legitimation, or higher-level support which makes implementation of 
the organization’s  goals possible’) (Romzek and Dubnick 1987, 227-8). This 
essay also consists of metaphors such as political systems, machines metaphor 
(identified as  technical and 'bureaucratic pressures’ [233-4]), and the issue of 
ignoring the workers and the  domination metaphor. The theoretical 
interpretation of the article is, a t its base, structural-functionalist Romzek and 
Dubnick use the language of the organizations as  organisms metaphor to 
explain wtiat happened. The primary focus of their research may be summed in 
their conclusion:
It was inevitable that the Challenger disaster would generate strong 
institutional pressures for NASA, and those pressures are creating new 
demands and expectations for the agency. Ironically, the direction of 
those pressures has been toward enhanced bureaucratic structures and 
growing resilience on legal accountability mechanisms which stress 
NASA’s  formal responsibilities for the safety of its astronauts (235).
The Romzek and Dubnick (1987) article is an example of an explanation in 
which structural-functionalism is embellished by other theoretical perspectives. 
Notably, an attempt is made in which functionaries in the organization are taken 
into account In this case, functionaries with important information were ignored 
by higher level administrators. The information held by the engineers and 
lower-level administrators was important to the conduct of the operation (i.e., the 
decision to launch). In essence, one of the causes of the accident was the 
inability of the experts within the organization to effectively communicate the 
information to the decision-makers, thus representing a  breakdown in the scalar
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chain.®*
The problem of effective communication is further articulated in an article
by William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken (1988a) entitled “Challenger:
Fine-Tuning the Odds Until Something Breaks” in the Journal of Management
Studies. The basic premise of the article is that repeated successes in the
previous shuttle launches, combined with an acclimatization (repeated
su ccesses  and incrementalism) and differing responsibilities betw een
engineers and managers, led to disaster. Starbuck and Milliken contribute
three theories as to the probabilities of future success:
[Theory 1 :J Neither success nor failure changes the expected prot>ability 
of a  subsequent success (321) [gambler’s  fallacy], (b) [Theory 2:] 
Success makes a  subsequent success seem less prot)able. and failure 
makes a  subsequent success appear more likely....Successes foster 
complacency, confidence, inattention, routinization, and habituation; and 
so human errors grow increasingly likely a s  successes accumulate. 
Failures, on the other hand, remind operators of the need for constant 
attention, caution, and vigilance; and so failures make human errors less 
likely (322) ...when applied to successes. Theory 2 is more an observer’s 
theory than a participant’s  theory. Although bosses might use Theory 2 
when appraising their subordinates’ actions, they would probably not 
apply it to themselves (323). (c) [Theory 3:] Success makes a 
subsequent success appear more probable, and failure makes a 
sut>sequent success seem less likely. Expected probabilities of success 
are not well-defined facts, but hypotheses to be evaluated through 
experience. Even if engineers or managers believe that a  probability of 
success remains constant for a  long time, they need to revise their 
estimates of this probability as experience accumulates (323). Theory 3 
offers a  very plausible characterization of the tieliefs of managers at
See Miller (1993) for more elaboration on the effects of a  breakdown in communication between 
the engineers and NASA managers. The main thrust of this article was that the engineers were 
unable to persuade the managers responsible for the launch decision because they could not 
communicate their views of the situation to the managers holding the knowledge. The engineers 
were ignored by managers who did not know the subNedes of their work. In this case. Miller places 
the blame squarely on the engineers: ‘...To the extent that NASA engineers could talk to 
themselves as a  group and to non-experts, most notably NASA managers, they attempted to 
bridge discourse communities....the very fact that the space shuttle Challenger was launched 
notwithstanding objections by the engineers indicates t h ^  did not adequately communicate their 
resen/ations to the non-experts....if a  community of experts believes that a  problem exists and a 
community of non-experts either disputes the existence of the problem or doesn't know it exists, 
the experts must persuade the non-experts to adopt the competing orientation" (101).
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Thiokoi's Wasatch Division and NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center 
(SFC) a s  they tried to evaluate the risks posed by joints in the shuttle’s 
solid rocket booster (SRB). As successful launches accumulated, these 
managers appear gradually to have lost their fear of design problems 
and grown more confident of success (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988a).
Theories 1 - 3  represent a  rationalistic approach in the genre of game theory, in 
this case the theoreticians apply the "gamlaler’s fallacy” as a  possible means to 
explain the decision-making process. Starbuck and Milliken subject the 
organization participants to a  form of analysis imputing motivations to the 
individuals involved. There is an implication here that the decision-makers 
thought they had perfect knowledge and in fact did not."' Furthermore, the 
managers a t Thiokol and Marshall were victims caught in a  web of their own 
making. Another aspect of Starbuck and Milliken’s  theories (especially Theory 
2) is the notion that managers have a  tendency in this case to apply a  set of 
evaluative criteria to employees for failure which do not apply to themselves.
Central to Starbuck and Milliken’s  analysis is the notion of hubris. There
is a  sense of inevitability exemplified by their work, in which the event occurred
regardless of consequences. They maintain that only after the fact of the launch
and the subsequent explosion was NASA capable of seeing its own folly:
NASA’s  incremental changes in hardware, procedures, and operating 
conditions were creeping inexorably toward a  conclusive demonstration 
of some kind. In retrospect, it now seem s obvious that numerous 
launches had generated increasingly threatening outix)mes, yet NASA’s 
managers persisted until a  launch produced an outcome too serious to 
process routinely. They seem to have been pursuing a  course of testing 
to destruction.
NASA’s apparent insensitivity to escalating threats has attracted 
criticism, and NASA could undoubtedly have made better use of the 
available evidence, but NASA was behaving in a  commonplace way. 
Because fine-tuning creates sequences of experiments that are 
supposed to probe the limits of theoretical knowledge, people tend to 
continue one of these experimental sequences as  long as its outcomes
This section has much in common with Morgan’s (1986) organizations as brains image, 
including Hertert Simon’s notion of ‘satisficing.'’
105
are not so bad: the sequence goes on until an outcome inflicts costs 
heavy enough to disrupt the normal course of events and to bring fine- 
tuning to a  temporary h a lf  (Starbuck and Milliken 1988a, 337).
Similarly, subsequent works by William H. Starbuck demonstrate his propensity
for interpreting events which have a  predetermined outcome. No event within
an organization occurs without someone having a  plan for every occasion.
Human beings are limited only by their “humanness” which causes reasonable
plans to go awry. Rationalization happens in the organization through the
entire deliberative process. Organizations become reified under Starbuck s
theoretical process:
Individual human beings can learn without having to erase what they 
already know; they can record new knowledge on top of their current 
knowledge. This causes some confusion, because people often end up 
with inconsistent chunks of knowledge in their memories, but it does 
make learning easy. Organizations, especially the older ones, find it 
harder to ignore their current knowledge, because they build up explicit 
rationalizations for why they are doing what they are doing, and because 
they tend to associate specific people with specific policies. So 
organizations integrate their knowledge into very rigid and coherent 
structures in which the intellectual and political elements buttress each 
other. Organizations can readily learn knowledge that fits into what they 
already believe, but they find it very difficult to learn knowledge that 
conflicts with their current knowledge. Before they become willing to 
accept radically different knowledge, organizations actually have to 
unlearn what they know, by dismantling their existing ideological and 
political structures. In particular, before organizations are willing to 
contemplate radically different policies and strategies, they have to 
convince themselves that the arguments supporting their current policies 
and strategies are wrong, and they have to lose confidence in their
""In a  later work the authors seem to qualify their analysis a s ‘People seem to see past events as 
much more rationally ordered than current or future events, because retrospective sensemaking 
erases many of the causal sequences that complicate and obscure the present and 
future.. .Observers who know the results of actions tend to see two kinds of analytic sequences:
Good results ->  Correct actions > Flawless analyses ->  Accurate perceptions 
Bad results ->  incorrect actions ->  Flawed analyses ->  Inaccurate perceptions
Knowing, for example, that bad results occurred, observers search for the incorrect actions that 
produced these bad results; the actual results guide the observers toward relevant actions and 
help them to see what was wrong with these actions... ‘ (Startxick and Milliken 1988b, 37 - 8).
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current managerial hierarchies (Starbuck 1989, 26 - 7).
Another facet of Starbuck s theoretical argument entails organizational 
learning. Organizations, a s  such, can learn as  if they were individual human 
beings. It is as if they take onto themselves a  life of their own:
Consider the m eans by which organizations learn. Most powerful 
tools are two-edged swords that can produce harm a s  well a s  good. 
Organizational learning mechanisms show this duality: while they foster 
autonomy, efficiency, and predictability, they simultaneously promote 
blindness, rigidity, and self-deception.
[1] Organizations have three basic learning mechanisms. One of 
these is buffering. An organization builds buffers between itself and 
sources of random variation in its environment...
[2] Slack resources afford a  second learning mechanism. ... Slack 
resources resemble buffers in that they enable an organization to satisfy 
environmental dem ands a t low cost; and by lowering what would 
otherwise be peak profits, slack resources also make an organization's 
performance appear smoother to its environment.
[3] The third, and  m ost important, learning mechanism Is 
programming. Programs enable organizations to repeat the same 
activities over and over again. People figure out how to solve some kind 
of problem or how to perform some task effectively, so they create a 
program that enables them to do it over and over again the same 
way . .Programs afford the main means by which organizations 
accumulate experience, coordinate activities, and control actions 
hierarchically (Starbuck 1989, 18-9).
With his later theoretical analysis, Starbuck promotes the use of mechanisms 
and structures within the organization in order to foster the internal coherence 
of the traditional organization structure: the pyramid. Startiuck’s  analysis here 
favors the machines and organizations as organisms metaphors. Learning 
mechanisms are important cogs in the organizational machine.
The power structure of the NASA organization is further exemplified by 
Starbuck and Milliken’s  analysis of the actions of the Rogers Commission. The 
Rogers Commission was found culpable of "retrospective perceiving” after the 
failure of the shuttle launch:
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...Thus, after the space shuttle exploded and destroyed the Challenger 
spacecraft, a  Presidential Commission searched for the human errors 
that caused this disaster. Physical evidence from the sea  tx)ttom, 
laboratory tests, and television tapes ruled out several initial hypotheses 
and focused attention on design flaws in the wall of the solid-rocket 
booster. Confident that mistakes had occurred when NASA decided to 
continue using this booster, the Presidential Commission could then 
review these processes and identify the mistakes. The Commission did 
spot some data that should have been taken more seriously, some rules 
that should have been enforced more stringently, some opinions that 
should have been used, and some specific people who had played 
central roles in the faulty decision processes. Many of these same 
actions had occurred before previous flights-the sam e rules had been 
bent, the sam e kinds of discussions had taken place, and the same 
communication channels had been ignored. But, after previous flights, 
no participant said th e se  actions had been mistakes; and when 
inspectors noted defects in the solid-rocket boosters, NASA personnel 
concluded that these defects were not serious.
Retrospective perceivers are much more likely to see bad results, if 
they did not themselves play central roles in the events.... (Starbuck and 
Milliken 1988b, 38).
Starbuck and Milliken’s interpretation of the Challenger event rests upon an 
assessm ent by NASA commission investigators concerning when bureaucratic 
rules were broken, communications within the scalar chain were disrupted and 
that hubris came into play interfering with the decision-makers’ judgments. 
Beyond the normal structural-functionalist failures (machines and organizations 
a s  organisms metaphors), Starbuck and Milliken indicate that those who 
perceived bad results as  a  normal occurrence in the events leading up to the 
launch were those in power.
Risk A ssessm ent and its Variants
Risk theorists have attempted to explain the Challenger launch disaster
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in a number of ways. Sociologists tend to dominate the theoretical image.^ 
There is by no means a  consistent interpretation of events surrounding the 
launch decision amongst its advocates. Indeed, a s  will be shown, there are 
basic disagreements among the theorists as they interpret the event In addition 
to theoretical disharmony, there are some common elements which comprise 
the various conceptions of risk theorists. First, risk theorists share with other 
structural-functional theorists a  propensity to consider the organization as a 
mechanical device or a s  a  system comprised of interchangeable components 
which, in the case of risk theorists, varies with the system 's complexity. 
Because of this aspect of risk theory, it can be placed under the heading of the 
“rationality project" as put forward by Stone (1997) above. A second element of 
risk theory is culture. Risk theorists are primarily advocates of the impact of the 
organization’s  culture on the behavior of individuals in the organizations. 
“Organizations” is the key here as the collective members are influenced more 
by tjeing in or of the organizational totality rather than by behaving or acting 
separately as  independent beings. Individual actions tend to be subsumed 
within the organizational culture. No particular organization members are 
responsible or accountable for the events that transpire, rather the organization 
(or the climate created by the organization's culture) is intrinsically culpable for 
any negative consequences that occur. Accidents happen in a  deterministic 
fashion (i.e.. accidents are  inevitable in complex organizations) even with the 
best of intentions by members within the organization when they attempt to 
avert an undesirable action.
One of the key insights into risk theory is that the organization by its very
”  See the previous discussion (Chapter I especially footnote 9 above) of Vaugfian’s  (1996) work, 
more of it will be covered here. Another prominent sociologist whose work has involved an 
assessment of tfie ChafHenger launch decision is Charles Perrow. Criticism of risk theorists, 
particularly the work of Perrow, will follow in the discussion of the radical structuralist paradigm after 
this section.
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I  nature as  a  human construction is fallible, particularly in high risk systems.
Accidents are built into the system in an unintended fashion, despite attempts to 
alleviate potential human error. In regard to other structural-functionalist 
theories, risk theorists tacitly recognize, or a t least qualify, the inherent 
imperfections of complex organizations built by humans and when engaged in 
theory building tfiey attempt to take these flaws into account This recognition of 
“humanness” constitutes a  movement away from strict functionalism but is at its 
core objectivist and an attempt to provide law-like generalizations for human 
activity.
The first risk theorist we will assess here is Charles Perrow (1984) and
his theory of “rtormal accidents.” Perrow's conception may be summed up by a
quotation from his work Normal Accider\ts: Living with High Risk Technologies:
...Risk will never be eliminated from high-risk systems, and we will never 
eliminate more than a  few systems at best At the very least, however, we 
might stop blaming the wrong people and the wrong factors, and stop 
trying to fix the s y ^ m s  in ways that only make them riskier.
The argument is basically very simple. We start with a  plant, airplane, 
ship, biology laboratory, or other setting with a lot of components (parts, 
procedures.operators). Then we need two or more failures among 
components that interact in some unexpected way. No one dreamed that 
when X failed, Y would also be out of order and the two failures would 
interact so as to both start a fire and silence the fire alarm. Furthermore, 
no one can figure out the interaction at the time and thus know what to 
do. The problem is just something that never occurred to the 
designers...for most of the systems...neither better organization nor 
technological innovations appear to make them any less prone to system 
accidents. In fact, these systems require organizational structures that 
have large internal contradictions, and technological fixes that only 
Increase interactive complexity and tighten the coupling; they become 
still more prone to certain kinds of accidents.
If interactive complexity and tight coupling-system characteristics- 
Inevitably will produce an accident, I believe we are justified in calling it a 
normal accident, or a  system accident. The odd term normal accident is 
meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and 
unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable. This is an expression 
of an integral characteristic of the system, not a  statement of frequency. It
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is normal for us to die, but we only do it once. System accidents are 
uncommon, even rare; yet this is not all that reassuring, if they can 
produce catastrophes (Perrow 1984, 4 - 5).
There is some question as to whether Perrow really means that the Challenger
would qualify a s  a  complex system which would meet his criteria as a  normal
accident. Indeed, there is apparently some confusion by Perrow as to whether
normal accident theory (NAT) even applies in the case of the shuttle disaster.
Two subsequent interpretations of the event are offered by Perrow for
comparison below. One of the key issues to be assessed here is the element of
time, as eight years had passed between Perrow's assessments. Another issue
concerns information or knowledge about the inddent with hindsight providing
a  motive for a réévaluation of Perrow's initial analysis. In an April 1986
Discover interview with Kevin McKean entitled “Do A ssessm ent’s Risks
Outweigh Its Benefits?”, Perrow outlines how his NAT works:
The sources of accidents are infinite,' says Perrow. ‘A lot of designers 
have to work together to build these systems, and they don't even know 
what the others are doing. So naturally there are all kinds of failures they 
didn’t think of.' As examples of technology coming a cropper, he cites the 
Three Mile Island nuclear accident, the Bhopal toxic chemical leak, and 
the explosion of Challenger
In Perrow’s  view, these accidents have several characteristic features:
" They usually begin with small events. I'm willing to bet that when the 
shuttle accident is completely understood, its cause will turn out to have 
been something completely trivial.'
* They are frequently driven by what Perrow calls production pressures' -  
in NASA's case, the need to get on with further shuttle missions, 
especially since many of them were military missions considered crucial 
to defense.
* A disproportionate share of them is unfairly blamed on human error: If 
the operator is confronted with unexpected and mysterious interactions 
among failures, saying that he should have zigged instead of zagged is 
possible only after the fact. During the accident, no one could know what
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was going on or what should be done.’
• Finally, even patient investigation of accidents does little to prevent 
others from occurring: T here are so many unexpected interactions- 
literaily millions-that every accident is unique. They’ll find out what 
caused this one. But it’s  really irrelevant, because ten feet is another 
accident waiting to happen.’
The shuttle explosion, Perrow adds, only proves that money and 
talent wont stop accidents. I draw a  comparison with the toxic chemical 
leak a t Bhopal. That was supposed to have happened because of things 
those "dumb” Indians did. But a  few months later, a very similar iesüc took 
place at a  prosperous West Virginia chemical plant run by a  bunch of 
"smart” Americans. And it happened again even after inspectors had 
gone through the plant to make sure that Bhopal couldn’t happen again.’
The feature linking these mishaps, Perrow says, is that each resulted 
from some complex and unanticipated interaction-either among parts of 
the system, between the system and its environment, or between the 
system and its human m asters....Perrow  concludes that ‘normal' 
accidents simply make some technological enterprises too dangerous. 7 
don't care about the space shutUe. because there's little potential for an 
accident that would be catastrophic to the public/he says. ‘But I do care 
about nuclear plants, nuclear weapons, and Star Wars, where the 
catastrophic potential is enormous.' Perrow argues that these 
endeavors should be scrapped, while other risky enterprises-chemical 
manufacturing and genetic engineering among them-should be more 
carefully regulated (McKean 1986, 5 4 -5 , italics added for emphasis).
Upon further review, Perrow posited that his initial summation of the events 
leading to the Cba//enger explosion qualified a s  normal accident theory, though 
the event was not as  significant a s  other incidents involving NAT, such as the 
1979 Three Mile Island incident
Perrow (1994) has retreated from his earlier analysis, i.e., that the 
Challenger space shuttle disaster was a  normal accident, or could be explained
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by NAT "  From the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Charles
Perrow explains in his article T h e  Limits of Safety: The Enhancement of a
Theory of Accidents” (1994) about the application of normal accident theory to
the decision to launch the Challenger
NAT predicts ‘system s accidents' rather than the more ubiquitous 
commonplace failures of operators, equipment, procedures, environment 
and so on (called component failure accidents', where there is no 
significant unexpected interaction of failures). It focuses on something 
quite different than the elements of HAT [high reliability theory] (safety 
goals, redundancies and learning which all organizations attempt). It 
argues that major accidents are  inevitable in some systems. Since 
nothing is perfect, if the organization is complexly interactive’ rather than 
linear, and tightly coupled’ rather than loosely coupled, small errors can 
interact in unexpected ways and the tight coupling will mean a  cascade 
of increasingly large failures (216).
And.
We may have been lucky that the space shuttle Challenger blew up; the 
next shuttle flight, with the sam e multiple and high risks of the 
Challenger, was to take up 47 pounds of highly toxic plutonium which 
could have drifted as a  powder over the Florida coast after an explosion. 
Incidentally. I do not find that Bhopal, the Challenger [and other 
incidents]...are normal accidents, though NAT helps us understand them 
and the afterm aths. They are  alarmingly banal exam ples of 
organizational elites not trying very hard a t all and are what I call 
component failure accidents' ...(Perrow 1994, 217 - 8).
Perrow posited that NAT did not apply to the Challenger situation. Perrow, 
instead, indicates rather that the organizational elites with power over the
“  Perrow received support for his original notion that the Challenger incident could tie explained 
by NAT. See McCurdy (1989) as he states that *The space programme is exceptional. It operates 
in the arena of tightly coupled’ technologies, where small errors easily turn into major system 
failures....NASA is one of a  handful of government agencies whose employees must perform 
their tasks at very high levels of reliability in order to make their programmes work. Sailors on the 
decks of large aircraft carriers and civil servants operating air traffic control centres provide other 
examples of such high reliability organizations’. Work in these organizations is simultaneously 
tedious and exciting; it is also uniformly catastrophic if a  serious error is made. Such organizations 
depart markedly from the tyical standards of trial and error that have traditionally been considered 
‘good enough for government work’ (302 - 3).
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decision to launch rendered a  bad judgm ent” Symbolically, too, the 
organizational elites represent components within the organizational system.
A logical extension of Perrow's notion of normal accident theory is
provided by Diane Vaughan (1996).” Similar to tfie work of other risk theorists,
there is a  deterministic strain embodied in Vaughan’s work. In particular,
Vaughan’s  theory contain the notions of the "normalization of deviance"” and
the "inevitability of mistake” (415):
... mistakes are systematic and socially organized, built into the nature of 
professions, organizations, cultures and structures. Collectively, they are 
chilling in their suggestion that the normalization of deviance creates the 
potential for mistake in organizations large and small. We are left with a  
disturbing question: If the normalization of deviance neutralizes signals 
of potential danger in intimate relationships-two decision makers, 
unencumbered by complex hierarchy, technology, and ‘blizzards of 
paperwork’-how can we expect to control it in larger organizations that 
deal in risky technology? In Normal Acddents, Perrow concludes that 
accidents are normal, or inevitable, in certain technological systems. He 
identifies the source of dangerous accidents as the system, not its 
component parts. [Note: compare with Perrow 1986 & 1994 above]. 
When a  technical system has parts that interact and also are tightly 
coupled, it is capable of generating unfamiliar, unexpected sequences 
tfiat are not visible or not immediately comprefiensible. Because tightly 
coupled technical systems have little slack, or give,’ they offer few 
opportunities to recover when something begins to go wrong. The 
Challenger disaster can justifiably be classed a s  a  normal accident: an
”  See also Karl E  Weick’s ‘OrganiZattonal Culture as a  Source of High Reliability" in Calitomia 
Management Review, Winter 1987 for a  continuation of this theme. Weick states The point is 
that accidents occur because the humans who operate and manage complex systems are 
themselves not sufficiently complex to sense and anticipate the problems generated by those 
systems' (112). With Weick’s  analysis, culture is to be used as part of an obiective pmcess to 
better the organizational system in a  rational fashion: T o  make decisions, you need a  stable 
environment When environments become unstable, then people need first to make meaning in 
order to what, if anything, there is to decide.—Stabilization and enactment make meaning
possible, which means they necessarily precede decision making Making meaning is an issue
of culture, which is one reason culture is important in high reliability systems’ (123).
See footnote #  9 in Chapter 1 above for more background on Vaughan’s thesis.
See Leon Festinger’s  A Theory of Cognitive [Xssonsmce (1957). Vaughan’s normalization of 
deviance owes much to the work of Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance. Festinger’s 
hypotheses are as follows: "(1) The existence of dissonance, being psychologically 
uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance; 
and, (2) When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it the person will actively 
avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance” (1957, 2).
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organizational-technical system failure that was the inevitable product of 
the two complex systems. But this case extends Perrow's notion of 
system to include aspects of both environment and organization that 
affect the risk assessment process and decision making. Increasing the 
basic pessimism of the original model of normal accidents, we learn that 
even when technical experts have time to notice and discuss signals of 
potential danger in a  well-attended meeting prior to putting the 
technology into action, their interpretation of the signals is subject to 
errors shaped by a  still-wider system that includes history, competition, 
scarcity, bureaucratic procedures, power, rules and norms, hierarchy, 
culture, and patterns of information.
An obvious advantage of the workplace over the settings of the other 
examples is that formal organizations can create rules, structures, and 
processes to regulate risky decision making (Vaughan 1996, 415, italics 
added for emphasis).
Vaughan’s  notions of the “normalization of deviance”^  and “the inevitability of 
mistake” as  applied to the space shuttle Challenger incident characterize the 
essence of Burrell and Morgan’s  (1979. 27 - 8; see also figure 4.3 above) 
contention that elem ents of other theoretical paradigms (i.e., radical 
structuralism and interpretive) are used to resolve the functionalist paradigm 
problematic. At its core, Vaughan’s theory attempts to objectify human reality by 
providing for contingencies not readily explained by traditional structural- 
functionalism. Imperfections in human activity are “accounted” for by tacit 
recognition of sutyective organizational psychological factors (the normalization
”  in an interview with New YorkNewsdayr&poiter Earl Lane on January 26,1996, Vaughan said 
that there was no obvious wrongdoing on behalf of the NASA managers involved in the decision 
to launch the Challenger: "Instead of evil managers, competent technical people made a 
disastrous decision while abiding by all the rules....Everyone followed the same rules,’ Vaughan 
said. But that was a  situation for which the normal rules did not apply ...you can see how well- 
intentioned individuals, following all the mandates of their system, can make a  mistake.' The 
organizational behavior, she said, tended to normalize deviance.’ The shuttle had flown in the 
past with unexplained 0-ring erosion. It had not tWown up. Teams had t>een working on the 
problem. It seemed okay to fly again. Judson Lovingood, a  retired Marshall Space Flight Center 
manager who took part in the telecon, objects to Vaughan’s charactercation. “We didn’t normalize 
the deviant’ he said. ‘We were trying to resolve i t ’ He said that after O-ring problems were 
noticed in previous flights, engineers had changed a  putty in the joint in one attempt to prevent 
the seal erosion. But he added, ‘Wb decided to keep flying while we were trying to get rid of it [the 
O-ring erosion],’ a  choice that buttresses Vaughan’s point On the issue of culpability, Lovingood 
is clear: I think everybody who participated in that meeting the night before the launch shared 
some responsibility.”
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of deviance) and recognition of the potential for human-made errors (the 
inevitability of mistake), the eternal “human curse "
A Note on Functlonalisin: Knowledge and Insights Gained
Functionalism and all of its effects are best described by Stone (1997) as 
stated above as  encompassing the rationality project There is a  tendency for 
scientific enterprises and highly technical organizations to cause members 
within the affected organizations to act in a  similarly rational manner. Stone 
points out that there is an all-pervasive orientation towards behaving rationally 
in the American scientifically dominated culture, an orientation which she aptly 
describes as constitutional engineering.” Social aspects of human behavior in 
organizations are to be  ignored, or at least subsumed, under the metaphor of 
mechanism. Human beings become “objects” or interchangeable mechanical 
parts. Problems become “problems” only when the machine breaks down. 
Early theorists such a s  Max Weber, a  critic of the dehumanizing effects of 
bureaucracy, and Frederick W. Taylor, an advocate of scientific management, 
have had an impact on subsequent functionalist theorists.
Members of scientifcally oriented organizations such a s  NASA make 
mechanical corrections to alleviate structural problems that occur. In the 
Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle 
Challenger Accident report the ostensible causes of the shuttle's failure were 
mechanical, both technical and human. The faulty solid rocket motor design 
was redesigned and, hence, fixed. Prescriptive recommendations were made 
for a  broken machine. New m anagers were brought into the NASA 
organization to replace those who had failed (Note that under the terms of
” See Adams and ingersoll (1990; footnote #5 above) and their similar conception of technical 
rationality.
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scientific or classical m anagem ent those management components were 
simultaneously repaired). The organization's procedures (i.e., rules, 
regulations and checklists) were improved and a  new safety bureaucracy was 
proposed to alleviate any potential safety risk to subsequent shuttle launches.
Academic analyses with a  functionalist worldview outside of the NASA 
organization and the Presidential Commission have focused on mechanical 
things to improve function of the organization. Heimann (1993) advocates 
using the metaphor of the circuit board in electronics logic in order to create a 
parallel system with built-in redundancy, which is inherently superior (safe) in 
design and more expensive than a  serial circuit
The organizations as organisms image is represented in this case study 
largely through the "institutionalist" work of Romzek and Oubnick (1987). NASA 
as  an organism exists within a  hostile environmenment in which internal and 
external pressures are put on the institution. These pressures consist of internal 
technical and mechanical problems, managerial problems between various 
components within the organization, and with customer relations and outside 
suppliers. In sum, the problems of the NASA organization are within the 
societal and political milieu (technical and bureaucratic conflicts between 
institutions). The primary cause for the organization’s  dysfunction w as that 
there was a  communication breakdown in the organization’s scalar chain (See 
also Startxjck and Milliken 1988a and Miller 1993). The implication here is that 
if all the NASA organization functionaries were doing their jobs properly, the 
pyramid would not have experienced a  malfunction.’ Starbuck and Milliken 
(1988a) also stress that repeated success led to a  malaise and an incremental 
descent to bad decision-making. Another element of Starbuck and Milliken’s 
analysis includes the notion of hubris; successful launches led to more
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(misplaced) confidence with the shuttle system even though there were known 
design flaws. In a final aspect of their analysis, Starbuck and Milliken (1988b) 
submit that the members of the Presidential Commission (as retrospective 
perceivers) were looking for scapegoats to an otherwise properly functioning 
organization.
Risk theorists attempt to gain access outside of the functionalist paradigm 
by engaging in a  discussion of culture, with all its implications. Risk theorists 
begin by qualifying organizations a s  human constructs subject to human 
fallibility. However, once this concession is made, risk theorists make an effort 
to establish nomothetic generalizations to explain all complex organizations. 
Accidents become inevitable; it is only a  matter of when they will occur. 
Systems are so complex and interactive that when a  component fails, it may not 
be readily apparent to managers and employees, thus leading to further events 
causing a  potential catastrophe.
Charles Perrow (McKean 1986) put forward the notion that the 
Challenger decision to launch was a  normal accident. A few years later, 
however, the decision was in retrospect a failure of organizational elites and not 
a normal accident. Diane Vaughan (1996) argues that the January 28, 1986 
Challenger launch decision was a  normal accident The Challenger accident 
was inevitable, even with organizational elite discussions as to whether the 
space shuttle should be launched, given the historical circumstances. Vaughan 
(1996) submits that there was a  normalization of deviance and that no one was 
essentially at fault for the decision to launch, noting that everyone involved in 
the decision-making process had followed the rules.
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Functionalism and Hypotheses Explanation: How Useful is the
Paradigm ?
The hypotheses stated in Chapter One are reiterated here in order to 
examine them in light of the explanations offered by functionalist theorists 
addressing aspects of the Challenger launch decision:
1. Managers ignored information from employees who knew what was 
going on.
2. Managers who ignore the useful knowledge of the workers will 
sometimes blame the workers when managements’ plans go awry. Also, 
organizations will go to great lengths to protect the managers and the 
organization until compelled to do otherwise.
3. Managers hold the simplistic notion that they can control every aspect 
of their organization, and even those of other organizations.
There is evidence from functionalist theorists that the managers in the decision 
process ignored information from the workers who know what was going on 
(hypothesis one). There is, however, a  bewildering array of explanations 
offered, but there are two broad categories that functionalist theorists use for 
explaining the event Firstly, theorists explained the phenomenon as a  series of 
bad judgments and a  breakdown in the scalar chain, thus indicating that the 
organization was dysfunctional by classical or traditional bureaucratic 
standards. The organization (machine) had failed. In order to repair the broken 
NASA organization, components, i.e., technical parts and defective managers, 
had to be replaced. In addition to some academicians, this method was favored 
and used by the NASA managers after the launch decision and was reinforced 
by the Presidential Commission. Secondly, some structural-functionalist and 
risk theorists advanced the notion that a  proper decision was rendered by 
managers using the best available information to them. Functionaries lower in 
the scalar chain had had their ideas considered. The organization worked
119
properly. Also, the workers could not offer enough technical (quantifiable) data 
in order to convince the managers not to launch. No individuals were at fault 
and all of the rules had been followed.” Accidents occur normally in complex 
organizations. The NASA organization is a  human construction and subject to 
human fallibility.
As far the second and third hypotheses of this dissertation are 
concerned, functionalist theories have an incapacity to adequately address the 
Issues raised. Individuals within the chain of command in the organization exist 
to provide information to the managers in higher positions. The utility of their 
arguments is placed within an organizational decision-making context Workers 
become objects to be employed within the organization based on their 
usefulness. As noted above, mechanical solutions were found to a  perceived 
breakdown in the machinery. Engineers wfio raised concerns about the launch 
due to the inclimate weather and their knowledge about tlie inelasticity of the O- 
rings were given a  hearing and could not provide adequate, quantifiable data to 
the launch decision-makers. Hard, technical and scientific data were needed 
by the managers, not sloppy intuitive judgments rendered by the engineers who 
had designed and maintained the solid rocket boosters. Ultimately, under 
theorists of the functionalist paradigm, in particular the risk theorists, no one is at 
fault for the Challenger launch decision because everyone involved in the 
dedsion process had followed the rules.
"  Miller (1993) offers tfie point tfiat if anyone were at fault, it would be tfie engineers who could 
not effectively make their case not to launch. Thus, the engineers failed in performing their proper 
organizational function.
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The Radical-Structuralist Paradigm: The NASA Organization as an
Instrument of Domination^
The radical-structuralist paradigm represents theories in which
organizations are instruments of domination and exploitation. The focus in this
section, as  well a s  the other analyses from the various images, will rest primarily
on whether the decision makers rendered an  appropriate judgment at the time
of the Challenger launch.” The image exposes the unintended consequences
of rational actions in organizations, revealing its double-edged nature (Morgan
1997,340). Thus, according to Morgan:
...the domination metaphor also shows a  way of creating an organization 
theory for the exploited. In exposing the seamy side of organizational 
life, whether in terms of structured inequality, institutionalized racism, 
occupational accidents and disease, or exploitation in the Third World, 
and in attempting to develop theories to account for these phenomena, 
the organization theorist has a  means of using organization theory as an 
Instrument for social change. Those interested in pursuing this agenda 
thus make much of the possibility of developing a radical organization 
theory to counter the influence of more conventional theory, which they 
see as  serving and reinforcing vested interests in the status quo (1997, 
341).^
Radical-structuralist theorists are keen on developing explanations about 
organizational behavior in which memt)ers are exploited for their human skills 
and abilities without just compensation or are  in danger of life and limb. The 
structure of the organization, i.e., the traditional management-sutx)rdinate.
See Morgan (1997,422) as the radical-structuralist paradigm is equated with the instruments of 
domination metaphor.
Of course it could be argued that having human beings in space flight is inherently dangerous, 
unnecessary, dominating and exploitative. See J. A. Van Allen (1986) atx)ve and Marvin Minsky 
(MIT Professor and recognized as a  leading expert in the fields of robotics and artificial 
intelligence) in his article "NASA Held Hostage: Human Safety Imposes Outlandish Constraints on 
the U.S. Space Program" in Ad Astra June 1990, pp. 34 - 7. Scientists, obviously with a  stake in 
the allocation of limited NASA funding, have an interest in whether human space launches should 
even continue. Minsky notes that "Our astronauts now play the roles, not of leaders, but of 
hostages.' because we will do virtually anything to protect their safety....Our culture has imposed 
a  no-win scenario on NASA: human flight is too risky and expensive: automated missions are too 
inflexible and unsensatiOnal" (34 - 5).
^  See Morgan (1997), especially Chapter 9. for more insights and information on this metaphor. 
This metaphor owes much to the work of Robert Micfiels, Max Wetierand Karl Marx.
121
authoritarian-hierarchical relationship, becomes the problem.
Prior to radical-structural theories concerning the Challenger launch
decision, members within the NASA organization were coming forward with
information about how managers knew of the ill effects of the O-rings.
Managers refused to do anything consequential about the problem." In
particular. Richard Cook, the budget analyst in the comptroller’s office of NASA
when the Challenger exploded, wrote memoranda stating the concerns of
engineers about the potential catastrophic consequences of the solid rocket
booster O-rings in July 1985 and after the decision launch on February 3. 1986.
Cook testified at the Presidential Commission hearings on February 11. 1986
about the memos and concerns that were expressed:
CHAIRMAN ROGERS:...l would like just to ask one question about the 
[February 3, 1986. second] memo. You say at one point when you are 
referring to the engineers. I believe you say-well, let me read the whole 
thing. It is also my opinion that the Marshall Space Flight Center has not 
been adequately responsive to headquarters concerns about flight 
safety, that the Office of Space Flight has not given enough time and 
attention to the assessment of problems with SRB safety raised by senior 
engineers in the Propulsion Division.’
Now, this is the part I want to ask about. ‘And that these engineers 
have been improperly excluded from investigation of the Challenger 
disaster." In light of the work of this Commission and the investigations 
that are being conducted now a t Kennedy, are you still of that view?
MR. COOK: Well, let me Just comment very briefly on that paragraph. I 
editorialized a  bit a t the beginning and the end of this, and I did so on the 
basis of my general point of view in retrospect on some of these issues, 
and since I wasn't prepared to comment on this memo at all today I’m not 
going to try to go into a  lot of detail about the first two items.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Well, it is really not necessary. I think the thing 
that concerns me most is whether you have confidence that the 
investigations are being properly conducted.
MR. COOK: Well, if I had access to my files and time to write. I would try
See . for example, Appendix A for written memoranda from the Morton-Thiokol engineers 
Boisjoly and Thompson.
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to be more specific. That Is all. But let me say this. The last item, frankly I 
was amazed that when this incident occurred the engineers in 
Washington were over there in their offices getting the data on the 
investigations from the newspaper and the media, and now and then 
phone calls from guys down at Kennedy about what was being found.
These were the top propulsion engineers who prepared reports for 
the Office of Space Flight and for the Administrator and for us. I just 
couldn't understand why that group w asnt down there going through the 
data and looking at the photos and everything else. Frankly, and I will be 
honest with you-and I’m not intending to explain why that was or criticize 
anybody-1 was just, in a  way I was glad because I could go over and talk 
to them and get my information from them.
But I just couldn’t understand why the headquarters propulsion office 
didn’t have their guys down taking part in th a t I have no question 
whatsoever about the investigation or the Commission’s  work. I don’t  
feel I’m really competent to make much of a  comment on that, although I 
must say I am glad that you all are having public sessions and that it Is a 
presidential level group. I think that is absolutely in order and really 
needed.
The only thing that I would urge would be that as much as  you can to 
get just the ordinary working guys, such as me and the engineers and the 
guys from the Marshall S&E Lab, and if you can get them in from Thiokol, 
just the ordinary engineers who break these things down, who look at 
them, who call each other on the phone and say  hey, look what I found 
here. You’ve got to take a  look at this. And that is what I hope will be 
included.
And I think that if everybody who has firsthand knowledge and 
experience and feels they can come up and talk freely, I think that you 
will have a  good investigation {Report IV. 388 - 9).
Cook’s skepticism as to whether the Rogers Commission would get to the
bottom of the investigation and as  to who was ultimately responsible for the
launch decision was borne out. Subsequent to his testimony in The
Washington Monthly November 1986 edition. Cook lamented the entire
commission process as part of an extraordinary cover up in order to protect
senior NASA administrators:
The commission’s  final report absolves high NASA officials of any direct 
responsibility for the accident Yet it ignores substantial evidence-some 
of it presented to the commission privately and some of It at public 
hearings-that those officials were fully aware of the long history of
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problems that led to the explosion. The commission left unchallenged 
statem ents by NASA officials that were contradictory and often 
obfuscatory. Indeed, at times tfie commission seemed to be coaching 
NASA witnesses on how to deal with tough public questions. On the key 
question of why the final decision to launch was made, the commission 
ignored so many suspicious coincidences and left so many questions 
unanswered that further investigations will undoubtedly be needed 
(Cook 1986. 13).
Ricfiard Cook also added that
The Rogers Commission, tfien. failed on three major counts. First, it 
didn't hold NASA's top officials responsible for not acting to guarantee 
flight safety when tfiey knew about the long history of O-ring problems. 
Second, it never determined wfio was really responsible for the decision 
to override Morton Thiokol's objections to the launch. Third, and most 
important, it failed to answer the question-in many ways it failed to even 
ask the question-of why NASA officials behaved so differently regarding 
that launch." What possible pressures were acting upon tfiem to cause 
them to send up a  space shuttle that they knew could explode? 
Unfortunately, tfie Rogers Commission has not done its job (Cook 1986,
21).
According to Cook, ignoring the testimony of potential witnesses with relevant 
Information, particularly members at the lower end of the organization, gives the 
appearance of protecting those decision-makers in the upper management 
levels.®
See Casamayou (1993) for further elaboration as to whether anyone in the Reagan 
administration was a  participant in sending the order, or at least applying pressure, to launch the 
shuttle. The gist of her argument which involves the political systems metaphor, is that "external 
forces pressured officials into sacrificing safety concerns for those of production ...Agency 
officials appeared to exhibit perceptual problems with the incoming information and. in the case of 
NASA, they were also experiencing very strong pressures from the external environment to keep 
the shuttle flying* (173).
"  See Jim Heaphy"s ‘Challenger’s  Trail of Blame" in In These Times, June 25 - July 8,1986, for an 
even blunter assessment of the Cha/fenger disaster. Heaphy s  radical critique of the NASA 
organization and the leadership provided by the Reagan administration (which is held ultimately 
responsit)le for the catastrophe) alleges that the Rogers Commission was a  co-conspirator in the 
cover-up. Heaphy does cite John Pike, associate director for space policy with the Federation of 
American Scientists in Washington, as saying "The report does a  r ^  good job of answering the 
questions it asks....But I think there are other questions. It gives a  very good portrayal of how the 
launch pressure was operationalizing itself internal to NASA. What is largely, almost totally lacking 
from the report is where that launch pressure came from. I point the finger at the administration. 
They were dearly dedaring the thing operational before it was operational, and that's something 
that has taken place entirely under the Reagan administration."
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The Presidential Commission hearings did provide insights from lower
NASA organizational participants and from participants in the launch decision
from other organizations. The Morton Thiokol engineers were key players in the
launch decision process and they were subsequently overruled by their own
management who had received extensive pressure from NASA m anagem ent
The Morton Thiokol engineers did have some support from at least one lower-
level NASA engineer t>ased on the Commission testimony of March 27, 1986:
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And there was testimony yesterday that he 
[George Hardy, Deputy Director, Science and Engineering, Marshall 
Space Flight Center], at one point said he was appalled [about the 
Morton-Thiokol engineering decision not to launch], and Thiokol people 
thought he was appalled at the decision. Mr. Hardy said he was appalled 
a t the data that was presented
Were you appalled by the data or the decision?
MR. POWERS [engineer. Structures and Propulsion Latx>ratory, Marshall 
Space Flight Center]: Sir, I fully supported the Thiokol engineering 
position and was in agreement with it
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And you made that known to Mr. Hardy?
MR. POWERS: No sir. I report to Mr. John McCarty, and we were 
caucusing, and I also reported it to Mr. Jim Smith, which is our chief 
engineer, and this would be a  typical thing that we would do. I would 
report to my boss and to my associate project m anagem ent in 
Engineering. I don't want to confuse this.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Did you report, too, that you agreed with the 
Thiokol engineers?
MR. POWERS: Yes, s ir .. . .
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Who did you report that to?
MR. POWERS: Mr. John McCarty. He is my-well, he is not my 
Immediate supervisor. He is my deputy lab director, but he was the 
senior man in line at that time, and I reported to him that I thought that the 
temperature would reduce the margin of safety for the joint performance.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And were there others in that telecon that agreed
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' with you. that you know of?
MR. POWERS: I can’t identify anyone joining me in that position, sir, I 
cannot make that statement.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And have you talked to them since, any of the 
people that were in that telecon. to find out how they stood on the issue?
MR. POWERS: Yes. sir. I have.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: And what did you find out?
MR. POWERS: Some of tfie engineering people have mentioned that 
they, too, were concerned, primarily with the temperature effect on the O- 
ring resilience, the spring-back ability of the O-ring.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Was there anybody who agreed with Mr. Hardy or 
Mr. Mulloy, as  far a s  you remember, on that telecon?
MR. POWERS: There was no dissent with Mr. Hardy, to my knowledge, 
other than the discussion that I had. I was the only dissenting engineer.
CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But the otfiers remained quiet, I assume?
MR. POWERS: Yes. sir (Report V, 1064 -5).
Testimony earlier in the Commission hearing by Morton-Thiokol engineers
brought out Powers’ testimony in the latter days of the hearings. In particular,
Roger Boisjoly. an engineer with the Structures Section of Morton-Thiokol. gave
testimony about the launch deliberation process on February 14.1986:
MR. BOISJOLY:...I first heard of the cold temperatures prior to launch at 
1:00 o’clock on the day before launch, and from past experience, namely 
tfie SRM-15 launch, of which I was on tfie inspection team at tfie Cape, it 
just concerned me terribly.
And so we started in motion to question the feasibility of launching at 
such a  low temperature, especially wfien it was going to be predicted to 
be colder than the SRM-15 [previous cold weather shuttle launch].
So we spent tfie rest of the day raising these questions.
...I felt we were very successful up until early evening, because it 
culminated in the recommendation not to fly. and that was the initial 
conclusion. I was quite please with th a t
I presented and prepared charts 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 4-1, and 5-1, and
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basically those were the charts where I had that exaggerated view 
showing the O-ring in joint rotation.
There was the summary that put a  probabilistic sequence on the 
timing of the seals, and then I prepared the chart of primary concerns.
I was basically concerned with how temperature, low temperature, 
affects the timing function and the ability of the seal to seal. Low 
temperature-and I stated this for over a  year-is away from tfie direction 
of goodness. / cannot quantify it, but I know that it is away from the 
direcbon of goodhess.
I feel very strong, and I always have felt veiy strongly, that SRM-15 
was telling us a  message, and a t tfie fligfit readiness review, we did not 
have any data to support anything but a  generalized statement that said 
we feel tfiat temperature was a  contributor. ..
...On tfie net tfiat nigfit. after I presented tfiose feelings very strong-1 get 
very emotional about these things-and I was quite strong over the net 
about it, as George Hardy remembers.
Somebody brought up atwut SRM-22 [Anotfier shuttle launch which 
had significant erosion and blow-by past the O-ring in warmer weather, 
75 degrees]. I was not personally at tfie Cape, and disassembled, 
seeing the hardware in 22. But one of my colleagues was, a  younger 
engineer. And I questioned him about this.
He told me that the gas blow-by that was observed on that gray, 
splotchy-type blow-by, over a  specific arc length, which I don’t remember 
at the moment. I made that point that on SRM-15 we had over 100 
degrees of arc, and the blow-by was absolutely jet black. It was totally 
intermixed in a  homogeneous mixture in the grease. I attributed that to 
tfie pumping action of the joint as  we were towing it back into the Cape. 
That is why it was totally homogeneous.
But we analyzed that chemically and found the products of 
combustion in it, we found the products of putty in it. we found the 
products of O-ring in it
I made tfiat point.
During tfie course of the evening, I also produced photos of the SRM- 
15, and my colleague produced photos of SRM-22. And you could 
visually see the difference in the amount of soot, as characterized past 
the O-ring seal.
I was asked then on the net to support my position with data, and I 
couldn’t support my position with data. I tiad been trying to get data since 
Octot)er on O-ring resiliency, and I did not have it in my hand. We have 
had tremendous problems in trying to get a  function generator and a 
machine to actually operate and characterize this particular 
pressurization function rate.
At that point, the telecon basically continued, and Mr. Lund presented 
his conclusions and recommendations.
So the formal part of the presentation was finished.
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Listeners on the other line seemed not very pleased with the 
recommendation. In fact, somebody asked Mr. Hardy what he thought 
about it, about our recommendation, and Mr. Hardy said he was appalled 
at MTI's decision. However, he would not go a ^ in s t  th a t He would 
recommend not to fly also.
There was a  very short discussion that ensued, and we had, we 
asked for a  five minute caucus. Our people asked for a  five minute 
caucus to discuss the situation. Those opposed to launching continued 
to press their case with MTI management, and those opposed to the 
launch that pressed this case in the caucus were basically myself and Mr. 
Thompson. And we did everything we could to continue to try and press 
for not launching describing-1 took the photographic position of the 
evidence and Mr. Thompson was trying to further elaborate on the 
sealing characteristics of the seals. When we realized that we basically 
had stopped in the discussion and we could go no further because we 
were getting nowhere, we backed off, both of us. We just sat back down.
GENERAL KUTYNA: What was the motivation driving those who were 
trying to overturn your opposition?
MR. BOISJOLY: They felt that we had not demonstrated, or I had not 
demonstrated, because I was the prime mover in SRM-15, because of my 
personal observations and involvement in the flight readiness reviews, 
they felt that I had not conclusively demonstrated that there was a  tie-in 
Isetween temperature and blowMsy.
My main concern was if the timing function changed and that seal 
took longer to get there, then you might not have any seal left because it 
might be eroded before it seats. And then, if that timing function is such 
that it pushes you from the 170 milliseconds region into the 330 second 
region, you might not have a  secondary seal to pick up if the primary is 
gone. That was my major concern.
I can't quantify it I just don't know how to quantify that But I felt that 
the observations made were telling us that there was a  m essage there 
telling us that temperature was a  discriminator, and I couldn't get that 
point across.
I basically had no direct input into the final recommendation to launch 
and I was not polled.
I think Astronaut Crippen hit the tone of the meeting exactly right on 
the head when he said that, the opposite was true of the way the 
meetings were normally conducted. We normally have to absolutely 
prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that we have the ability to fly, and it 
seemed like we were trying to prove, have proved that we had data to 
prove tfiat we couldn’t fly a t this time, instead of the reverse.
That was the tone of the meeting in my opinion {Report IV, 674 - 6, 
Italics added for emphasis).
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The testimonies provided by an engineer and budget analyst of NASA and the 
testimony provided by an engineer from the Morton-Thiokol organization are 
examples of em ployees having knowledge about th e  work that they are 
involved in being suppressed by higher m em bers of their respective 
organizations. From the instruments of domination metaphor (or radical- 
structuralist paradigm), the scenarios above indicate domination by elites within 
the respective organizations over their subordinates. The result was disastrous 
in the Challenger launch decision.
Gouran, Hirokawa, and Martz (1986) in tfieir article “A Critical Analysis of
Factors Related to Decisional Processes Involved in the Challenger Disaster””*
in Central States Speech Journal, note that a  rigid adherence to observation of
role boundaries played an important part the failure of the shuttle launch
decision. Gouran. Hirokawa, and Martz. commenting on the lack of
persuasiveness by the engineers involved in the launch decision and the
rigidity of upper m anagem ent, note that
It may have been that they simply reached the point where further 
argument seem ed pointless. A more compelling and generally 
applicable explanation lies in the rigidity with which roles in a 
h ie ra rc h ica lly  a rra n g e d  d ec is io n  s tru c tu re  a re  o ften  
enacted .A[n] ..explicit illustration of the unwillingness to violate role 
boundaries surfaced in the testimony of William Lucas, Director of the 
Marshall Space Flight Center. Although Lucas was not involved in the 
teleconference, Lawrence Mulloy and Stanley Reinartz, Shuttle Projects 
Office Manager, apprised him before the teleconference and the 
following morning that concern had been expressed about weather 
conditions, but not specifically about the possible effect of temperature on 
the functioning of the O-rings. When asked why he did not report the 
concern to Level II, however generally it had been conveyed to him, 
Lucas's response was. That is not the reporting channel' [Report V: 
1039] (Gouran, e t al. 1986,124).
In addition to the barriers to effective communication through role boundaries
There are also many functionalist elements to Gouran, Hirokawa and Martz's analysis.
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thesis [or the failure of the organizational pyramid], Gouran. Hirokawa and Martz 
note other influences on poor decision-making: (1) the perceived pressure to 
produce a desired recommendation and concurrence with the recommendaticn 
among some of those initially opposed to the launch; (2) the questionable 
patterns of reasoning ty  key managers, (3) the amtxguous and misleading use 
of language that minimized the perception of risk; and (4) the frequent failure to 
ask important questions relevant to the final decision (1986,121).^
The strongest indictment of the Challenger launch decision from a 
radical-structuralist perspective comes from Ronald C. Kramer’s  “The Space 
Shuttle Cha//enger Explosion: A Case Study of State-Corporate Crime” (1992). 
Kramer posits that the incident involved government entities (the state) and 
private industry (Morton-Thiokol, Inc.) were working in conjunction with the 
state and that organizational misconduct occurred (214 - 5). Kramer states that 
the Challenger explosion was a  prime example of what he calls an “integrated 
theory of organizational misconduct”:
• ...the explosion of the shuttle was not an accident’
• ...the Challenger explosion was the collective product of the interaction 
between a  government agency (NASA) and a private business 
corporation (MTI) and thus can be viewed a s  an instance of state- 
corporate crime. This disaster cannot be attributed solely to the actions 
of one organization....lt is hoped that the concept of state-corporate crime 
will direct further attention to the structural relations between corporate 
and  governmental organizations and  to the im portance of 
interorganizational relationships and organizational sets in the study of 
organizational misconduct.
• The Challenger case study provides general support for the hypothesis 
that criminal or deviant behavior a t the organizational level results from a  
coincidence of pressure for goal attainment, availability and perceived
One of the keys here is that Gouran. et al, point to management failure. They note in the 
conclusion of their article that "Our analysis has revealed that no matter how carefully crafted a  
decision structure may appear in terms of the sequence of analysis and choice to which it commits 
decision-makers, its effective utilization is still reliant on the social, psychological, and 
communicative environment in which responsitWe parties function' (1986,133).
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attractiveness of illegitimate means, and an absence of effective social 
control [external political pressure, unreasonable launch rate schedule, 
and unsafe launch commit criteria}.
Thus, all three catalysts for action that are indicated by the integrated 
theoretical model were present in this case .(Kramer 1992, 238 - 9).
Radical-structuralist theorists G. Richard Holt and Anthony W. Morris
(1993), wrote in Human Organization and described what they call “activity
theory” based on the work of Evald Ilyenkov's Soviet Communitarianism."* The
activity theory advanced by Holt and Morris reexamined the basic philosophical
assumptions of traditional scientific [or functionalist] theories, and they based
the theory on the Soviet sociohistorical school." Activity theory has been
further developed by Yrjo Engestrom (1988) who examined organization
process and “posit[ed] that the unit of analysis in accounting for emerging
institutions is neither that which occurs in the individual mind (the cognitivist
position), nor the structure of tfie organization (the functionalist position), but the
activity through which both are continuously generated” (Holt and Morris 1993,
97)." Holt and Morris also criticize interpretations of Descartes’ dualism as
“frequently characterized a s  an incommensurability between mind and body”
and for being an “anthropocentric reading of dualism” (97). And,
David Bakhurst [1988:31] explains that tfie cultural-historical school, from 
within a  different world view, conceptualizes as a priori tfie interaction of 
minds and world., .[tfiere are four theoretical insights:] First, tfie higher 
mental functions of the human individual “exist in, and are mediated by,
”  See Yrjo Engestrom’s  (April 1988) article ‘How to do research on activity?’ in The Quarterly 
Newsletter of ^ e  Laboratory of ComparsfBve Human Cognition, 10/2:30-1, and David Bakhurst’s 
(April 1988) article ‘Activity, Consciousness and Communicalion” in The Qusaterty Newsletter of 
the Laboratory of Compaiaittve Human Cognition, 10/2:31-8, for more background on the Soviet 
sociohistorical school.
See Burrell and Morgan (1979:7,25,19,33-4) for further elaboration of Russian social theory in 
the radical-siructuralist paradigm.
Certain aspects of activity theory share theoretical insights developed independently by Vickers 
(1995) and his human systems or ‘appreciation theory.‘ Under Burrell and Morgan’s  (1979) 
sociological paradigms, therefore, activity theory could be considered to be influenced by the 
radical humanist and/br interpretivist paradigms.
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language” and person/object interaction. Second, language, comprised 
of a set of societally shared media that complement activity, presupposes 
“a se t of shared  social meaning” historically constructed by the 
community. Third, cultures are real and comprised of shared social 
meanings brought into existence by the collective’s  activity. Finally, the 
human child/individual progressively becomes a  full participant in the 
generation of a  sodety’s  institutions via exposure to a  community’s 
activity and internalization of its culture. It follows, then, that the higher 
mental functions are internalized forms of the activity of the community in 
which an individual acts. Since activity is the antecedent of culture and 
thus of language, activity should be a  unit of investigation in the 
explanation of emerging minds and institutions’ (Holt and Morris 1993. 
97-8; Bakhurst 1988.31).
With Holt and Morris, functionalist theories such as  systems theory embody a
blurring of human activity. Indeed, the humanness in time and space is lost
when theorists are engaged in systems analysis. In a  comparison with Charles
Perrow’s  Normal Acddents (1984)”  and the Presidential Commission’s  report.
Holt and Morris emphasize the weaknesses of the functionalist approach as
observed from a  radical-structuralist perspective. I submit that that the same
criticism also holds for Vaughan’s  theoretical analysis from a  radical-
structuralist perspective:
Perrow [Vaughan] takes a  systems theory approach to the phenomenon 
of the conflict between ideal means of solving problems in high-risk 
complex system s and their real-world implementation....By emphasizing 
coupling of system com ponents.’ Perrow [Vaughan] is perhaps 
unconsciously assenting to an inappropriate reification of the activity 
system a s  something separate from the people who make it up. After all, 
a  'system’ did not make the decision to launch the Challenger; the people 
who m ake up the system  are  responsible for that particular 
decision....Excessive abstractions, such as those found in the Perrow 
[Vaughan] model, are appealing for their neatness and theoretical 
elegance, but in fact they obscure the real functioning of activity, which is 
frequently m essy ,’ disorganized, seemingly chaotic, and hence 
endlessly fascinating. Perrow’s  model represents a  decided advance 
over the simplistic structural repairs prescribed by the Rogers 
Commission, but it still fails to recognize the complexity of the activity
"  It needs to be remembered here (Burrell and Morgan 1979) that theories from incompatible 
paradigms may be used to criticize other theoretical interpretations.
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system as  a  whole (Holt and Morris 1993,102).
Other differences between activity theory analysis from more traditional 
analyses of organizational productlon-consumption paradoxes [functionalism] 
Include:
1. Activity theory unrelentingly em phasizes the fluidity of the social 
system under examlnatlon....the human organization Is a  dynamic entity, 
fueled by the tensions between the contradictions Inherent In Its history of 
production and consumption and continuously evolving toward a  number 
of future states.
2. Activity theory Is consistently oriented toward the evolving future state 
of the organlzatlon....One problem with traditional analyses of such 
resources-partlcularly those resources connected with decision making- 
Is that they are nearly always oriented toward a  fixed view of some past 
dysfunction of the resource, a  kind of letis-flx-wfiat-went-wrong' mentality 
that only enhances the tendency to try to justify one's own actions in the 
wake of an organizational disaster. .. By focusing, as  Marx did. on the 
mediating Instrument as occupying a  dynamic, unfixed balance point that 
coordinates both past and future state of the system and to the mediating 
Instrument's potential role In that future state (102-103).
Holt and Morris apply activity theory In the case study of the Challenger
In order to explain what had occurred. Furthermore. Holt and Morris prescribe
analytical solutions to practitioners and scholars in order to prevent a similar
episode from occurring, both In the actual case Itself and any future complex
organizational endeavors. They blend elements of the radlcal-humanlst
paradigm and Interpretive paradigm, I.e.. the tfieoretical notion that time and
space are crucial to understanding human behavior In context In combination
with a dialectical analysis, and with a  Marxist dass-structure analysis. To wit:
Our analysis will delineate the flight readiness system [based on the 
Flight Readiness Review] as  one activity system within NASA’s  shuttle 
program. To do so. we will employ the following organizational schema:
(1) define the nodes of the activity triangie that correspond to the shuttle 
program preparing to launch according to a  given timetable; (2) discuss 
the production/cor^mption paradox Inherent In the '24 safe flights per 
year' mandate; (3) ictentify the primary contradictions arising a t each of
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the activity triangle’s  nodes; and (4) demonstrate the emergence of 
secondary contradictions from the primary contradictions. We will 
conclude with a  discussion of how the present shuttle flight readiness 
system has emerged from the older form of the activity, impelled by the 
springt)oard of the explosion Itself (Morns and Holt 1993, 104; See also 
Figure 4.4 below).
The primary question raised previously was how the faulty O-ring seals could
be used on the Challenger despite previous warnings is answered by Holt and
Morris:
(1) The ideal form df the FAR [Flight Readiness Review] did. indeed, flag 
the defective O-rings long before the accident, though NASA chose to 
change the directions of the agency from a focus on research and 
development to a focus on profit (104) . .this idealized version of the 
Flight Readiness Review (FRR) may be seen as  a  mediating Instrument 
that supposedly ensures that a large amount of information from the 
various Shuttle subsystem s is evaluated by decision makers in a 
thorough and timely manner. The FRR is an example of the kind of 
institutional rationality that is so often designed to com pensate for the 
limited decision making of individual human beings...
(2) The production/consumption paradox: (i) shuttle program had 
overspent or consumed too much; (ii) Kruglanski (1986), writing about the 
Challenger disaster, cites this form of rationality a s  an  example of the 
power of sociohistorical antecedents to constrain symtxalic action in the 
present, noting that the pressures to prove the value of one’s  program in 
a  highly competitive funding environment often leads to 'freezing, ’ a 
psychological commitment to a decision even in the face of evidence that 
the decision is wrong....The response of the NASA officials to the paradox 
of the conflict tietween NASA-as-consumer of Federal funds and NASA- 
as-producer of a  money-making enterprise is one that is often resorted to 
by persons in similar situations: they reverted to a  decision already 
settled upon, mistakenly believing that organizational procedure would 
make up for individual indecision.. In activity theory terms, they ignore 
the fluidity of the activity system in favor of a  static picture of how they 
perceive the system to have performed successfully in the past; thus, it is
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the ongoing nature of activity evolution that is frozen ' sr
(3) The contradiction Ixtween the increased numt)er of flights (24) versus 
the contradiction of flight safety otherwise known as a ’doubie-bind'J^ 
Three secondary contradictions accrue from this (a) between the 
community and the decision makers; (b) between the decision makers 
and the instrument [hard-reading vs. convenient reading of FRR]; and (c) 
between the rules and the object [safe shuttle vs. timely and cost-effective 
shuttle].
(4) Other secondary conbadictions:,.M  one chooses to look a t the 
accident in a  certain way, the explosion of the Challenger is tantamount 
to a  springboard which, though a  tragedy, has nevertheless served as an 
impetus for positive change in the flight readiness activity system. Before 
the explosion (that is, under the former, cost-conscious, system) the 
choice of competing forces on each primary node was dictated by a  
‘bottom-line’ mentality; cost-conscious,’ not safety-conscious’ decision 
makers (subject node); cost-efficient,’ not safe’ shuttle (object node); and 
so on. Following the explosion, a  new set of priorities emerged in line 
with the expanding system....it is highly unlikely that any mission planner 
will forget the Challenger explosion, and thus, even when increased 
utilization of the shuttles is contemplated, it will always be with an 
awareness of the potential for disaster (Holt and Mom's 1993,105 - 6).
"  See Arie Kruglanski ’Freeze-think and the Challenger” in Psychology Today, August 1986. pp. 
48-9. Kruglanski concludes his article in much the same way as Vaughan (1996) arrives at her 
interpretation of how the NASA organization behaved during the launch decision: ‘When disaster 
strikes, it is only human to look for someone to blame, but in the Challenger tragedy the real culprit 
might have been the decision-making system rather than any individual decision-makers* (49). 
Kruglanski does offer a  prescription to prevent future occurrences within the organization (as 
opposed to Vaughan who does not): "Decision-makers should . be taught the effects of 
psychological freezing. Research on the aspects of decision-making show that increasing 
people’s  awareness of the process that leads to biased judgments increases their ability to resist 
those biases. This psychological consciousness-raising could be done in two ways: through 
workshops for decision-makers at which the mechanisms that lead to freezing biases are 
explained and illustrated and during times of decision by reminding decision-makers periodically 
to consider whettier they had frozen prematurely and asking them to reassess the available 
options* (49).
See Gregory Bateson (1972) Steps to an Ecology of Mind. NY: Ballantine Books.
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FIGURES. SECONOARr CONTRADICTIONS IN ACTIVITY TRI­
ANGLE REPRESENTING NASA'S FLIGHT READI­
NESS SYSTEM
F ig u re  4.4 NASA’s  FRR Nodes of Contradiction (Source: Secondary 
Contradictions in Activity Triangle Representing NASA's Flight Readiness 
System, Holt and Mom's 1993,106).
Holt and Morns show the benefits of using activity theory in order to
analyze the Challenger space shuttle launch and to prevent social conditions
from occurring wfiich may lead to a similar disaster in the future. Paramount in
importance is the consideration of the paradoxical relationship between
members in the organization and the organization itself. According to Holt and
Morris, activity tfieory also demonstrates the complexity of human relationships:
(1)...the activity model...locates the tension t>etween the individual 
organizational actor’s  perceptions, and their awareness of what is going 
on in the activity system as  a whole. Had Mulloy and the people at 
Thiokol been made aware, over extended periods of time, of the internal 
contradictions embodied in the activity triangle on the night of January 
27, 1986, it is less likely that they would have clung so stubbornly to their 
individual viewpoints that a  launch on the following morning would have 
occurred.
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(2) [The] analysis brings into serious question the assumption of the 
Rogers Commission...that the contradictions are  obstacles to effective 
organizational functioning, aspects of the system  that must be 
fixed .'...contradictions are not only inevitable in any dynamic system, but 
are signs that the system  is growing, expanding, and evolving 
[contradiction is a  sign of function and not dysfunction].
(3) Application of activity theory to such a  complex problem virtually 
forces the analyst to account for /nfenrelationships among a  plethora of 
contributing factors (Holt and Morris 1993,107 - 8).
Thus, Holt and Morris engage the organizational theorist to consider the human 
complexities involved in the mix of recreating organizational reality. 
Organizations like NASA are not established on a  fixed, or static, point in a 
limited time and space continuum." Rather, organizations are constantly 
evolving and as such are subject to internal contradictions. Members within 
organizations need to becom e aware of th e se  ever-changing internal 
contradictions in order to prevent catastrophes from occurring again.
A key aspect to activity theory is Marx's economic determinism, which 
ultimately underpins Holt and Morris's notion of the  production/consumption 
paradox. Holt and Morris are persuasive in their demonstration of how the 
NASA system moved from first, a  safety conscious organizational system to 
second, a  cost conscious system and finally, to one in which safety concerns 
became of the utmost importance following the explosion the Challenger space 
shuttle system. The NASA agency had moved historically from a  more safety 
conscious and experimental research and development focus to a  focus on 
making a  profit. The number of missions had been increased significantly and 
prematurely in order to realize a  material gain. T hese internal contradictions
"  See Bensman and Lilienfeld (1991. 25) for a  more thorough analysis, or Table 2.2 in this 
dissertation. Holt and Morns’s conception of the FRR process would be placed in the‘Ritualistic 
and Ceremonial Action" quadrant of Bensman and Lilienfeld's typology. Rituals and ceremonies 
are followed in organizations without any effective criticism (alternative choices or decisions are 
not considered).
137
ultimately led to a  series of bad judgments having been rendered by decision­
makers in the orgemization.
Holt and Morris also identify the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) 
prelaunch decision making process as  an instrument of the ubiquitous 
institutional rationality which attempts to com pensate for limited human 
decision-making capacity. The FRR system leads to domination of human 
beings by displacing human decision making with a  cognitive construction 
rationally designed with an economic incentive to limit human input The NASA 
organization had been corrupted by an institutionalized process which moved 
away from safety (Holt and Morris' safety node) to consumption or cost 
efficient^ (Holt and Morris' object node). The internal contradictions within the 
NASA organization proved to t)e too much for the NASA organization. The 
result was the shuttle explosion which symbolically is analogous to Marxist 
circumstances leading to a  proletarian revolution. It took the ill-fated 
Challenger launch decision to expose the inherent contradictions and 
systematic domination of the NASA organization.
A Note on Radical-Structuralism: Knowledge and Insights Gained
Radical-structuralism t>est represents the domination of lower-level 
organization participants, as defined by Burrell and Morgan (1979) and Morgan 
(1997). Under radical-structuralism, members within organizations who have 
experienced oppression based on the structure of the organization feel the 
impact of decisions rendered by managers. Lower organizational participants 
react to the environment created by executives and managers who regard the 
members as objects. As recipients of the dehumanizing effects of the 
established bureaucracy, lower participants in the organization's scalar chain
138
become frustrated and alienated In their efforts to control aspects of their own 
work-world. We see from the examples offered in this Challenger case study 
how organizational structures can become instruments of domination. In the 
Presidential Commission hearings we have observed several examples of the 
seamier side of organizational behavior. The NASA budget analyst Richard 
Cook was frustrated by tfie NASA management hierarchy wfien his memoranda 
were ignored. Cook's pleas for tfie Commission to investigate the complaints of 
engineers within the NASA organization fell upon deaf ears. Cook later further 
alleged tfiat higfier-level NASA officials had not been properly held responsible 
for the launch decision. Cook maintained that the Rogers Commission had 
failed to do its job and was, ttierefore. part of the organization's cover up. The 
Commission exposed the fact that some within the NASA organization opposed 
the Challenger launch. It was apparent from the testimony of Ben Powers (tfie 
Marshall Structures and Propulsion Laboratory engineer) that channels of 
communication were not open. Members were compelled to maintain their 
silence and to offer advice or dissent only through proper organizational 
channels. Roger Boisjoly of Morton Thiokol was cowed by George Hardy of the 
NASA organization who was appalled by the initial decision of MTI engineering 
not to go along with the launch, even tfiough tfiere were well-known ill effects of 
cold weattier on the Solid Rocket Booster rubber O-rings. Boisjoly could not 
immediately quantify (or justify) what he knew intuitively, that the frozen O-rings 
would not properly seal. This inability of the O-rings to seal allowed hot gases 
to pass through the O-rings and ignite the rocket fuel. All three testimonials of 
the lower-level participants demonstrate the effect of the NASA organization as 
a  dominating instrument
Radical-structural theorists who analyze the Challenger launch decision
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place the responsibility for the launch decision on the NASA managers. 
Qouran. e t al. (1986) and Kramer (1992), note that the structure of the 
organization caused the accident, in particular the strong role delineations and 
rigid hierarchical boundaries. Holt and Morris (1993) believe that the 
ubiquitous and traditional interpretations of Cartesian dualism (functionalism) 
prevalent in Western society lead to an artificial separation of the individual 
minds of members in the organization from the structure of the organization. 
The traditional functionalism/systems theory of risk theorists Perrow and 
Vaughan fails to capture the paradoxical nature of human activity. 
Organizational structures such as NASA’s  FRR take human beings out of the 
deliberative and contemplative process in an attempt to rationalize decision­
making. Systems put in place by managers seeking cost reductions make 
decisions rather than do the workers who are involved in the work. This action 
does not, however, alleviate internal contradictions from persisting In 
organizations, especially when there is a  conflict between the values of 
economy and efficiency versus the safety of human beings.
Radical'StructuralIsm and Hypotheses Explanation: How Useful Is
the Paradigm?
The hypotheses stated in Chapter One and earlier in this chapter under 
the functionalist heading are reiterated here in order to examine them in light of 
the explanations offered by radical structuralist theorists addressing aspects of 
the Cha/Zeriger launch decision;
1. Managers ignored information from employees who knew what was 
going on.
2. Managers who ignore the useful knowledge of the workers will
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sometimes blame the workers when managements’ plans go awry. Also, 
organizations will go to great lengths to protect the managers and the 
organization until compelled to do otherwise.
3. Managers hold the simplistic notion that they can control every aspect 
of their organization, and even those of other organizations.
Radical-structuralist paradigm theorists are concerned primarily with the 
nefarious effects of organizations a s  instruments of domination. There is a 
human tendency for one to want to blame someone else for ill-considered or 
unwise action. Radical-structuralist theorists have an inherent bias against 
traditional management structures, which they see  a s  part and parcel to the 
economic and political status quo. To them, traditional management represents 
oppression: slaves have been replaced by paid functionaries in organizations 
who still do the will of their masters.
The hypotheses statements laid out in this dissertation are well-suited for 
analysis by theorists of the radical-structuralist paradigm. Of course managers 
ignore or disregard information coming from subordinates. Organizations are 
designed by those in power in order to protect managers from the actions of 
their workers. Employees are merely tools at the disposal of managers. 
Modern organizations, no less so than more primitive organizations, are 
structured in order for lower participants to follow orders and directives from 
higher authorities.
Radical-structuralism also addresses the third hypothesis (stated above) 
in that the NASA organization obviously controls aspects of the Morton Thiokol 
company. There is a  consensus among most radical-structuralist theorists that 
NASA managers Hardy and Mulloy clearly intimidated Thiokol management 
into overturning their initial decision not to lauix:h the Challenger on January 
28. Indeed, both NASA managers directly threatened Thiokol officials. In this
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case, the Thiokol organization was subordinate to NASA. Thiokol memlaers. 
particularly the engineers, were used  a s  objects by NASA managers to 
legitimize the launch decision.
The radical-structural theorists analyzing the Challenger launch decision 
offer convincing arguments a s  to why the decision w as rendered. Holt and 
Morris (1993) rendered an analysis in which human organizations such as 
NASA are complex and should not be  sui^ect to over-simplified interpretations. 
The radical-structuralist paradigm is particularly helpful in explaining events in 
which conventional organizational activity has been turned upside-down. 
Radical-structural theorists have tools readily available to them to explain 
problems in organizations when they occur. Marx’s  concept of internal 
contradictions and Max W eber's concept of the dehumanizing effects of 
bureaucracies offer analytical tools for the organizational theorist to come to 
grips with som e of the paradoxical complexities inherent in human 
organizations.
An objection could be raised here tfiat radical-structural theorists are too 
accusatory (and hence, ideological) or conspiratorial in their biases against 
traditional management structures and the managers themselves in those 
organizations. Perhaps organizational structures assum e greater prominence 
and importance than is warranted. Human history is replete with examples of 
revolutionaries over throwing the sta tu s quo powers and installing similar 
economic, social and political arrangem ents which ensure the continued 
domination of elites over those out of power. Thus, solutions advocated by the 
revolutionaries are ephemeral and transparent The potential for abuse over 
time in human organizations persists.
Holt and Morris (1993) managed to place an emphasis on the movement
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away from a  focus on safety to a  focus on cost and efficiency in tfie NASA 
organization. In particular, the Marxist internal contradiction problematic 
provides a  useful means of examining the Challenger launch decision. As 
Commission testimony amply illustrates, safety considerations were clearly 
compromised.
Another objection that could be raised is that the radical-structural 
theorists overstate their case. The NASA organization upper-level managers 
do not always mistreat their employees by ignoring member’s  needs and 
insights. It could be argued that the organization was for most of the time more 
or less functional rather than dysfunctional. Radical-structural theorists can be 
as  deterministic in their outlook of human nature as their functionalist 
counterparts. In other words, managers are not always prone to ignoring 
information and to ignoring the knowledge of the work by memt)ers employed 
under them. Otherwise, the organization would fail to have the cooperation 
necessary for its continued existence.
Structuralism, Functional and Radical, Reconsidered
Functionalist and radical-structuralist theories are primarily concerned 
with organizations as  structures. Human beings tend to be subsumed into the 
organizational miasma. Functionalist theories promote the hierarchical 
arrangement of people, as cogs in a  machine, in order to render them as useful 
objects for effective and efficient utilization for those at the top of the hierarchy." 
Radical-structuralist theories in the modern organization focus on the 
dehumanizing effects of the organization as  a  structure. Various functionalist
See Rosenbk)om (1993) for further discussion of his managerial approach which encompasses 
the logic of economy, efficiency and effectiveness in organizations.
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and radical structuralist theoretical interpretations of the Challenger launch 
decision reaffirm these tendencies. The major difference between the two 
paradigms considered is that functionalist theorists promote the status quo by 
keeping the organization’s  functionaries in their proper place, whereas radical- 
structural theorists promote an overthrow of the existing organization in order to 
benefit groups being oppressed by organizational elites.
The central weakness of structural theories, both radical and functional,
is that the organization is objectified to the point that human be/ngs lose their
individual identity and the ability to render judgments which affect their
condition in the real world. Another problem peculiar to functionalist and
radical-structural theories is that there is an automatic consensus concerning
the members in the organization as  being fundamentally healthy and normal in
a  psychological sense."  Hence, a  further consideration of workers as
individual actors capable of rendering decisions and/or promoting the
organizational working environment is necessary. A sense of the pitfalls of
functionalism is captured by psycho-analytical organization theorist Howard
Schwartz (1990), who is a  critic of functionalism generally:
...traditional organization theory does not enable us to understand 
organizations that are fundamentally unhealthy. Our theories of 
organization are  basically functionalist theories, which assum e that 
organizational processes make sense in terms of the overall purposes of 
the organization. Within this paradigm, these overall purposes go 
unquestioned, and the validity of the fundamental organizational 
processes that carry them through is taken for granted. Thus, within this 
paradigm, organizational disasters and the bad decisions that lead up to 
them mustbe seen  as aberrations (Schwartz 1990, 73).*^
^ Functional theorists exhibit concern for profit making, economy, efficiency, etc., all part of the 
rationality project. Radical-structural theorists reaffirm the effects of the rationality project, but 
seek fundamentally to overthrow, or give pause to, the status quo powers-that-be.
'  [This issue is raised by Schwartz as he is highly critical of structural-functional theories such as 
Karl E. Weick’s (1988) "Organizational culture as a  source of high reliability," and Startxjck, W.H.. 
and F.J. Milliken, (1988) ‘Challenger: Fine-tuning the odds until something breaks.” Both 
theories are considered above. Schwartz's work is considered more in depth in the next chapter.
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In our attempt to capture the complexities Involved in the decision to launch the 
Challenger, we will need to pursue other theoretical avenues in order to explain 
the conditions leading up to the explosion. This necessarily involves a  more 
thorough consideration of the role of individual human beings in the fateful 
course of events. The next chapter will consist of an examination of the radical 
humanist and interpretive paradigms in order to see  what insights and 
knowledge those theoretical perspectives yield.
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Chapter V: Radical Humanism and Interpretivism
The radical humanist and interpretivfst paradigm explanations offered by 
tfieorists of tfiese respective worldviews are  rattier few in comparison with ttie 
structuralist paradigms, particularly the functionalist tfieories. This is to tie 
expected given ttie predominance of ttie rationality project a s  indicated by 
Stone (1997), Adams and Ingersoll (1990), Schwartz (1990), Morgan (1980, 
1986 and 1997) and Burrell and Morgan (1979). Neverttieless, the Challenger 
launch decision has been analyzed from a  psychic prisons (psycho-analytic) 
and an organization communication theoretical perspective. I have interpreted 
both the psychic prisons and organization communication theoretical concepts 
a s  belonging to the culture metaphor wtiere the emptiasis is on how language 
shapes organizational reality (see Morgan 1997, 399). In contrast to the 
aforementioned theories, the flux and transformation metaphor has an 
emphasis on the paradox of organizational r e a l i t y . M o r g a n  notes that 
"humans-whetfier scientists or individuals in everyday life~[act] a s  interpreters 
and creators of an ‘objective reality,’ rather than neutral observers” (429).°* 
Despite the paucity of theoretical analyses from tfie radical humanist and 
interpretive paradigms, the theoretical explanations offered by scholars 
interpreting tfie Challenger launch decision are remarkable and distinctive in 
their approach a s  compared to the previously examined structural analyses. At 
the end of tfie chapter, I will offer a  mostly phenomenological interpretation
See Morgan (1997, 420) for a  discussion of the dialectics of management, or managing 
paradox. Morgan notes that considenng paradox in organizations can "provide ways of thinking 
about the management of competing tensions and of how paradoxes can often be reframed 
through creative insights." Tompkins (1993) as we will see below demonstrates the tensions 
exhibited by managers and employees of the Marshall Space Flight Center which had an impact 
on the launch decision.
Note here that the organization communications ttieories offered tiy academicians vary widely 
but are categorized as belonging for the most part to the interpretive paradigm for this case study 
as put forward in Morgan’s (1986; 1997) analytical framework.
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based on the knowledge analytic developed by Camevale and Hummel (1996).
Psychic Prisons. Culture and the Challenger Launch Decision 
Organizational Decay and Idealism
As was indicated in the previous chapter, structural theories, both radical 
and functional, have a  propensity by their advocates to consider the 
organization as an entity whose existence is separate and apart from individual 
human beings. There is an assumption in structural theories that the collective 
group of individuals within the organization subsum e their distinct human 
conception of being into the organizational totality. Thus, the organization 
assum es, in a  reified manner, a  distinct identity and being of its own. 
Functionalist theories reinforce the status quo and enable elites to maintain 
control over organizational members. Radical structuralist theorists 
demonstrate the oppressive nature of the same organizational totality, but have 
a  tendency to prescribe a  change in leadership by replacing the nefarious 
social arrangement with a  new, or revolutionary, structure. Both theoretical 
paradigms are concerned with structural causation and analysis. The role of 
the independent actor is either not considered at all or is relegated by structural 
theorists to being secondary in importance.
The major antithetical theoretical argum ent in juxtaposition to 
functionalism is presented by Howard S. Schwartz in his work Narcissistic 
Process and Corporate Decay: The Theory of the Organization Ideal (1990)."= 
Schwartz presents the case that the NASA organization was psychologically
dysfunctional. The organization was led by leaders with an unhealthy
^ One of the major points of emphasis in Burrell and Morgan (1979) is that the radical humanist 
paradigm is primarily anti-organization in principle. As we will see from Schwartz’s  work, the NASA 
organization represents an instrument of decadence for the psychologically dysfunctional 
leaders.
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disposition to t)eing narcissistic which ultimately tjecame critical to the ill fated 
ChaHen^r launch decision. Relying primarily on the works of Sigmund Freud 
and Carl Jung. Schwartz makes the argument that NASA, prior to the 
Challenger space shuttle launch, was the embodiment of the organizational 
ideal in the form of egocentric behaviors manifested by NASA decision makers. 
Schwartz demonstrates the impact of individual human beings and their 
behaviors which impact activities in organizations. Schwartz emphasizes that it 
is not organizations which make decisions, rather human beings within the 
organization do. As such. Schwartz focuses our attention on leaders in 
organizations who make decisions for others and the resulting consequences 
which follow.
Before contemplating Schwartz's psycho-analytical theory as applied to 
the Challenger case study, we will examine his conception of the differentiation 
of traditional management practices taught in university courses which do not 
adequately represent reality. According to Scwartz. the propensity to foster 
traditional technical rationality in organizations by managers and students alike 
is irresistible. First. Schwartz develops the clockwork metaphor which 
represents 1exttxx)k” explanations of organizations, i.e., “the organization is like 
a  clock: everytxxly knows what the organization is all about and is concerned 
solely with carrying out its mission; people are basically happy at their work; the 
level of anxiety is low; people interact with each other in frictionless. mutually 
supportive cooperation; and if there are any managerial problems at all, these 
are basically technical problems, easily solved by someone who has the proper 
skills and knows the correct techniques of management” (1990, 7).” Schwartz 
describes this method as an “ego ideal” as not being a  true depiction of reality.
The clockwork metaphor has much In common with the rationality project or technical rationality 
described above.
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rather he states that the ego ideal does not explain human organizations as It 
“représentes) the return to nardsslsm -the healing of the rift between subject 
and object self and other, freedom and necessity, that permeates post Infant 
mental life . .[Schwartz's students] wanted to know about the clockwork 
organization not t)ecause It represents a  perfect organization, but rather 
because it represents the possitxiity of Isecomlng perfect themselves” (Schwartz 
1990, 9). According to Schwartz, tfie clockwork organization Is not a  true 
depiction of reality but Is rather an “ego Ideal” which does not exist nor can ever 
be attained.
The second metaphor, termed the snakepit. Is the opposite of the
clockwork metaphor, or the traditional texttiook projection. According to
Schwartz, the snakepit metaphor represents a  truer sense of reality of
organizational life:
Here, everything Is always falling apart, and people's main activity Is to 
see tfiat It doesn't fall on them; nobody really knows what Is going on. 
though everyone cares about what Is going on because there Is danger 
In not knowing; anxiety and stress are constant companions; and people 
take little pleasure In dealing with each other, doing so primarily to use 
otfiers for tfieir own purposes or because they cannot avoid tieing so 
used themselves. Managerial problems here are experienced as 
Intractable, and managers feel that they have done well If they are able 
to make It through the day ...How was it possible to reconcile the interest 
of my students In the texttxxik/clockwork Image of the organization with 
the fact that the best evidence of tfieir own senses, and of tfie senses of 
their peers, was that such things do not exist?....(he idea of the ckjckwork 
organization had much more than pragmatic significance for them. It was 
rather an article of faith. And, as with all articles of faith, the way to 
understand this one is to understand its place in the individual’s 
psycftological configuration. We hold to articles of faith because we 
need to. That is why they cannot t)e dislodged tjy  facts. In other words, 
the question becomes what did the idea of the clockwork organization 
mean to ttwse students? What did it represent to them that was so 
important for them to believe in?" (Scfiwartz 1990, 8, Italics added for 
emphasis).
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The clockwork model is the organizational ideal, or myth, taught and desired by 
students in management even though they know that the snakepit is the truer 
depiction of reality.
Schwartz notes that most theories explaining the events leading to the
Challenger incident are functionalist, tiave a  propensity to perfect the allegedly
inerrant system in question by offering structural fixes, and that "traditional
organization theory does not enable us to understand organizations that are
fundamentally unhealthy”:
Within this [functionalist] paradigm, [the purposes and processes of the 
organization] go unquestioned, and the validity of the fundamental 
organizational processes that carry them through is taken for granted. 
Thus, within this paradigm, organizational disasters and the bad 
decisions that lead up to them must t)e seen as at)errations (1990. 73)."^
Schwartz shows that most of the previous launches were not successful and 
that in fact "many of them were near catastrophes and had been so for a  long 
time" (1990. 74). There are two major elements provided by Schwartz's 
analysis. Firstly, the theory of organization decay delineates the process by 
which the organization loses sight of its responsibility to its members. And 
secondly, the theory of the organization ideal depicts the psychologically 
dysfunctional NASA organization dominated by the narcissism of its leadership 
and their commitment to the fantasy of perfection. The NASA organization was 
in a  constant state of denial about the importance of the SRB O-rings and this 
denial was an important element of narcissistic behavior, i.e.. the notion of 
infallibility due to the managers’ conception of themselves being perfect.
History" shows that the NASA organization was headed towards organizational
”  Note here that Schwartz is taking particular a«n with his criticism of Karl Weick's ‘Organizational 
culture as a  source of high reliatxiity and W.H. Starbuck and F.J. Milliken’s ‘Challenger: fine- 
tuning the odds until something breaks.* Both of these functionalist articles were considered in 
the previous chapter.
" See also tfie chronological history of tfie Cha/ienger shuttle disaster developed in Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation
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decay ” Schwartz recounts the incidents chronologically:
1. As early a s  Octot)er 1977, NASA rejected as ‘unacceptable’ Morton- 
Thiokol’s design for solid rocket booster (SRB seals because ‘joint 
rotation’ prevented the secondary O-rings from sealing.)
2. After tests performed in May 1982, NASA Accepted the conclusion that 
the secondary O-ring was no longer functiOnal . when the Solid Rocket 
Motor reached 40 percent of its maximum expected operating pressure’ 
[Report/, 1986:126] arxl therefore ruled the seal system non redundant.
3. In-flight erosion of tfie primary seal occurred as  early a s  the second 
shuttle flight, in November 1981, and, beginning with flight 41-B in 
February 1984, it becam e a  regular occurrence, with some primary rings 
not sealing at all,
4. On flight 51-B, not only did a  primary O-ring fail altogether to seal, but a  
secondary O-ring eroded.
Thus, NASA knew that it could depend on neither the secondary O-ring 
nor the primary O-ring. It also knew, of course, that if neither O-ring 
sealed, the result would be catastrophic. This condition was deemed so 
serious that NASA issued a  launch constraint on all subsequent flights- 
and then waived it in each case.
The second premise, that the system was healthy, also turns out to be 
false. Rather, a  closer look at the organizational context shows that, 
despite Weick’s  claim, there certainly was something wrong at NASA. 
Indeed, the system had changed its character. To be sure, it had not 
changed suddenly. Nonetheless, over the years, NASA had become a 
hollow shell of its former self.
Consider the problems that had arisen in four cross-cutting dimensions:
1. Hardware Problems: The solid rocket booster joints that were found 
to have caused the Challenger explosion were far from being the only 
unreliable items in the  shuttle system. On the contrary, the Rogers 
Commission found that the wheel, braking, and steering systems were all 
"  See also Donald Christiansen's "A System Gone Awry” in IEEE Spectrum, March 1987, 
24/3:23. Christiansen notes that "...The toss of Challenger in January 1986 was the result of a 
long-recognized and well-understood fault in the txxister rocket design. [A txiard appointed try 
NASA administrator James Fletcher in the 1973 Skylab misadventure] stated that th e  
management system developed by NASA for manned space flight places large emphasis on rigor, 
detail, and thoroughness. In hand with this emphasis comes formalism, extensive 
documentation, and visibility in detail to senior management While nearly perfect such a  system 
can submerge the concerned individual [emphasis added] and depress the role of the intuitive 
engineer or analyst It may not allow full play for the intuitive judgment or past experience of the 
individual. An emphasis on management systems can, in itself, serve to separate the people 
engaged in the program from die real world of hardware'.
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faulty and that the main engines had a  number of serious problems, 
including cracks in the turbine blades, valve failures and leaks from heat 
exchangers.
2. Lx)ss of Administrative Contrat NASA had virtually lost control of its 
spending and had wasted, according to federal audits, a t least $3.5 
billion...
3. Loss of Technical Control: In its early years. NASA had maintained 
the technological capability and the staff to oversee its contractors....
4. Loss of Control over Operations: NASA came to have extreme and 
increasing difficulty in conducting and coordinating the complex 
processes involved in shuttle operations. The Rogers Commission, in 
assessing  NASA’s  difficulties in this area, maintained that ‘an 
assessment of the system’s overall performance is best made t>y studying 
the process at the end of the production chain; crew training’ (Report I, 
1986; 166). And, in this regard, the commission quoted astronaut Henry 
Hartsfield:
Had we not had the accident, we were going to be up against a  wall; 
STS 61-H...would have had to average 31 hours in the simulator to 
accomplish their required training, and STS 61-K would have to average 
33 hours [Note: normal time was 77 hours]. That is ridiculous. For the 
first time, somebody was going to have to stand up and say we have got 
to slip the launch t)ecause we are not going to have the crew trained’ 
[Report!, 1986:170].
On the whole, the picture of NASA that emerges from thorough 
investigation is of an organization characterized t>y the generalized and 
systemic ineffectiveness that we associate with organizational decay-an 
organization in which the flawed decision to launch the Challenger was 
not an aberration but a  normal and ordinary way of doing business 
(Schwartz 1990, 74-77).
The decay of the organizational culture was hastened by the narcissism 
of the NASA managers at the expense of Morton-Thiokol engineers. The 
manifestation of this narcissism w as apparent in the January 27th 
teleconference:
Perhaps the fact that the 27 January teleconference was the most 
minutely investigated element of the disaster is the reason that it also 
gives us the best example of what the denial of pressure looks like with
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regard to the people who are Iseing pressured. For, it is dear that, on the 
one hand, Morton-Thiokol was under considerable pressure to please an 
important customer and go along with NASA’s  desire to launch, while on 
the other hand, it appears that this pressure was not regarded by Morton- 
Thiokol management, a s  opposed to Morton-Thiokol engineers, a s  
pressure at the time, nor remembered as pressure by them. Thus, 
engineers Allan McDonald and Brian Russell, a s  well a s  other Morton- 
Thiokol engineers, testified that they had felt pressure, but Jerry Mason, 
senior vice president, [and] Jo e  Kilminster, vice president for shuttle 
projects [did not].
Evidently, the differentiation coincided with a  disparity in perception of 
the way that NASA had redefined the situation, from one in which they 
had to prove that it was safe to fly. to one in which they had to prove it 
was unsafe to fly. Morton-Thiokol engineers evidently realized that the 
situation was being redefined, while management did not Thus. Robert 
Lund said:
‘We have always dealt with Marshall for a  long time and have always 
been in the position of defending our position to make sure that we were 
ready to fly, and I guess I didn’t  realize until after the meeting and after 
several days that we had absolutely changed our position from what we 
had before’ [Report 1,1986:94].
It appears that we have here, in the case of Morton-Thiokol management, 
an example of the dynamics FreucT™ associated with leadership. For 
Freud, the leader takes the place of the follower’s ego Ideal. In the 
process, die IndMdual’s sense of judgment, his or her reflecting, critical 
ability, is given over to the leader, and consequently the individual’s 
sense of moral autonomy is lost With regard to the Morton-Thiokol 
engineers, this had not happened, or a t least not comptetely. This is why 
the Morton-Thiokol engineers felt pressure, while the managers did not 
The experience of pressure involves a sense of oneself as a distinct 
entity against another distinct entity. Thus the engineers maintained a 
sense of their authority by retaining their own ego ideal-an ego ideal in 
which their professional engineering standards played a large part For 
the managers, however, putting NASA in the place of their ego ideal 
meant in effect, that they had taken NASA as their image of what they 
should be themselves, the realization of tfieir own narcissism. In this 
way. ttie tx)undaries tjetween them and NASA vanished. They fused 
with NASA and gave up their sense of being distinct entities. In effect, 
these people had given up tfieir own selves. There was no self tfiat could
For a more comprehensive (yet still t)rieO analysis, see Sigmund Freud's (1984) ‘Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" in The Mstfor Works of S^mund Freud (664 - 96) 
[translated by James Strachey and originally published in 1921]. Chicago: Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc.
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have experienced pressure (Schwartz 98-99. italics added for emphasis).
By fusing their individual identities with the NASA organization, the managers 
lost their sense of judgment and the individual's sense of moral autonomy. The 
engineers were consumed by the decision making process and were largely 
unconscious of the narcissism of the NASA managers.
Part of the problem with NASA’s  narcissism is that it is pervasive in the
American culture (Schwartz 1990, 124). Americans want heroes and gods to
protect them from the evils present in the world:
When the original astronauts were chosen, during a  period in which 
American rockets did nothing but blow up. the adulation for them was 
instant They, our bravest and best test pilots, would ride the rockets into 
space and symbolically do battle with the Russians, in much the same 
way that earlier lone warriors had stood for the armies of which they were 
part and prefigured or replaced the battle between the armies 
themselves. The public would grant them anything. It would be the 
loving world of which they were a t the center. It would fulfill for them the 
ego ideal... the astronaut would take upon himself the role of a protecting 
god (Schwartz 111 -2).
The American public had been caught up in an overly romanticized and 
unrealistic fantasy concerning what mere mortals could do in such a  complex 
undertaking. At the same time, the space shuttle launch system had been sold 
by NASA*” and by government leaders as  becoming fully operational. 
According to Schwartz,
"" Schwartz criticizes and questions the competence of Acting NASA Administrator William R. 
Graham whose "arrogance may be understood as a  natural concomitant, and even a requirement 
of his high position in an organêation like this. His position meant that he could, and even stioukJ, 
idealize himself and require that others do the same. He was. according to his ideology and the 
ideology of an increasingly totalitarian NASA, the ego ideal, and that meant to him that his 
ideological agenda was the meaning of NASA" (84). Schwartz was referring to Graham’s public 
statements referring to the Solid Rocket Boosters as  being the sturdiest part of ttie space shuttle 
system. Schwartz also pointed out that "As the political criteria for NASA selection became more 
important, Trento shows, the managerial and administrative competence of its high officials 
steadily decreased. The ultimate act in this tragedy came with the appointment of William R. 
Graham as Begg’s  deputy....Graham was forced on Beggs. wtw was tricked and browbeaten into 
taking him even though Graham’s background was not in the space program but as a  nuclear 
weapons expert....Beggs, as he himself says, had been warned by this time that the guy was a 
right-wing kook, a  nut™ (Trento 1987,261] (Schwartz 1990, 83 - 4).
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...Having proved Its capacity to create magical transformations, the space 
shuttle had nothing left to show.
This is the context in which the sorts of abuses of organizational 
process described earlier occurred at NASA: appointments to technical 
position based purely on politics, loss of technical capacity to properly 
oversee contractors, submission of schedules that could not be met, 
commitment to projects that were grossly underfunded, extreme 
miscalculation of risks, suppression of unpleasant information, 
degeneration of organizational processes into empty rituals, and so on.
In a  word, I sutjmit that wttat occurred was a  neurotic regression of the 
symbolic structure in which the American people saw manned space 
flight and through it themsefyres. TNs regression went from a religious 
framework, where danger was acknowledged, the possibility of failure 
was present, and competence was required, to an animistic system, in 
which safety was assured, perfecdon was assumed, and nothir^ was 
required at all. In the first system, technological achievement was 
possüWe. In (he second it was not (Schwartz 124).
Schwartz thus takes Stone's (1997) notion of the policy paradox to task in that
American managers and executives hold a  deep and abiding faith in resolving
complex problems by restructuring organizational processes. While agreeing in
principle with Stone's contention concerning America’s  fixation with structural
solutions to human entities, Schwartz takes Stone's analysis a  step further by
indicating that the managers in the NASA organization have a  deep-seated
psychological disorder which is increasingly prevalent in the American culture:
... NASA was serving a  symbolic function within the American 
culture . upon NASA had fallen the burden of maintaining the narcissism 
of a  strikingly and perhaps increasingly narcissistic American 
culture....Gaining a  sense of the place of narcissism in American society 
requires a  concept that I have not made much use of before: the 
superego. In the normal case, partly through projection and partly 
through introjection, an individual comes to have a  relatively stable 
image of the person he or she is supposed to be’ or should be' in order 
again to become the center of a  loving world. Thus, a  set of obligations is 
understood as expressing the conditions for the attainment of the ego 
ideal. This set of obligations provides the basis for the superego.
The superego gives a  sense of direction to one's life and especially to 
those areas of life, such as one’s  organizational role, that are dominated 
and motivated by a  sense of the appropriate. But between people and 
within the same person at different times, the balance between the
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fantastical aspect of the ego ideal and its obligatory aspect, the 
superego, may differ. When the obligatory aspect gains the upper hand 
and displaces the fantastical, we speak of the person a s  an obsessive- 
compulsive, When the obligatory aspect is very weak a s  compared with 
the fantastical, we refer to the person as narcissistic. Such persons may 
be said to identify themselves with their own ego ideal.
The difference between the narcissistic aixl the normal case, then, has 
a  developmental dimension. The obligatory component develops 
through the course of a  person’s  life-a course that begins with primary 
narcissism but that progresses through identifications with adults whom 
the individual regards as  having attained the ego ideal and whom the 
individual strives to be like. Thus, the normal person believes that he or 
she needs to live up to certain standards, to become somebody’ in order 
to attain the ego ideal. The narcissist, maintaining an infantile orientation 
to the world, believes that he or she is already the ego ideal and in one 
way or another denies those elements of reality that contradict this 
preferred vision .note that the denial of difference is a t one and the 
same time a  denial of the difference between the world and the self, 
reality and fantasy, achievement and desire, between technology and 
magic. A society thinking of itself in these terms, living its emotional life 
on this level, would have lost the motivational basis for technological 
achievement (Schwartz 1990, 109-11, italics added for emphasis).
With Schwartz’s  analysis we see a  sense of the loss of obligation to those 
workers and astronauts affected by the decision to launch the Challenger. 
Narcissistic managers possessing idealized conceptions about their own 
abilities and limitations lose their capacity to render appropriate judgments in 
critical situations.
Psychic Prisons and Ethical Dimensions
The question of ethics and ethical conduct represents another theoretical
approach within the radical humanist paradigm. An aspect of Morgan's psychic
prisons metaphor is that of ethics. While there is some mention of ethics in his
work, it is may be summed by the following comment:
...the psychic prison metaphor plays a  powerful role in drawing attention 
to the ethical dimension of organization....[T|here is nothing neutral about 
the way we organize. It is always human in the fullest sense and . an
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increased awareness of the human dimension needs to t>e built into 
everything we do. While the metaphor offers obvious guidance on the 
management of change, it also warns us that we may be walking on 
dangerous ethical ground, especially when we use our knowledge of 
archetypal feelings or social defence mechanism to achieve instrumental 
ends (Morgan 1997, 248).
Ethics, here comprising manifestations of conscience and having normative
connotations, is represented in analyses of the Cha//enper disaster. Analysts of
ethics tend to view the events surrounding the accident from the worker's (or
engineer's) perspective. Individual identities within modern, highly technical
organizations have been hidden within the organizational milieu to the point
that "it is no longer the individual that is the primary focus of power and
responsibility, but [rather] public and private institutions""' (Boiqoly, Curtis, and
Mellican 1989, 217). The Challenger accident represents a  challenge to
traditional conceptions of ethics in the workplace:
A disturbing feature of so many of the analyses and commentaries on the 
Challenger disaster is the reinforcement, and implicit acceptance, of this 
shift away from individual moral agency with an almost exclusive focus 
on the flaws in the management system, organizational structures and/or 
decision making process. Beginning with the findings of the Rogers 
Commission investigation, one could practically conclude that no one 
had any responsibility whatsoever for the disaster...
When the Commission states in its...finding that "waiving of launch 
constraints appears to have been a t the expense of flight safety, the 
immediate and obvious question would seem to be: Who approved the 
waivers and assumed this enormous risk...There are two puzzling 
aspects to this Commission finding. First, the formal system already 
contained the requirement that project offices inform at least Level I of 
launch constraints....Second. the Commission clearly established that the 
individual a t Marshall who both imposed and waived the launch 
See also Steven Goldberg, T h e  Space Shuttle Tragedy and the Ethics of Engineering” in 
JunmetncsJouina/, Winter 1987,155 - 9. Goldberg develops the concept of "separatism”, or the 
notion that scientists and engineers should have technical inputs only in decision making. 
Goldbeig does not attribute heroism to the Morton-Thiokol engineers, particularly Roger Boisjoly: 
There is a  name for Boisjoly’s approach. It is not heroism, it is separatism: the notion that 
scientists and engineers should supply the technical inputs, but appropriate management and 
political organs should make the value decisions. Separatism is the dominant approach today to 
policy problems of this type, and it is an approach that has been explicitly applied to 
engineers...(156 - 7).
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constraint was Lawrence Mulloy. SRB Project Manager. Then why 
blame the management system, especially in such a  crucial area as  that 
of launch constraints, when procedures of that system were not followed?
Is that approach going to increase the accountability of individuals within 
the system for future Flights?....
The approach of the Rogers Commission and that of most of the 
analyses of the Challenger disaster is consistent with the growing 
tendency to deny any specific responsibility to individual persons within 
corporate or other institutional settings when things go wrong....
The problem with this em phasis on management system s and 
collective responsibility is that it fosters a  vicious circle that further and 
further erodes and obscures individual responsibility. This leads to a  
paradoxical -  and untenable -situation (such a s  in the space shuttle 
program) in which decisions are made and performed by individuals or 
groups of individuals but not attributed to them. It thus reinforces the 
tendency to avoid accountability for what anyone does by attributing the 
consequences to the organization decision making process. Again, 
shared, rather than individual, risk taking and responsibility become 
operative. The end result can be a  cancerous attitude that so permeates 
an organization or m anagem ent system that it m etastasizes into 
decisions and acts of life-threatening irresponsibility (Boisjoly. et al. 
1989.225 - 7).
In accordance with the psychic prisons metaphor, the Rogers Commission 
represents the instrument through which irresponsible NASA launch decision 
makers are protected. The central terxlency of the modem organization is. in 
essence, to protect careless m anagers from receiving adequately their just 
desserts.
Another example of managerial coverup is cited by Trudy Bell and Karl 
Esch In their article "The fatal flaw in Flight 51-L" in IEEE Spectrum, in their
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interview with former NASA Associate Administrator Hans Mark**° :
The only criticism that I have of the [Rogers commission] report is that 
they laid more blame on the lower-level engineers and less blame on the 
upper-level management than they should have. As with most of those 
commissions, the guys on the bottom took the rap. They quote [associate 
administrator for space flight Jesse] Moore and [administrator James] 
Beggs and a  few others saying they didn't know about the O-ring 
problems, which I find awfully hard to believe. I mean, hell, I knew about 
it two years before the accident and even wrote a  memo about it. I just 
find it very hard to believe (Bell and Esch 1987, 49).
And from an organization communications scholar:
The Rogers commission report did not explicitly grapple with the 
question of the locus of responsibility-whether it was primarily people, or 
primarily procedures, or a  mixture of tfie two. The Conclusions and 
Recommendations sections of the Rogers report reflect this lack of 
clarification. At the end of the volume in which causes are discussed, 
paragraph one states, the decision was flawed;* paragraph two states, 
the decision-making process was flawed;’ and paragraph three states 
that the cause was failures in communication’ [Report f, 82]. These 
expressions are confusing, ambiguous, perhaps even contradictory. 
Were particular decisions flawed, suggesting personal responsibility; 
were the procedural systems tfiemselves flawed, indicating procedural 
responsibility; or did someone fail to do something required by 
procedures, indicating personal responsibility?
. .[P]ersonal judgment, rather tfian procedural shortcomings, accounts 
for the loss of Challenger. The Conclusions and Recommendations 
sections of both investigations, however, make little mention of personal 
judgment or responsibility. That tfie conclusions do not follow logically 
comes to light only wfien key decisions are examined to assess  whether 
personal judgment or procedural requirements determined important
Mark (1987) makes the following obsenratidn: 'My own part in the chain of events that led to 
the accident began when I returned to NASA in 1981. I first became aware of the fact we had a 
problem with the o-ring seals on the solid Rocket Motor at the time when our engineering people 
were questioning whether these field Joints’ on the SRM were reaUy fail-safe....My memory is that 
questions as to whether the double o-ring system was really fail-safe began to be raised sometime 
in 1982. In F e b ru ^  or March 1983 Mr. L Michael Weeks, the deputy associate administrator of 
NASA for space flight signed out a  memorandum waiving the fail-safe requirements for the field 
joints in the Solid Rocket Motor. I remember discussing that matter with him at the time and 
concluding that such a  step was justified. I argued at the time that we had more than a  hundred 
successful firings of the Titan Solid Rocket Motor with a  seal of somewhat similar design 
containing only one o-ring. I tfiought because of the Titan precedent that the risk of failure was 
small. As things turned out. this judgment was not correct because there are significant 
differences between the Titan and the SRM joints. I did not look at these differences with 
sufficient care at the ümeT (219, italics added for emphasis).
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decisions. Repeatedly, key decisions show that personal decision­
making was much more important than impersonal procedural decision­
making. Two examples follow.
First, Lawrence Mulloy (Manager, SRB Project, Marshall Space Flight 
Center or MSFC) testified that he had told ‘everyone’ about the problem 
with the O-ring seals, yet there is absolutely no mention of it in the flight 
readiness reviews [Report V, 85]. Thus, the all-important decision 
whether to put a  verbalized reservation into print was a  personal 
judgment This decision shows that procedures operate only derivatively 
on the basis of written inputs that might not reflect the whole decision­
making picture.
Second, there existed alternative, independent paths for reporting 
problems such a s  O-ring charring, but their existence did not prevent the 
disaster [Report V. 84]. Thus deliberate procedural redundancy was 
rendered ineffective by decisions that were erroneous or misleading 
(e.g., that charring was not "anomalous”). This circumventing of 
procedural safeguards shows the futility of expecting too much of 
procedures themselves.
Thus, many crucial decisions were made not through procedural 
algorithms but personally and separately from the system of procedures. 
Procedures were involved only after personal decision-making, to effect 
decisions already m ade....It therefore does not make sen se  to 
recommend th e  implementation of more and more impersonal 
procedures to prevent poor judgment and ethical lapses (Dombrowski 
1995,147-8).”*
The problematic of ethical dilemmas is especially difficult for functional and 
radical structural theorists to come to terms, in particular, personal 
responsibility and judgment are emphasized rather than making structural 
repairs.” ' Theorists who examine ethical problems in organizations make the
case that individual human beings within an organization who have autfiority
The problem of human values and judgment in technical communication is also addressed by 
Pace (1988) in whiCh he notes "The Challenger disaster illustrates that technical communication 
is not a  mechanistic process which can be reduced to transmission and receipt of messages. The 
testimony gathered by the President’s  Commission illustrates in graphic terms how human' the 
process of communication is. even in a  highly technical organization like NASA. Technical 
communication scholars, as well as technical decision-makers, should txoaden their perspectives 
of communication to include the human values inherent in the process. Understanding those 
values more clearly and further investigation into the unique problems of differentiating technical 
information can hopefully prevent a  future disaster like the loss of Challenger from occurring" 
(218).
See also Dombrowski (1991) where he criticized the Rogers Commission that ‘[had focused] 
largely on procedural aspects in the conclusions and recommandations.. [and] personal 
responsibility was not a  significant factor" (214).
160
and legitimacy bestowed upon them by the organization determine events and 
not bureaucratic procedures and processes, in ethical theorist analyses, 
someone is ultimately responsible for the ill-fated launch decision and fingers 
are pointed toward the culpability of senior and higher level NASA managers, 
rather than toward som e abstract organizational system or the lower 
organizational participants -  in this case toward the scapegoated engineers.™ 
Radical humanist ethics theorists go beyond Schwartz's theories of the 
organizational decay and ideal. The previous analyses also indicted the 
Rogers Commission for being part of the cover-up of the launch decision and, in 
addition, ethics theorists make a  compelling case about the ill effects of 
technology on ethics in organizational behavior.
Radical Humanism and H ypotheses Explanation: How Useful is  the
Paradigm?
The hypotheses stated in Chapter One are reiterated here in order to 
examine them in light of the explanations offered by radical humanist theorists 
addressing aspects of the Challenger launch decision:
1. Managers ignored information from employees who knew what was 
going on.
2. Managers who ignore the useful knowledge of the workers will 
sometimes blame the workers when managements' plans go awry. Also, 
organizations will go to great lengths to protect the managers and the
For a  more detailed explanation of organizational t)ehavior and ethics see Thompson (1987): 
‘When a  superior puts great pressure on subordinates to produce results and gives the 
impression that questionable practices to achieve these results will be condoned, .then the 
blame falls equally on the superior. Ignorance ceases even to mitigate responsibility.
But that an official apply pressure . is not a  necessary condition for making an official 
responsible for the subsequent actions of others. Officials who set in motion bureaucratic 
routines cannot escape culpability for the consequences even if they are no longer involved in 
the process wtien ttie consequences occur. ...Wtiettier ttie bureaucratic routines are pattiological 
or conventional (or both), they can be anticipated. That they have a  life of their own, often 
roaming beyond their original purpose, iS a  fact of organizational behavior that ofRcials stiould be 
expected to appreciate. The more the consequences of a  decision fit such bureaucratic patterns, 
the less an official can plausibly invoke the «reuse from ignorance" (60 -1).
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organization until compelled to do otherwise.
3. Managers hold the simplistic notion that they can control every aspect 
of their organization, and even those of other organizations.
There is evidence from the psychic prisons metaphor that pertains to the 
Challenger launch decision to support the three hypotheses above, although 
there is some variation. Explanations offered by Schwartz demonstrate that 
narcissistic NASA managers gave the Morton Thiokol engineers a  hearing but 
were predisposed to ignore information from them because it contradicted their 
own perfect conception of themselves and NASA. Schwartz shows that the 
unhealthy psychological orientation of NASA managers prevented the right 
decision from taking place (the no-launch alternative). Boisjoly et al., and 
Dombrowski contend that the NASA managers were ethically challenged, 
refusing to accept responsibility and holding themselves accountable for having 
made the wrong decision (the decision to launch).
The first statement of the second hypothesis does not receive the same 
support from the psychic prisons metaphor theories presented here. Schwartz, 
Boisjoly et al., and Dombrowski conclude that the organization itself is used as 
a  means to deflect criticism from the managers who had rendered the decision 
rather than the engineers or others involved in the decision making process. 
With Schwartz, the whole NASA organization was neurotic. The blame for the 
launch decision rests primarily with the managers who, engaged In their 
psychotic fantasy, were in a  state of denial about tiieir own culpability. The 
second statement of the secorxj hypothesis does receive support Boisjoly et 
al., and Dombrowski demonstrate the absurdity of the Rogers Commission 
report which ultimately claimed that no one was responsible for the launch 
decision. There is rather a  tendency to blame the management system and the
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decision making process. Boisjoly e t al., and Dombrowski also note that 
personal judgment was not considered in the Rogers Commission report, even 
though the testimony provided by various witnesses w as damning towards 
high-level NASA m anagem ent In effect, the Rogers Commission was part of 
the NASA organizatkxi cover-up in order to protect senior managers.
The third hypothesis is well supported by the radical humanist theorists 
work presented here. Schwartz’s  narcissistic manager was dearly predisposed 
to using any means available, including the browbeating of managers and 
engineers from Morton-Thiokol, in order to manipulate his will (the will of 
NASA). There is evidence from testimony and documentation from the Rogers 
Commission to support this daim . Boisjoly e t al., and Dombrowski imply that 
the managers were protected by the organization through the Rogers 
Commission proceedings, and ttierefore, that they were able to avoid the blame 
for the incident The ethics theorists believe that the Commission was a  co­
conspirator with NASA to protect the managers from responsibility for the 
tragedy. Thus, this episode reaffirms the beliefs of those managers within the 
organization that the organization will protect them from being held accountable 
for their actions, even at the cost of lower-level organizational partidpants t)eing 
manipulated.
The Interpretive Paradigm and the Challenger Launch Decision
As we have seen from the first chapter of this dissertation, the interpretive 
paradigm in Morgan’s  metatheoretical conception (see Figure 2.1 above) 
contains theories from phenomenology, phenomenological sociology and 
hermeneutics which attempt explain human society as to how it re@//y is and 
to understand die soda! world from the subjective experience of individual
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œnsciousness (Burrell and Morgan 1979). There is a  concentration on basic 
human experience and interaction. Theoretical analyses from this paradigm 
have been written about the Challenger accident, although, like the radical 
humanist paradigm considered above, there have not been many. Theories 
from the interpretive paradigm will be considered below. In addition to those 
works, we will examine a  phenomenological interpretation based on the 
knowledge analytic developed by Camevale and Hummel (1996).
Feynman’s  “Orgcom” Theory
Nobel prize-winning physicist and member of the Rogers Commission
Richard P. Feynman was one of the few members of the Commission who did
not have ties to the NASA organization prior to the ill-fated Challenger launch
decision. Organization communications theorist Philip K. Tompkins’”^ (1993)
writes in Organizational Communication Imperatives: Lessons of the Space
Program that Feynman is credited with having established a  theory of
organization communication in which he defines the differences between
engineers and management;
As a  result of his communication difficulties with the engineers who 
testified before the Rogers Commission, and particularly with those who 
had been promoted into management positions, according to his book, 
Feynman felt he needed to break away from the insulated atmosphere of 
the Rogers Commission. He had begun to suspect that there might be a 
management problem behind the technical problem of the O-rings. He 
wanted face-to-face communication with ordinary NASA workers and 
engineers, to talk to them without the inhibiting presence of their bosses.
Feynman spoke with a  group of workers, who were initially fearful of 
talking to a  member of the Rogers Commission, and asked them detailed 
questions about their jobs. They willingly described without success to 
communicate these problems to their supervisors. Happily enough for 
the astronauts in the Apollo Program, upward-directed communication at 
the Marshall Center had received high priority under von Braun. The
Note; Tompkins was previously an organizational communication consultant to Vbn Braun at 
Marshall Space Flight Center.
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system Feynman was examining did not seem to work in the sam e way.
It was at the Marshall Center that Feynman conducted his second less 
well-known experiment** [See also Feynman 1988, 213 - 9  (Tompkins 
1993, 143).
Feynman was attempting to get to the truth of what had transpired prior to the 
Challenger launch decision. Feynman was trained as  a  physicist but had an 
intuitive grasp of the differences tsetween management and engineers, which 
led him the Marshall Space Flight Center. In the following article he wrote for 
the February 1988 edition of Physics Today, Feynman explained how his theory 
of organization communication works :
Suddenly I got an idea. I said, ‘All right. I'll tell you what. In order to 
save time, the main question I want to know is this: Is there the same 
understanding, or difference of understanding, between the engineers 
and the management associated with the rocket engines as  we have 
discovered associated with the solid rocket boosters?'
Mr. Lovingood says, ‘No, of course not Altfiough I'm now a  manager,
I was trained as an engineer.'
I gave each person a  piece of paper. I said. Now, each of you please 
write down what you think the probability of failure for a  flight is, due to a 
failure in the engines '
I got four answers—three from the engineers and one from Mr. 
Lovingood, the manager. The answers from the engineers all said. In 
one form or anottier (tfie usual way engineers write-'reliability limit,” or 
“confidence sub so-on”), almost exactly tfie sam e thing 1 in atx)ut 200.
Mr. Lovingood's answer said, 'Cannot quantify. Reliability is determined 
by studies of this, checks on tfiat, experience here’ -blah, blah, blah, 
blah.
'Well,' I said. I've got four answers. One of tfiem weaseled.’ I turned 
to Mr. Lovingood and said, I think you weaseled.'
He says, I don't think I weaseled.’
Well, look,’ I said. ‘You didn't tell me what your confidence was; you 
told me how you determined it. What I want to know is: After you 
determined it, what was it?'
He says, ‘100 percent. ' The engineers' jaws drop. My jaw drops. I 
look a t him, everytxxdy looks a t him -and he says, ‘Uh...uh, minus 
epsilon?'
OK. Now the only problem left is, what is epsilon?'
The other experiment was Feynman’s well known use of the O-ring material in the ice water 
incident which had the effect of dramatizing to the public the problem of O-ring shrinkage which 
led to the escape of hot gases causing the solid rocket boosters to explode.
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He says. ‘1 in 100,000 ' So I showed Mr. Lovingood the other 
answers and said. ‘I see  there is a  difference between engineers and 
management in their information and knowledge here, just as tfiere was 
in the case of the rocket, but let me not bother you about; let’s continue 
with the engine’ (Feynman [February]1988. 34).
In this story Feynman was able to convey to his readers the problem of
perception between members of the same organization. Feynman’s  theory is
based upon the knowledge of engineers and their immediate and day-to-day
work in contrast with tfie more distant and abstract knowledge of managers. In
addition to the differences in knowledge between the managers and engineers.
Feynman also modified his "orgcom” theory to accommodate the apparent
organizational decay at NASA** :
...I would like to say something about the general deterioration of NASA- 
and the fact that tfiere was no information coming up from the engineers 
to the management...
I invented a  theory, which I have discussed with a  considerable 
number of people, and many people explained to me why my theory is 
wrong. But I don't remember their explanations as  to why it’s wrong-you 
never can. because that’s  tfie way you’re built! I am a  weak human, too. 
so I cannot resist telling you what I think is the problem.
When NASA was trying to go to the Moon, it was a  goal tfiat everyone 
was eager to achieve. Everybody was cooperating, much like the efforts 
to build the first atomic bomb at Los Alamos. There was no problem 
between tfie management, and the other people, because they were all 
trying to do the same thing. But then, after going to the Moon, NASA had 
all these people togetfier, all tfiese institutions and so on. You don't want 
to fire people and send them out in the street wfien you're done. So the 
problem is wfiat to do.
You have to convince Congress that tfiere exists a  project this 
organization can do. In order to do so. it is necessary (at least it was 
apparen^  necessary in this case) to exaggerate-to exaggerate fiow 
economical tfie shuttle was going to be. to exaggerate tfie big scientific 
facts that would be discovered. (In every newspaper article about the 
shuttle tfiere was a  statement about tfie useful zero-gravity experiments- 
such as making pharmaceuticals, new alloys and so on-on  board, but 
I've never seen in any science article any results of anything that have
Feynman's simplified theory has been replicated by the organization decay models of 
organization theorists previously considered. See, for example, Schwartz (1990) and McCurdy 
(1989) above.
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ever come out of any of those science experiments which were so 
importaitl) So NASA exaggerated how little the shuttle would cost, they 
exaggerated how often it could fly, to such a  pitch that it was obviously 
incorrect-obvious enough that all kinds of organizations were writing 
reports, trying to get the Congress to wake up to the fact that NASA’s 
claims weren’t true.
I believe that what happened w as-rem em ber, this only a  theory, 
because I tell you, people don't agree-that although the engineers down 
in the works knew NASA’s  claims were impossible, and the guys at the 
top knew that somehow they had exaggerated, the guys a t the top didn’t 
want to hear that they had exaggerated. They didn’t want to hear about 
the difficulties of the engineers-the fact that the shuttle c a n t fly so often, 
the fact that it might not work and so on. It’s  t)etter if they don’t hear it, so 
they can be much more "honest” when they're trying to get Congress to 
OK their projects.
So my theory is that the loss of common interest-between the 
engineers and sdentists on the one hand and management on the other- 
~is the cause of the deterioration in cooperation, which, as you've seen, 
produced a calamity (Feynman [February] 1988, 37, italics added for 
emphasis).
Another problem which came to the attention of Feynman on his trip to
the Marshall Space Center is the differences in types of knowledge between
executives and managers. In this case, he is referring to a discrepancy
between a  range safety officer and "the big cheeses at NASA”:
We finally divided into working groups [between Commission hearing 
meetings], and I went to Marshall with General Kutyna’s  group. The first 
thing that happened there was, a  range safety officer by the name of 
Ulian came to tell us about a  discussion he had had with NASA higher- 
ups about safety. Mr. Ulian had to decide whether to put explosive 
charges on the side so ground control could destroy the shuttle in case it 
was falling onto a  city. The big cheeses at NASA said. Don’t put any 
explosive on, because the shuttle is so safe. It’ll never fall onto a  dty.’
Mr. Ulian tried to argue that there was danger. One out of every 25 
rockets had failed previously, so Mr. Ulian estimated the probability of 
danger to be about 1 in 100 -  erxxjgh to justify the explosive charges.
But the higher-ups at NASA said that the probability of failure was 1 in 
100,000. That means if you flew the shuttle every day, the average time 
before your first accident would be 300 years -  every day, one flight for 
300 years -  which is obviously crazy! Mr. Ulian also told us about the 
problems he had with the big cheeses — how they didn’t come to the 
meetings sometimes and all kinds of other details (Feynman [February]
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1988, 33 - 4).
Feynman's theory, devised from a  single ca se  and his own life
experience, provides an insight into how various levels of an organization, f.e.,
executive, manager, and worker, can become uncooperative in joint endeavors.
The NASA organization w as obviously suffering from a  lack of communication.
Tompkins (1993) offers his interpretation Feynman’s  “orgcom” theory:
If Feynman's thesis is correct that NASA apparently needed to 
exaggerate the benefits and economies of the shuttle to Congress, then 
these claims may have also been heard by NASA's own employees. 
Those employees would have had three choices: (1 ) to try to fulfill those 
exaggerated claims; (2) to communicate to their superiors that it would be 
difficult if not impossible to realize tiiem; or (3) to avoid communicating 
their problems to their superiors. Managers who make exaggerated 
claims run the risk of believing their own rhetoric. They then have the 
choice of encouraging people to talk about their problems-as was done 
during the von Braun e ra -o r  of discouraging any defeatist m essages 
from their employees.
Similarly, corporations that make exaggerated claims about their 
products or services can run into unintended difficulties with employees 
who know better. Credibility and trust can be expected to be among the 
first casualties in such a  system. ..
Whether Marshall's management was ignorant of the O-ring problems 
because it had inhibited the upward-directed transmission of those 
problems, or did know about the problems but pretended otherwise, the 
system failed in both a  technical and moral sense. To know about a 
technical prot)lem that can cause the loss of human life, and then fail to 
act upon that problem, is also a  failure of communication and morality. 
Marshall management knew about the O-ring problem; that is well 
documented. The failure of communication in the decision to launch 
Challenger was the failure to exercise automatic responsibility-to solve 
tfie problem or see that it was communicated up tfie line, rather than 
encouraging Morton Thiokol to recommend the fligfit (Tompkins 1993, 
149-150).
Tompkins demonstrated that a  communication problem existed between 
workers and management through an examination of the Marshall leadership 
over the years of the space center’s  existence. Von Braun was a  "charismatic" 
leader, and Tompkins asked the rhetorical question: "The sociologist Max
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Weber expressed the crisis for charisma in the question; How to avoid mere 
routinization after the person of the organization is gone?" (Tompkins 1993, 
159). Tompkins then traced the Marshall leadership subsequent to Lucas. 
Prior to Lucas’s  arrival as chief of the MSFC in 1974, Rocco Petrone was sent in 
1973 to Marshall where he had a  brief tenure. Tompkins descrit)ed unsolicited 
characterizations of Petrone by interviewees "as a  hatchet man’ who was 
determined to ‘weed ouf all of the Germans, to cut out the fat’ . Petrone’s 
methods created a  persecution complex’ at the Marshall Center" (160). 
Tompkins also confirmed Malcolm McConneirs (1987) harsh assessment of Or. 
Lucas (161). Employees Tompkins interviewed a t Marshall had made 
numerous scathing remarks about Lucas’s  leadership at the space center. To 
wit:
C olleagues A sse ssm e n ts  of Lucas. The following remarks were 
made by my interviewees. The comments are  nearly literal 
transcriptions, with some editing and paraphrasing to provide context:
* It’s not hard to get up here [to the ninth floor of Building 42CX)] and 
become isolated. Dr. Lucas lost touch. We were not being effective in 
downward communication and did not make people comfortable coming 
up the line. Dr. Lucas sincerely wanted to know, but he didn’t  get the 
information he should have. The ninth floor is hallowed ground.
* i feel bad about saying this, but people were afraid to bring bad news [to 
Lucas] for fear they would be treated harshly. They didn’t want to be 
chewed out. It was kill the messenger. There was a  tendency to push 
things down, to keep the lid on prot)lems; no news is good news. Lucas 
was not sinister or nasty-it was just his management style. It seemed 
apparent to everyone that to reinstill our organizational pride, it was best 
that Or. Lucas leave.
■ Lucas was a  dead fish. Cold, vindictive, he would embarrass people 
publicly. It was very hard to go to him with a  problem-you could expect 
no sympathy. He could chill you with that hostile expression of his: ‘Good 
grief.’
* Dr. Lucas related poorly to the press and his superiors....He never
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acknowledged we made a  mistake with Challenger but left his key 
subordinates swinging In the wind during the investlgatlons....Dr. Lucas 
resigned under pressure.
• I thought the world of Dr. Lucas, even tfxxjgh he was so rigid and formal. 
People were afraid to raise protMems with him. We started canning and 
preprogramming what went up to D r Lucas. We were afraid of his 
response. He'd jump all over people If what they said didn’t  suit him.
'  Dr. Lucas's team presented an image of strength. As such, they gave the 
impression they didn't like to hear tiad news. When they did. they’d say 
we didn’t anticipate the problems and solve them. The messenger gets 
shot, in other words. It takes a  strong m essenger under those 
circumstances. That caused us to put the shiniest face on everything we 
could, put on the biggest smile. I don t want to up there to the ninth floor 
and get shot down, so they got less than totally accurate information. 
You delay, you put the best face on it  If he expects you to be perfect, 
you're going to flunk. If you carry a  problem to Dr. Lucas, he would 
demand, out of frustration. ‘How many more of these are out there?’
• Dr. Lucas's group expected us to be conversant about every technical 
detail. They made us apprehensive, reluctant to volunteer information. 
To volunteer an opinion sutyected you to uncomfortable critiques. So. 
you didn't volunteer. We suffered embarrassment and humiliation. Your 
career could be In jeopardy. Lucas constrained communication. There 
were too many managers tiying to master too much detail....
• My feeling was that Dr. Lucas was secluded. He ate his meals on the 
ninth floor. It was not easy  to get through to Lucas. He was 
protected....And then they [Lucas. Kingsbury. Mulloy. Reinartz] had to 
leave after Challenger. They deserve some blame for Challenger 
because of their communication style.
• Communication with Lucas was more constrained than with von Braun, 
not as open, but you could get through if you wanted to. My opinion is 
that If somebody was forceful he could have been heard.
'  Communication for a  year or two or more before Challenger was a 
problem.
• The pre-Challenger period was the worst we've seen in communication. 
There was a  fear on the part of people to surface problems at a  high 
level: kill the messenger. I’m at fault for not surfacing problems. I saw it 
in meetings with Dr. Lucas-people humiliated In front of peers and 
contractors.
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• Lucas wanted information filtered. His communicative style was 
Intimidation. The way he did business didn't encourage people to bring 
up problems. Before a  formal review, he wanted people to tell him what 
was going on. He didnt want to hear about it for the first time in a  formal 
review.
These concerns from top and middle managers establish something 
close to a  consensus that Lucas's communication style produced an 
ineffective system of organizational communication...(Tompkins 1993, 
163 - 5).
Tompkins also discovered during the interviews that enough information 
had been volunteered to inspire him to ask a  small numt)er of the interviewees 
as to whether there was an adverse impact on the Challenger launch decision 
based on poor communication practices at the Marshall Space Flight Center; 
Com m unication a s  a  Factor In th e  C h allen g er A ccident
Could the communicative style of MSFC have been a  factor 
contributing to the Challenger accident? I had not planned to put that 
question directly to my interviewees. But it seemed to be a  natural one to 
pose during six of the interviews because of the concerns I heard 
expressed.
Here is what the six I asked had ti) say:
• I don't know. Lucas's style did intimidate a  lot of people. I’m not sure, but 
society requires us to say 'yes'-we fire the football coach when the team 
doesn’t  win.
• Yes, the communication prolalem was a  factor-txit not the night t)efore.
We knew about the O-rings, but I'm not sure the problem was 
communicated to the right people. And it was not d ea r who was to be 
the project director, the Center Director or someone else.
• W as it a  factor? My opinion is that is probably a  true statement. We 
developed a  feeling. Well we've had 25 flights and weren't going to have 
a  failure." We ignored or put off the problem.
• Was it a  factor in Challenger^ We all knew about the O-ring problem.
We met in August and had a  solution, but Lucas and Hardy were under 
pressure to be on time with the flights. To hold up a flight was difficult.
The level of fatigue was dangerous.. .The teleconference got turned
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around. When challenged. Thiokol, rather than standing behind their 
data, told the government what they thought it wanted to hear....Yes. there 
was a  communication problem.
• There were four factors that I see: (1) There was some basis in Lucas and 
his style; (2) some basis in the goals from Beggs [the NASA administrator 
who determined the frequency of shuttle flights] and his advertising to the 
public; (3) some basis in the misinterpretation of the 0-rings-we were 
misreading the hardware; and (4) if Thiokol had said ‘We don’t  want to 
fly.’ then there would have been no flight
• Was communication a  factor in the Cha/Zenger accident? I worry about 
that a  lot. My Impression is that Thiokol was opposed to the launch at the 
engineering level. They were surprised at the stance of the Marshall 
managers. Always before, the Marshall managers would make sure that 
It was okay to launch, the teleconference was atypical. We needed more 
openness in the agency than we had then. We’ve seen the results 
otherwise.
I asked. ‘What results?’
The manager said. ‘Challengei’ (Tompkins 1993,166-7).
Clearly Tompkins demonstrated that the Marshall Space Flight Center had 
some serious communications problems.'" Tompkins provided the cover of 
anonymity to the Marshall employees in order to get them to express their true 
feelings concerning the management style of Dr. Lucas. Using Gendlin’s (1973, 
304)'" signposts for phenomenological explication, we discover from the 
interviews that the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) organization that a  
pattern of hostility and intimidation had been built into the organization’s culture 
during Lucas’s  tenure. Managers Mulloy. Kingsbury and Reinartz were also a  
critical part of the decision to launch the Challenger and. according to 
organizational participants above, were important to maintaining the
This style of management fostered by Or. Lucas at the Marshall Space Flight Center could 
certainly be construed as  being symptomatic of a  culture of narcissism and supportive of 
Schwartz’s argument above.
See also Chapter 1.
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dysfunctional management style of the senior managers at Marshall."^
Tompkins' analysis of the  dysfunctional m anagerial style of 
communication at the Marshall Space Flight Center, which was influenced by 
Feynman’s  orgcom theory, provides us with an insight into some of the 
management practices at NASA prior to the Challenger launch decision. 
Tompkins and Feynman show that there is a major discrepancy between what 
managers and workers know. This theoretical insigtit will be further explored 
and developed in the next section.
The Challenger Launch Decision and the Knowledge Analytic
Theories previously considered in Chapter Four and earlier sections of 
this chapter, whether from the functionalist, radical structuralist, or radical 
humanist paradigms, depict events leading to the Challenger launch decision in 
a  single framework of knowledge. A recapitulation shows that knowledge from 
the functionalist paradigm is limited in its ability to explain the hypotheses 
statements which encompass (1) managers ignoring employee warnings; (2) 
managers not taking responsibility, but rather blaming tfie employees, in the 
name of protecting the organization; and, (3) managerial underestimation of 
other organizations and the intrinsic need of managers to control every aspect 
of their own organization. Functionalism promotes the status quo and 
reinforces tfie traditional management notion of h ie r a r c h y .R e c a l l  that in 
regard to tfie first hypotfiesis, functionalist theorists, insofar as tfiey attempted to 
explain phenomena, presented arguments indicating that m anagers had 
position power and tfie prerogative to ignore the engineers warnings by virtue
of their position within the organization’s scalar chain. Other functionalists,
’’’ See Appendix A for organization charts on NASA and the Marshall Center, specifically.
We have also seen that this "notion" can be an ideology. See Stone (1997) above. We will also 
cover this topic more thoroughly below.
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notably the risk theorists, noted that a  proper decision was rendered. Due 
process was granted to lower organizational participants in that their concerns 
about the O-rings and other work aspects were given a  proper hearing. No evil 
deeds were done and the decision makers simply made a  mistake. According 
to risk theorists, no one in the organization was a t fault for the accident, oecause 
all of the rules had been followed. Their view was that the organization 
functioned normally and that it was unfortunate that the accident had occurred. 
As far a s  the second and third hypotheses are concerned, workers became 
objects to be used by managers a s  part of the regular organizational process. 
No one was to be blamed for a  properly functioning organization in which 
control of employees is part of the normal state of affairs. With functionalist 
theories, we see from this Challenger case study the generation of knowledge 
about the shuttle launch deasion from the traditional managerial perspective.
Radical structural theorists represent events surrounding the Challenger 
launch decision from the worker's (or in this case  study, the engineer's) 
perspective. Engineers critical of the launch decision were either systematically 
ignored or exploited by managers. Managers, promoters of the status quo and 
part and parcel to the bourgeois hierarchical structure, moved the engineers 
into a  position where the engineers were dominated in the decision to launch 
process. The NASA organization was the instrument of domination used by 
executives and managers to exert their will over the affected employees in the 
NASA and Morton-Thiokol organizations. Radical structural theories as 
demonsbated in this case study contribute to knowledge generation from the 
point of view of the workers affected tjy the launch deasion process. Workers 
were used as  objects to justify and legitimize the preconceived and 
predetermined decision to launch by the managers. When objections to launch
174
were voiced by the engineers, they were intimidated by the NASA managers to 
stop voicing their dissent Radical structural theorists also add that this a  normal 
part of the exploitation process of the  capitalist-based management ideology 
prevalent in western society. Safety concerns for lower organizational 
participants were of secondary importance to economic considerations.
Radical humanist theorists are  primarily concerned with showing how 
individuals can affect, or are affected by, organizations. In this case study, 
there are two primary means by which radical humanist theorists are critical of 
the NASA organization. Firstly, NASA executives and managers were ill 
psychologically, or narcissistic, and had a  fantasy-oriented representation of the 
world. The NASA organization w as suffering from the effects of narcissistic 
leadership. Sound judgments which would be normally made were lost to the 
absurdities of the decaying organizational culture. Fantasy replaced reality and 
allowed for the ill-fated launch decision. Secondly, we find that other radical 
humanist theorists approached the case  study from an ethical dimension. They 
contend that the unethical NASA organization, with the equally culpable Rogers 
Commission, engaged in a  coverup to protect NASA managers, who were 
identified as being a  critical part of the organization. In effect, radical humanist 
theorists concerned with the ethics of the NASA organization show the
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absurdity*'^ of a  situation wherein no single individual is held responsible for 
making the launch decision. Knowledge gained by the analysis of the 
Challenger case study by radical humanist ttteorists demonstrates what can 
haf^jen when the utopian dbsurrSUes of idealism, promoted by executives and 
managers, are foisted upon lower level m em bers of the organization. 
Regarding the hypotheses statements presented above, managers ignored 
important information from workers wfien it did not suit wfiat they ideally wanted. 
The NASA organization also attempted to protect executives and managers 
through the Rogers Commission hearings, wtiere it was pointed out that no one 
was at fault for tfie launch decision. Finally, control over every aspect of the 
NASA and Morton-Thiokol organizations was attem pted by the NASA 
managers as tfiey held a  narcissistic conception of their ability to control events 
in a  preconceived perfect world.
We have now arrived at the point where multiple conceptions of 
knowledge may be considered when analyzing tfie Challenger launch decision
"* An important distinction is drawn here on Heidegger’s  (1962) discussion of "meaning" and 
"absurdity," or what Heidegger calls "unmeaning": T h e  concept of meaning embraces the formal 
existential framework of what necessarily belongs to that which an understanding interpretation 
Articulates. Meanfng is the 'upon-which' of a profeclion in ternis of which something becomes 
intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore- 
conception. In so far as  understanding and interpretation make up tfie existential state of Being of 
the "there”, "meaning" must be conceived a s  the formal-existential framework of the 
disclosedness which tielongs to understanding. Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein”, not a 
property attaching to entities, lying "behind” them, or floating somewhere as an "intermediate 
domain". Dasein only "has” meaning, so far as disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be "filled 
in” by the entities discoverable in that disclosedness. Hence only Dasein can be meaningful 
[sinnvoll] or meaningless [sinnlos]. That is to say, its own Being and the entities disclosed with its 
Being can be appropriated in understanding, or can remain relegated to non-understanding.
This Interpretation of the concept of "meaning” is one which is ontologico-existential in 
principle; if we adhere to it, then all entities wfiose kind of Being is of a  character other than 
Oasein’s must be conceived as unmeaning [unsinniges], essentially devoid of any meaning at all. 
Here "unmeaning” does not signify that we are saying anything about the value of such entities, 
but it gives expression to an ontological characteristic. And only that which is unmeaning can be 
absurd [widersinnig]. Tfie present-at-hand, as  Dasein encounters it. can, as it were, assault 
Dasein’s Being; natural events, for instance, can txeak in upon us and destroy us* (193).
"Note to readers Dasein means literally "being there" or existence. For a more thorough 
discussion of Dasein see Husserl (1973,367 - 8).
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case  study. We have seen in the interpretive “orgcom” theoretical frameworks 
provided by Feynman and Tompkins that there is a  discrepancy in assessing 
reality by executives, managers and workers. Traditional and unconventional 
interpretations offered by theorists analyzing the launch decision represent a 
largely mutually exclusive and one-dimensional image of what transpired in this 
complex human event As we have seen, there is a  tendency by theorists to 
perceive the reality of the event from either the management or the worker 
perspective. When theorists engage in an explanation of an actual event and 
pursue it from a single image, something of the complexity of the event is lost in 
translation. Clearly Feynman and Tompkins were intrigued by the eviderxx that 
they had gathered from individuals about the phenomena of perceptual 
differences between members of the organization. Feynman pointed out the 
wild discrepancy regarding the probability of a  mishap based on the SRB 
technology t>etween the Marshall manager. Judson Lovingood, and the 
engineers. Feynman also was t)ewildered by the safety concerns expressed by 
Mr. Ulian, i.e., the safety factor of putting explosive charges on the space shuttle 
launch system in order to prevent a  mishap which would affect population 
centers near the launch site, in that the “big cheeses” had an unrealistic 
assessm en t about the chances of a  catastrophe occurring. Tompkins 
uncovered the veil of secrecy about the excessive absurdities through which the 
Marshall Space Flight Center had operated under Dr. Lucas. A culture of 
intimidation was built in order to control information received from lower level 
participants in the organization. Information, or knowledge about the work that 
was presented by members of the MSFC. was suppressed and devalued by the 
omnipresent management ideology. Feynman and Tompkins indicate and 
anticipate in their analyses that there are at least two kinds of knowledge in
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organizations: executive/managerial and worker.
There is a  conceptual framework available for interpreting differences
between knowledges (plural) provided by Camevaie and Hummel (1996, 9).
Based largely upon the work of the philosophers Immanuel Kant. Edmund
Husserl and Martin Heidegger, Camevaie and Hummel (1996, 19) developed
the knowledge analytic^ a s  follows:
Once we ...raise the question of how we know and how different people at 
different places in organizations know, problems arise, for us and and for 
them:
How do we know wfiat we want?
How do those whom we instruct know what we want?
How do they know what it takes to work out what we want?
The modern organization structures the answers to these questions 
because it structures knowledge:
We, we executives, know what we want by the numtiers.
We, we managers, know wfiat we see and want as  objects;
these we define and manipulate: organizational structures, the work as 
an object, the workers as  objects; all these get named by us and moved 
around for maximum economy and efficiency like [a] piece on a 
cfiessboard.
They* ...well, they, tfie workers, are not assumed to know much of 
anythir^. Tfiey simply do They work. Tfiey carry motions of working 
according to our plans.
The resulting knowledgeAwork pyramid...
See, for example, Immanuel Kant’s The Critique of Pure Reason, (1984) (trans. J.M.D. 
Meiklejohn), Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica. Inc. (originally published in 1781), Edmund 
Husserl’s  Erperience and Judgment, (1973) (trans. J.S. Churchill and K. Ameriks), Evanston, IL 
Northwestern University Press (originally published in 1948), and Martin Heidegger’s Being and 
Time [Seiri und Zeitl, (1962) (trans. J. Macquarrie and E  Robinson), San Francisco: Harper Collins 
Publishers (originally published in 1926).
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Executives know the ideal product; 
Managers know the means as objects.
Workers work.
...contains, after all, the genius of modem organization. Moving away 
from the uncertain and ill-defined knowledge of actual hands-on work to 
ever more certain, objective, and ultimately numerical standards of 
product and process, the modern organization is able to produce its 
miracles of mass production, m ass service, and mass controls according 
to highly precise standards.
The assumption, however, that executives and managers have 
knowledge and workers don't is simply not borne out by further analysis. 
It is a  management ideology: a  way of thinking about knowledge that 
furthers management interests and prevents profound questions from 
arising, not only about work, not just about respect and reward, but alxxjt 
necessity of having workers wfx) know what they are doing.
...The underlying principle here is that organizations are not simply 
divided into those who have knowledge and the rest is simply working. 
Instead: tx>th the organizing and the working require knowledges, plural, 
and these knowledges are not only different but incompatible in the 
sense of one not comprising the other.,..
[The first principle of the modern organization] is that modem rational 
and scientific knowledge of work processes must be balanced by 
opportunities to translate it back into actual working moves. Knowledge 
of pure ideas, even the detached objective knowledge of mid-managers, 
must be translated into the less pure but engaged knowledge of what to 
do. Since modem organizations ordinarily value ideas more than reality, 
reforms tend to tighten the rule of ideas and subvert the reality of work. In 
short the answer to idealism’s  move toward perfection is: the protection of 
imperfection.
For all of these questions, however, it is necessary to inquire into the 
nature of the knowledges involved: to engage in a  knowledge analvtic.
The knowledge analytic asks: What are the kinc^ of knowledges in 
modem organizations, how do they work, how can they be brought to 
work togethei9....
The approach reexamines management’s  claim to possessing a 
monopoly of know1edge....[though it] does not share the conventional 
modem assumption that there is only one kind of ultimate knowledge in 
organizations. The analytic asks a  simple question: How do people in 
organizations know things? [There is not simply just the knowledge of 
pure reason]....
Questioning the monopoly of reason also calls in question the
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possibility of a single knowledge elite the knowledge analytic asks
whether there is not a  prejudgment or bias in the way the modern way of 
thinking ties effective work to ever greater perfection in one. single kind of 
knowing which we are  used to calling by th e  singular term 
‘knowledge’....When it was tacitly assumed that there was only one kind 
of knowledge, all reforms could be viewed in terms of perfecting that kind 
of knowledge. The history of reforms could t)e read a s  gradual but solid 
progress toward a  perfect state when no more adjustments and 
adaptations would be needed. The tolerances could be tightened and 
closed ...the knowledge analytic begins by reopening the question of a 
plurality of valid knowledges (Camevaie and Hummel 1996, 2 - 9, italics 
added for emphasis).
We have seen  from many of the previous interpretations offered by 
theorists analyzing the Challenger launch decision a  parallel rationalization to 
the knowledge/Work pyramid for the position of workers and/or managers with 
the knowledge analytic. We have found that the ubiquitous scientific 
(functionalist paradigm) theoretical renditions of events leading to the 
Challenger launch reinforce the tendency for the dominant management 
knowledge ideology manifested in modern Western society. Radical 
structuralist theories specific to this case study explore the domination of the 
management ideology as it pertains to the workers (engineers). The Thiokol 
engineers were used as  instruments for their knowledge by managerial elites in 
order to legitimate the management decision to launch Challenger When the 
engineers, who were intimate with the working knowledge of the space shuttle 
system, refused to cooperate with the management decision they were 
harassed, ignored, and later fired, as in the case of Roger Boisjoly. As we have 
seen, psycho-analytic organization theorist Howard Schwartz m ade the 
argument that the NASA organization m anagers charged with making the 
decision to launch were narcissistic and had an idealized conception of 
themselves to the point that common sense was lost Sound judgment was
altered by a psychosis which was prevalent in the NASA organization culture.
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The NASA was thus the "perfect" organization captured by its idealism. NASA 
managers were the organizatibn.
The tendency to think about the case study in a  preferred way of thinking, 
or under the rubric of a  single knowledge, is powerful and difficult to overcome. 
As we have seen from various perspectives, the theoretical explanations of the 
Challenger launch decision generally are from one major paradigm with 
embellishment from theories mostly to resolve the functionalist prot)lematic 
which em phasizes the objectivist nature of the world. The functionalist 
problematic, used by scientific theorists in trying to overcome science’s 
shortcomings, has a  propensity to show a  concern for explanations which 
emphasize the regulation of social affairs for the dominant management 
Ideology (see Chapter 4; Burrell and Morgan 1979, 28). Worker knowledge and 
human relations within the organization have presented problems for the 
idealized functioning of organizations through the eyes of management elites. 
Modem management has been attempting to address the shortcomings of 
science through various reforms in order to deal with the functionalist 
problematic. Cam evaie and Hummel (1996) point out the futility of 
managem ent reforms with a  single dominant ideological orientation as 
"Perfectionist reform may be seen a s  futile attem pts to homogenize the 
knowledge structure of modern organizations. Reformism pursued in the face of 
evidence of plural knowledges would be challenged as  a  totally unjustifiable 
totalitarianism" (10). Camevaie and Hummel also add that “evidence of 
different kinds of knowledge is indeed found in modem organizations" (1996, 
10) and that an analysis which leaves behind any of the different kinds of 
knowledges is incomplete.
In order to get beyond the traditional focus of seeing events from the view
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of either just the management perspective or just the worker perspective, we
must be prepared to understand that there are differences in how members in
modem organizations perceive reality. The knowledge analytic
...outlines the differences between how managers know and how workers 
know a s  the paradoxical key problem to be overcome by modern 
organization -  paradoxical because what makes modem organizations so 
powerful is that they have solved the problem of translating working 
knowledge into management knowledge but not the problem of translating 
management knowledge back into working knowledge. In anticipation of the 
results of what we call a  knowledge analytic of the modern organization, we 
can summarize our findings:
1 -  The modem organization is ng t contrary to all claims, built on one 
kind of knowledge, not even on twgg but on five: three types of knowledge 
inside tfie organization and an additional two outside.
2 -  The three types of knowledge inside the organization are: the 
numerical knowledge of administrators and executives, the often 
scientific but minimally at least objectifying knowledge of managers, and 
tfie experiential knowledge of workers. Tfiese are distinct enough of 
each other to be named separately: pure reason, science, and 
experience.
2a -  The three types of knowledge harnessed inside the modern 
organization are in fundamental ways incompatible. As knowledge and 
control ascend from the worker to the manager to the executive or 
administrator, parts of each type of knowledge are left behind. This 
clears the way for rational calculation governing the organized 
components of tfie organization but at the sam e time creates a paradox: 
The type of organization that knows so much in general about all its 
structures and functions knows in reality so little, the higher up you go, 
that it is incapable of instructing its workforce in any meaningful way: that 
Is, without translation jgy the workforce. This is the ultimate paradox: 
Those whom the organization considers to know the least are charged 
with tfie most knowledge-demanding task: the translation of essentially 
meaningless orders into work.
3 — The dominance of reason and science is both driven and 
modified by two types of knowledge outside the organization. These are, 
served by science and reason a t tfie very top, tfie system of ideas of 
those who have an investment in organizations whether economic or 
political. Following usage in philosophy we can call a system of pure 
ideas or of ideas claiming to be more real tfian the real: idealism. At the
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bottom of the organization, however, is the utilitarian realism of the 
consumer and client: there the knowing of what an organization does is 
in terms of pragmatic use. Idealism and user realism (in a  sense: 
utilitarianism) are at odds and produce contrary pulls.
4  -  In a  dear way, the organization is pulled in opposite directions: At 
the top, toward su ccess in investment markets, including political 
investment in the legitimacy of the political system (Is there a  profit? Are 
ideals upheld?); a t the txittom, toward success in consumer markets and 
dient constituencies (Does it work?).
5 -  Idealism of ‘investors’ and realism of consumers and clients exert 
a constant pull and tension throughout all the knowledge types of the 
organization, even in normal times. In times of crisis, when one or the 
other seem s to win out. the pull becomes destructive of the organization 
itself, and those with the most power threatened find they must 
reorganize to maintain i t
6 -  The long term victor in the contest between idealism and realism 
has been -  over the 400-plus years of modern thought -  idealism. 
Modem Western civilization’s  idea of progress is simply that mind will 
triumph over matter. The actual work of accomplishing that triumph is 
correspondingly devalued: it is bound too closely to what is the matter.
7 ~  The recurrent reforms of the last three decades -  recurrent and 
coming a t ever closer intervals -  reflect the triumph of the idealism that 
has guided the work of modem organization during the centuries. In its 
perfect incorporation in the modem organization, the dogma that ideas 
are more real than the real, has finally reached such perfection that in 
some organizations working experience and customer/client knowledge 
of the real have been almost totally driven out of the enterprise or 
agency. Paradoxically, the cause for every newly needed redesign and 
reorganization is the increasing perfection of the organization itself, 
driven most lately by the dominance of the pure reason of the computer 
(Camevaie and Hummel 1996, 11 -14).’“
Following Camevaie and Hummel (1996 17 - 8). we can readily se e  in the 
Challenger case study the problem of different knowledges and how this can 
affect the way decisions are  made. The Thiokol engineer Roger Boisjoly. 
involved in worker realism, could not quantify his rationale for not allowing the
See Appendix A for Camevaie and Hummel’s  (1996,63) "Figure 2: Knowledge Taken and Left 
Behind by Leading Groups."
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shuttle to launch, even though he t)elieved, t)ased on his experience, that the O- 
rings would not be at)le to respond properly to the cold temperatures a t the time 
of the launch. Also, note the strange twist in NASA culture as demonstrated by 
the claim "there was pressure to launch" put upon Morton Thiokol engineers as 
opposed to traditional organizational conceptual statements “prove to me we 
can fly”, "give me a  study” or statem ents such as "where is the statistical 
evidence” to support your conclusion not to fly. This requirement of scientific or 
mathematical proof displaces intuition, particularly on the part of Boisjoly and 
Thompson, where the "blow-by” in the temperature range a t 53 degrees 
Fahrenheit would not seem reasonable in comparison with the 36 degree 
temperature (questioning judgment). It is paradoxical that those individuals with 
the least experience and inclined towards using scientific rationality, the NASA 
managers Mulloy and Hardy, overruled those workers with the most experience, 
Boisjoly and the Thiokol engineers. In a  less dire yet revealing tale, physicist 
and investigating Rogers Commission member Richard Feynman demonstrated 
the disparity in knowledge about the possibility of engine failure with his 
"adventure” to Marshall Space Flight Center. Engineers at Marshall with first­
hand experience about the reliability of the solid rocket motors had a  radically 
different interpretation than the manager over them, Judson Lovingood. Also, 
Feynman recounted the incident of Mr. Lilian's problem of using explosives to 
destroy an out-of-control shuttle and the big cheeses (executive rationalism) 
exerting their idealistic and unrealistic conception about the numerical odds 
and possibility of a  shuttle falling on a  populace and causing tremendous 
damage, death and destruction.
As applied to the Challenger case consider the "operational” unrealistic 
launch rate that led to worker fatigue {Reparti 1986; McConnell 1987) and
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Trento’s  (1987) depiction of Acting NASA Administrator Graham “as a  right-wing 
kook” driving the organization beyond its realistic limitations. Profit motive was 
a  major concern for management at NASA based on investor idealism. Holt 
and Morns (1993) showed in their production/consumption paradox node that 
there was an inherent contradiction between the high monetary costs of the 
operational mode of 24 flights per year mandate from NASA executives and the 
problem of crew safety. The economy/isfficiency argument superseded the crew 
safety concern.
We can see  the result of the decision to launch on those clients who 
experienced the loss of their lives: the astronauts. One of the results of the 
Rogers Commission was that those affected by the launch decision directly, the 
astronauts, would have representation on any launch board or panel. This is 
surely a  correct and appropriate response to the tragedy and it should have 
been in place prior to the Challenger inadent The fact that astronauts were not 
involved in delit)erating whether the shuttle should be launched is indicative of 
the predominance of management ideology. It took a  tragic event of the 
magnitude of the loss of Challenger and the realism of what happened to the 
clients {client realism) to force a  cfiange in management thinking.
Scientists who favored unmanned spaceflight also had a  stake in the 
NASA organization. The astronomer James Van Allen and the robotics scientist 
from MIT, Marvin Minsky, were in favor of scientific missions which entailed the 
use of unmanned spaceflight for research purposes and were in principle 
opposed to the space shuttle program. Manned spaceflight was expensive, 
risky and ultimately tragic for human beings. There was a  battle for scarce 
resources between a  small contingent of scientists with a  vested interest in how 
the NASA organization allocated its funds.
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The NASA organization was. from its irxxptior), constantly selling itself as 
a  potentially profit-making enterprise for economic and political investors.'^ A 
prime example of selling the NASA Space Shuttle Program was put forward by 
Jam es C. Fletcher, former and future NASA Administrator, who penned the 
article "Are SKYLAB and the Space Shuttle Worth the Investment?” in 
Goverrment Executhæ, January 1974, to rationalize to potential investors the 
t)enefits of flying with NASA, which [erroneously] would t)e fully operational by 
198a
I will summarize the benefits we expect from the Shuttle...
• ...the Shuttle will save more than $1 billion per year in launch costs and 
payload costs.
• The Shuttle is also much more versatile than present rockets...
'  It will be a  great boon to scientists and other users because it will greatly 
reduce the lead time and cost of preparing their experiments and permit 
them to accompany their experiments to ortxt when necessary.
• The Shuttle wipes out the long-standing argument whether we should 
empahsize (sic) man's role in space or automated spacecraft. The 
shuttle makes it highly advantageous to use both men and machines.
• The Shuttle will be used for both science and practical benefits in Earth 
orbit It will open up new opportunities such as space manufacturing.
• The shuttle will give us a  space rescue capability at all times and at 
reasonable cost.
• The Shuttle calls for significant advances in aerospace technology...
• Like Sl^lab. the Shuttle initiative of the United S tates greatly encourages 
and facilitates intemational cooperation in space...
• The Shuttle is the key to America's bright future in space. There is no 
substitute for it as the lead project and focal point for developing space 
technology and space uses in this decade.
See the history of the NASA organization presented in Chapter 3.
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..In short there is no new frontier in space for America and for mankind 
without the Shuttle.
All of our cost/benefit studies show the Shuttle a very worthwhile 
investment. Even if they did not. I would say  we should build it. We 
cannot run spaceship Earth without it (Fletcher 1974, 41 - 2).
We see  here an appeal to the idealism of the investor ostensibly in order to 
obtain support for space shuttle program. " From Fletcher’s  bullets and an 
examination of the history of the space shuttle, we gain an insight into the 
problem of selling the then not-yet-completed idea of NASA’s  space shuttle 
program. There were several aspects of investor idealism appealed to that 
have never come into being. Firstly, the shuttle space system has never been 
able to pay for its launch costs a s  advertised. Secondly, several scientists, a s  
we have seen previously, have never believed that the shuttle project was a  
great scientific boon; rather they have seen the space system a s  a  bane to their 
research. Thirdly, space manufacturing has not materialized a s  implied within 
the time frame put forward by Fletcher. And finally, while it remains to be seen 
as to whether the space shuttle systems is effective as a  rescue vehicle, it 
certainly has not lived up to the cost schedule as  outlined by Fletcher even after 
seventeen years beyond 1980.
NASA Administrator Fletcher is by no m eans alone in his idealistic 
rendition of selling the space shuttle program to investors, both client and 
consumer. The essence of the distinction between the idealism of the 
administrator and the reality of the life-world is captured by Camevaie and 
Hummel (1996):
In reality, of course, most of idealistic these goals outlined by Fletcher have never happened. 
Heidegger (1962) on idealism points out that "When something no longer takes the form of just 
letting something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that 
it lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a  synthesis-structure, and with this it 
takes over the possibility of covering up" (57). This conception of synthesis-structure is in marked 
contrast to the "as-structure," or what "The philosopher Martin HeWegger calls this higher sense 
of what a  thing is when connected to human use the as-structure of things’ (Camevaie and 
Hummel 1996,30; see also Heidegger 1962,199 - 200).
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We find ourselves in an economy that ritualizes not only investment 
activiy, but organizational activity and work activity. This parallels the 
rituaiization of politics and administration. Things are  done this way 
because they have always been done this way And besides, it is 
popularly argued, the reinvestment economy, the hierarchical political 
and organizational design, sdentized work -  these are the structures for 
conducting productive economic and political life that exist and one must 
work within them.
The investor and the citizen are a s  imprisoned by the structures within 
which his knowledge of the world runs as  anyone else (59)....the 
government worker, like the administrator and middle manager, is 
constantly called to account for actions...whether they make sense in 
working life or no t All the complaints about bureaucratic administration 
ultimately have tfieir source in the separation between judgments made 
ahead of time about administrative situations by people who know 
nothii^ about administrative work and judgments that must be made in 
the situation by those who know administrative work only too intimately 
(Camevaie and Hummel 1996:59 - 60).
The knowledge analytic represents the reality that multiple forms of 
knowledge exist in organizations. Camevaie and Hummel (1996. 17 - 8) note 
that “Different forms of knowledge indeed exist each affiliated with a  different 
interest. Drawing from the total repertoire of major types of knowledge in 
modernity, we identify them as:”
idealism — affiliated with investors and citizens [Congress. 
President, shuttle contract investors, scientists with interests outside of 
unmanned spaceflight, and the American public.]
Rationalism — affiliated with chief administrators [Graham. 
Lucas and other NASA officials, particularly at the highest levels]
S cience — affiliated with management sc ien tists  and mid 
m anagers [Mid-level managers such a s  Kingsbury. Reinartz. and 
Mulloy a t NASA and Lund a t Morton-Thiokol]
Realism — dominant am ong th o se  w ho ultimately and 
directly produce the goods and services and those who use  
them [engineers such as  Boisjoly & Thompson, analysts such as 
Richard Cook, and the seven Cha//enger astronauts]
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Consider these types of knowledge. Their location on an outline of 
the organizational pyramid can already be mapped:
Figure 5.1 fFlq. 11: Intereete and Their Types of Knowledge
Investor Idealism  
Executive Rationalism  
M anagement S cien ce  
Worker Realism  
Consumer/Client realism
The idealism of investors will not only be compatible with the 
rationalism of administrators but will command such rationalism 
(Camevaie and Hummel 1996, 17 - 8) [Note: I have applied here my 
conception of the Challenger case study to Camevaie and Hummel's 
typology].
We have seen from examining the Challenger launch decision case 
study a  clear distinction between the relationship of knowledges between the 
various interests in the NASA organization and the Morton-Thiokol 
organization. Knowledge incompatibility and the question of the ultimate 
reconciliation of the divided reality of everyday working knowledge, scientific 
knowledge, and investor knowledge are central to the knowledge analytic:
The question now becomes: What is the relation between these 
different kinds of knowledges?...ls a  comprehension of these types of 
knowledge by one of them possible? If not then all management reforms 
will continuously follow the chimera of a  unified knowledge system when 
the reality -  which someone has to absorb - i s  one of different kinds of 
knowledges in a state of mutual misunderstanding (Camevaie and 
Hummel 1996, 31).
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The primary compatibility problematic"" for organizations is the differences in 
knowledges between science and the everyday work experience of the 
workers:
Ultimately, management science ‘proves’ it is in certain ways superior 
to working knowledge. This certainly holds true for scientific 
management’s  ability to control energy input into work (economy) and in 
reducing th e  ratio  betw een  energy input and ou tpu t 
(efficiency). ...scientifiG management and science in general must deny 
the validity of a  working knowledge that is adequate for its own 
purposes ...It must also deny any worker’s ability today to make 
judgments about that which he directly experiences unless these 
judgments can be generalized....
What needs to be considered here is the possibilitv that scientific 
knowledge and everyday working knowledge are far removed from one 
another in the definition of experience and things. The two may, in fact, 
be so far apart a s  to be possibly incompatible: i.e., requiring
transform ations into each  o ther’s  terms th a t leave essen tia l 
characteristics and knowables behind....As long a s  there are economic 
and other power interests that value such sdentific products a s  control, 
economy and efficiency, they can also compel a  worker attitude that 
pretends to be appreciative of science’s  findings and, as management 
science, its working imperatives (Camevale and Hummel 1996, 4 7 -8 ).
We see clear evidence of the incompatibility of scientific knowledge and worker 
(engineer knowledge) as  depicted in the testimony of Morton Thiokol engineer 
Roger Boisjoly given during the Rogers Commission hearings. Despite 
repeated warnings to the NASA managers in both written™ and oral form, 
Boisjoly's knowledge about the possibility of O-ring failure based on 
experience, a  gut feeling and intuition (or worker realism) was ignored by the 
NASA m anagers charged with rendering a m anagem ent decision (or
management science) who wanted Boiqoly to quantify his position in a  limited
The QompaUbiiity problematic shares the same puzzling aspects as  the functionalist problematic 
for theorist of a  scientific or functionalist orientation. In Chapter 4 above we examined how 
sociological positivism attempts to reconcile its explanatory shortcomings by incorporating more 
radical influences from the radical structuralist and interpretive paradigms. See also Burrell and 
Morgan (1979.27). The knowledge analytic makes a  dear disUrwtion between sukx 'ec^ worker 
knowledge and the allegedly more objective management science, acknowledging their mutual 
incompatibility.
See Appendix A for written warnings about the O-rings from Boiqoly and Thompson.
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amount of time.
The knowledge analytic as presented by Camevale and Hummel (1996) 
does not pretend to be a perfect theoretical conception. There is a  recognition, 
instead, that imperfection is an ever-present fact of human existence. What the 
knowledge analytic provides for managers, practitioners and academicians is a  
systematic means to recognize the reality of differences of knowledges in 
organizations. In order to reform mistakes and/or errors in organizations, the 
manager or analyst must be cognizant of the reality of the following conclusions 
as  presented by Camevale and Hummel (1996):
1 -  /Vo total knowledge system so far conceived under the reign of 
idealism and positivism can ever be perfect.. tends to [capture] itself 
within its own techniques which are insensitive to human demands 
outside of them.
2 -  With the existing knowledge system dominated by idealism and 
positivism, reform is ever and again needed [permanently].
3 — The visdJle reform can neverWeless be defined. Its place is 
wherever purportedly irresistible pure thought must be modified, in order 
to get work done, by the immovable realities of work itself, including the 
organization of work in such a  way as to make work possible (69 - 70).
interpretivlsm and Hypotheses Explanation; How Useful Is the
P arad ig m ?
I will reiterate here the hypotheses stated in Chapter One in order for us 
to examine them in light of the explanations offered by interpretive theorists 
addressing aspects of the Challenger launch decision:
1. Managers ignored information from employees who knew what was 
going on.
2. Managers who ignore the useful knowledge of the workers will 
sometimes blame the workers when managements' plans go awry. Also, 
organizations will go to great lengths to protect the managers and the 
organization until compelled to do othenwise.
191
3. Managers hold the simplistic notion that they can control every aspect 
of their organization, and even those of other organizations.
Evidence presented by organization communications theorists Feynman and 
Tompkins demonstrated dearly that in the first hypothesis managers ignored 
the information from the Marshall workers. While there may be mental illness 
on the part of the Marshall Space Flight Center managers involved in the 
decision making process, there is no conclusive proof. By virtue of their 
position in the organization, the managers made a  judgment at)out the odds of 
a  disaster occurring based on management science rather than the worker 
realism of the engineers. As a  result of the dominant management ideology, 
workers tended to be treated as  objects useful only for their utility in performing 
organizational tasks. Feynman took the notion of differences in knowledge a  
step further by showing the discrepancy of management versus executive 
knowledge.
Camevale and Hummel’s knowledge analytic provided the conceptual 
framework for interpreting the different knowledges in organizations. The 
paradoxical nature of organizations have the internal problem of reconciling the 
numerical knowledge of executives (reason), the objectifying knowledge of 
science, and worker experience. There is also of the problem of investor and 
citizen idealism outside of the organization. Using the knowledge analytic I 
showed how scientific rationality was used by the NASA managers Mulloy and 
Hardy to overrule the Thiokol engineers in the course of the decision process 
(this aspect also applies to the third hypothesis statem ent) Investor idealism 
affected the NASA organization by forcing the space shuttle program to 
operationalize when in reality it was still in an experimental stage. This led to 
deleterious consequences, such as worker fatigue, an unrealistic launch rate.
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and a  focus by executives and managers on economy and efficiency rather than 
safety concerns. These factors all led to the ill-fated decision to launch which 
resulted in the loss of the seven astronauts (client realism).
The second hypotfiesis was supported by Tompkins’s  interviews of the 
MFSC workers. Or. Lucas promoted an organization culture which humiliated 
and intimidated lower participants into not truly representing problems as they 
existed. Mulloy, Reinartz and Kingsbury protected their tx)ss from bad news by 
resorting to methods such as “killing the messenger" and letting his “key 
subordinates [swing] in the wind during investigations.” The acknowledgement 
in the intenriew by Tompkins also revealed that “[Lucas] never acknowledged 
we made a  mistake with Challenger....Dr. Lucas resigned under pressure” 
(1993, 163-5).
The mafor contribuUœ by interpretive parad^m theorists is the disœvery 
of multiple knowledges in organizations. The incompatibility of knowledges, 
especially between worker realism and management science, contributed to the 
ill-fated decision to launch tfie Challenger space shuttle. The perfect idealism 
of management science represented by the NASA m anagers dominated the 
Imperfect worker knowledge of the Morton-Thiokol engineers.
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CHAPTER VI:
CONCLUSION: KNOWLEDGES AND PARADIGMS
At the outset of this dissertation I undertook as  my task the examination of
the ill-fated decision to launch the sp ace  shuttle Challenger. In the
accomplishment of that endeavor I utilized a  framing, or metaphorical, approach
from the organization theory literature devised primarily by Morgan (1986;
1997) and Burrell and Morgan (1979) in order to cover thoroughly the rich
complexity of the single, historical event Organization theorist Gareth Morgan
anticipates this notion of complexity in the following passage:
Organizations are many things at once I They are complex and 
multifaceted. They are paradoxical. That’s  why the challenges facing 
management [indeed, all members of the organization as we have seen] 
are often so difficult In any given situation there may be many different 
tendencies and dimensions, all of which have an Impact on effective 
m anagem ent.... m etaphors... reveal this complexity. Each provides a 
com prehensive view of organization and m anagem ent from the 
perspective created through the metaphor. Each generates Insights. But 
taken to an extreme, these insights encounter severe limitations. Any 
given metaphor can be incredibly persuasive, but it can also be blinding 
and block our ability to gain an overall view (1997, 347).
I discovered in my pursuit of various explanations of the tragedy that numerous 
scholars had interests similar to those of the organizational participants they 
portrayed and, in effect, had exptsuned the events leading to the deasion with 
an affinity for the manager’s or the worker’s perspective. Of the two 
perspectives there is a  noticeable tendency to overrepresent management 
rationalism. Morgan's work also generally tends to reflect this tendency (See 
Tsoukas 1993, 330).
The reframing, or images, method is useful for organization theorists and 
managers to acknowledge that several insights, not just one, exist when one 
analyzes behavior in organizations. The Challenger case study had numerous
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theoretical Interpretations representing all four of Burrell and Morgan's 
sociological and metatheoretical paradigms. The paradigms are useful for 
categorizing the various perspectives offered by tfieorists in this case study. It 
was n o t however, until we examined tfie interpretive paradigm (consisting of 
the “orgcom” theories presented by Feynman and Tompkins) that we could 
begin to comprehend that managers and engineers were not able to come to a  
basic understanding concerning “tfie work” in the NASA and Morton Thiokol 
organizations. Feynman explained his orgcom theory as the loss of common 
interest between the engineers/scientists and managem ent which led to a  
deterioration In cooperation, thus resulting in the Challenger explosion. 
Tompkins embellisfied Feynman's theory by showing ttiat the employees of the 
NASA organization were intimidated by tfie superior position of management 
and that communication between the managers and workers atrophied until 
credibility and trust were lost The knowledge analytic (Camevale and Hummel, 
1996), a s  applied to the Challenger case study, extended Feynman and 
Tompkins’s  orgcom theories by revealing the incompatibility of knowledges 
between the engineers, m anagers and otfiers in the organization. With the 
knowledge analytic we can begin to see possibilities regarding irreconcilable 
knowledge differences in organizations and expand our understanding of 
human interaction.
The decision to launch the Challenger case study has tieen tfioroughiy 
analyzed tiy social scientists, journalists, government officials and members of 
the NASA organization themselves. The hypotheses are recapitulated here as: 
(1) m anagers ignored em ployee warnings; (2) m anagers did not take 
responsibility for tfieir own actions, but rather blamed the employees, in the 
name of protecting the organization; and, (3) managers underestimated other
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organizations and some m anagers sought to control every aspect of their own 
organization. From these hypotheses I found that how  one interprets the course 
of events surrounding the disaster is determined in large m easure by one's 
view of the world. The hypotheses had the effect of organizing theoretical 
arguments to address questions pertaining to human relations in the affected 
organizations. Of course, a s  we have seen, how one perceives the tragedy 
depends on one’s orientation to and identification with organizational 
paiHapants involved in the tragedy. That usually m eant that m anagers were 
exculpated from the incident either direcOy by functionalist theorists who blamed 
the mishap on the engineers for ineffectively communicating their concerns up 
the organizational pyramid, or indirectly by Other functionalist tfieorists and the 
Rogers Commission who blam ed the decision making process. Some 
functionalists (notably risk theorists) directly implicated the organization 
structure and culture, thereby relieving anyone from decision making 
responsibility. Presenting the concerns of the worker, radical structural theorists 
in the Challenger case study showed the seamier side of organizational life by 
depicting the engineers a s  exploited victims of NASA m anagers and the 
process of the capitalist-tiased management ideology prevalent in Western 
organizational culture. Safety concerns for tfie astronauts and tfie shuttle were 
sacrificed for the sake of economy and efficiency. Radical humanist theorists 
demonstrated the ill effects of narcissism on the NASA organization and the 
absurd idealism of its senior m anagers which ultimately led to tfie Challenger 
tragedy.
The history of tfie Challenger accident will be explained for years to 
come. This is desirable. I have rendered a  historical judgment of the events 
leading to the launch. It would be incorrect and presumptuous of me to pretend
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that this should be the final word (See Habermas 1988). The sheer complexity 
of human activity, especially complicated by the passage of time, invites 
continuous artistic interpretations of history beyond the scope covered fiere.
It is worth remembering here Allison’s  (1971, 276 - 7) admonition that 
paradigm s neglect or underplay a  numt)er of aspects of governmental 
behaviors and that additional paradigms are needed. That wisdom is as true 
now asitw asttien .
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Qffcs
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T hiokol letters and memoranda w ritten after O -ring concern escalates
KtoRTONThlOKDLiNC
Wteatch DivWon
coMFAinr n m n
Interolfic» Memo
3: JvXr 1985 
2S70:me:073
ms
OC:
nfM:
SOUSCXs
a. %. IsmS
vie* Vraaldcat, bglaMSlag
». c . BdjUoa, A. J . IU om U , %. l.-Sqntr, J . S. bpp
a. a . BeisjoiT
AppUad acdKBlcs -  b e . 3529
SUf (MUap XeMloa/VaccBClal. Valias* CEttScaUtp
Xhls la c ta s  la  «stecaa ta  laawxa th a t aaaagaaast l a  ta lly  aaasa #1 tba 
M zloaaaaaa a t th* casraa t 0-iiag  araalaa p cohlaa ia  A a SU  jalmta tra a  am 
caglaaaclas ataaSpalat.
Xh* a la ta kaal y  accapta* yoaitlaa an tba J a la t y ta b te  aaa ta  f iy  a lthaat fa s t 
a t f a l la ta aad to  saa a aa tlas a t deatga aaalaatiaaa -f»*»** aoaU alrtaasaly  
lead to  a aalae iaa  as a t  la a a t a  a ip a lficaa t sadacriaa a t th* aseaioa ptoblaa. 
Utla p o a ttto a  la  aoo d ta sd c a lly  *haa#*d aa a  sa ao lt a t  th* SU lid  aoxzl* 
Jo in t atoaloa «bleb *sad«d a aocoadaxy 0-Slag o ltb  th* pdaasy 0-Slng acvcr 
aaaixag.
I t  tba  saa* aeaaazlo ahauld oeeot la  a  M aid ja la t  (aad i t  eaald), thaa i t  la  
« Jo*p h a ll aa to  th* saceaaa as dallas* a t  th* ja la t  hataam* th* aacaadasy 
0-Klag r  aaa at  raayaad to  th* cXavia apaalag sa t*  aad any e a t h* capaU* at 
p scsx asln c io a . -3b* SMOlt aould b* a eacutrapha ad th* hlghaat atdar -  
loaa a t  boaaa lid * .
A* aawdfftrjal  team (a  aaaa daflalag  th* taaa aad i t s  pasyoaa aa# aa»cs 
ptthliataad) ad th  laadas aaa dotaad a* 19 Jh ly  1985 aad aaa taahad aSth solalag 
the ysohla*  fo r  both A* abort aad laag t e n .  lU *  a te ffflrta l taaa la 
aaaaatiaU y aaaasistaac a t  th is  tla a . 1* ay o p ta iaa , th* taaa aaat ba 
ofW rtal ly  g ita a  tba  sam poaalhlllty aad th* au thority  to  aaacwta th* *oth 
th a t aaada to  h* daa* a* * aaa-latasiasaac* basis ( t e l l  tla a  awlgnaaat aat i l  
coaylatad).
pagei
RooarBohjolyhiRtaiiempt alter STS 51-B (Nghl 17) to con- 
vine* his management ol the seriousneaa of the O-rino omion 
prabiem.
(Source: Report I, 249)
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Mo rion  THiokol In c
Vtisaidi DIvisfcjn
lm*#i*MXe# M«me
Z 87IsR M tl«l 22 tecue IW
20: S.K . S ta la .
ffsejact 1 * 1 « —r
CC: J.XU B ifpt KJU Sparsy, 2 .6 . l e s s e l l ,  2 .T . BbeUe®, I .B . Mclmtaah.
B.H. H. te U e a  B.V. KtCMT
nUMx A.K. IkdepeoB, SaparvlM s
S tn etarM  B ul^ k
SOXJiet: SIH m « h c  Sm I  U a i— m iitlw t
Zh« (V-das ##ml pco**— ha# lacaX r kaeea* •en sa  - SolacXaas, bock lo o *  aad 
■hock co ts or* balog aosgkc, i s  cfao saas M s» tu n ic a  a t*  e o s d s a ls g . Zc la  
mt XKoasaadakloa ebac a  aaar c a ts  aoX scias b s IseecpetaeaS lo r  n ifb c a  
la llo o la s  StS»27 ohiek  la  corrascly  aehadolad 1er 24 A sfoar 19S5. A *  aaar 
c a ts  sa la r ia s  aaaa tha sariaM s poaalh l a s k is  cktcksaaa aaA a .292 * .0 0 5 /-.0 0 3  
iaeb  41s O -d sg . Ike rsas lt a  e l  thea* coo chaagaa are akaas i s  A b le  1 . 4  
groat goa l a l  a ffo r t «111 be regslrad  to  Iseerporac* tkaae ebosgaa. Booavar, 
■a shosB i s  the Table th e O tlm g sgaaara la  sa a r ly  4ooble4 1er tb s aaasple 
(STg-Z?A)« A. bear eCCact sb a sli be sage t s  is c l s i e  a  sa x  a b is U r  as4  Che 
.'292 41a IK dsg aa aoos a# la  p c a e tle a l. Wacb o f  the ia lW a l h lo irb y  4iislag  
<H risg saal Ing la  coscxeU bg by 0 -r lsg  agseeae. A lae so t*  aac r l l l c la l O tla g  
s s r e r ia l la  eeal l ab le t*  y csta e t th e aaaiad p o cd o s oC the 0 -d a g . The a44*4 
eroaa- aeed wial  area e l  the .292 41* O -dag stlX  help the c e a llla se a  ceopoaae 
bp s44ad preaasre Ira s the groove aide s e l l .
S erarsl long term a o lsd o sa  lea k  good; b a t, aeveral peers are regsirsA  to  
Imcorporete u s e  e l  tha*. The a lsp le  abort to r s  saaaeras akeuld be cake* to 
redeee llia k t  d ak a .
ASS/Jk
In ffd mamoiandum to SA. SWn. Alt Thompaon indcdM 
me O'finB aaal protaetn *■ acuta and afioft-4onp maaamsa 
should bo lahan to raduos light ride
(Source: Report I, 251)
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Acmxir UNIX
Tbs taaa  tnmrallf bmm he** « y r i —clag tm th l*  £nm tbm %*#(«### 
MM o m al aetlcadc A m  #upp*g ti*g « c iu t a t l a u .  t e c  #f th is  i s  #ss t# 
Isclf o f smdsTstssdls* sC has Isjo rtsn t  th is  tssh  tss#  set&tlKy is  sad 
th s xsac I s  êmm to  mxo ofsroH ot peo estes tssttlm  ohich pcston ts 
tih o ly  s s so lts  to  s  opoeiCte tofooot.
tb s  tssm mot o lth  Jos so 10/3/IS to  Hocass tihls
prohl sw. m# oostsd sp sd S le  s w p ls i ohleh hs sms g lsos sad ha sisplp 
coosXadod t h s c t t  too ooocy tssm ooohsto eespeeslM ll^*to  fla p  praUsas 
th a t oecaxxad to  otptoiootrloosl sopo ttisloa sad t a ^  ta  rsonvo tho toss 
Uoefc by g scd sg  tho n iprtrod  support to  oolto tbs prooiso. th s ptoblsa 
ass fox thar otplolosd to  topolsa s la o s t f o il  tla a  oarsfap a f  asah task 
to  la sa ra  I t  Is  tsfcsa to  csoplstlao  by a  ooppoct  prot p . Joo olaply 
spraad sod sold to  sboold th sa  aozsa sto ry task to  hato.
Pa p ls ia  doaso 't tadoxatsad th a t thsxo a r t  s e t snimpk f oopl s to  do 
A se klad of <~p o f tack  task , box ha doasa't aaaa to  aiad  dlxtctlsp  
A ax tho task  aeter-the-leao  pots deao. fo r axsapla, tho tssm jo st 
foood o a t th a t th sa  to  oahsdt a  raaaast to  parehssa am Item , th a t I t  
poos thcompk apptoelaetaly I  to  I  poopla hafoxa a pwrrhaso order la  
o r lt ts a  sad tha Item aetaaXly oxdarod.
Sha tofldoxs to  ora ootfciap td tk  am oasis sod spscar rlap s hs*a 
xtopoadsd to  ear ropsosts Im a  tiaalym aaasr yet a s  QOZ) cassoc pat a 
piirrhsoo oxdax to  thorn la  a  tfa s ty  osaasr. Oar lab  has boom aeltiiip  for 
a  frntmimi pomaxato r  sloes S-23-P3. Xhs pspartork auchorlzlap tha 
parthsoo t s s  Mol shod by ompfaooxiap cm *»2*-IS sad placed In to  tha 
hato y e t t s  xoeafto tha xopoostod Item , th is  typo of
pagel
m ihit PdnMy rapoft nooar Bohialy «MprsHPt hit fiutlralian 
wtti the akwv progress of and lack of nnanaaomentanantion to 
the aaoi task ferae.
(Source: Report I, 254)
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«aap i*  la  eypleml àml casid.cs I s .lo s t  casoaceas ( te r  hsd to ta  |laasc4 
ta  4a case «ode fo r «s la. a  cloaly aaaacz.
I  foc osa taaaae «adclaf a t  f u ll  capacity a l l  weak 1cm* aad ebaa 
balm* xa*micad ta  aappuct ac tiz icy  cm tha aadramd Chat coaU  hsva haaa 
aaaaapUabad duzlag tha saafc. 1  mlÿlC add th a t aaaa HASd fcceai'ics th a t 
tha  Caaa la  b tla*  Machad la  lea anglsaarlac affocta to  acaoapllah I ts  
task s. USft la  aamdla# am amglaaarlai* capcaaamtatlza to  stay  alth. aa 
a ta td a *  Oct 14th. Va deal th a t th is  la  A a dlxact caamlt a t  th alr 
daaUa* th a t oa QftX] arm o a t caspoadlag fatck ly  aacagh cm tha aaal 
pcoblas.
I  ahomld add 'that aa rcc il o f tha team oaahara taÿicatod that aa ha 
gtaaa a apaclfSe oaaafactaxla* aagtnaar, gnallty  aaglaaac, aafaty 
amglaaar aad 4 te  4 tachslclaaa to  a lla v  oa t s  do oat ta a ts  oa a 
aoo-lacacfacamca h u la  «1A tho cast a f  A a a y a tu . th is  raq n u t aaa 
daaoad s a t aaeasaazy sham Joo docldod th a t Ao aara la t o f Ao caA 
appcaaA a u  dlcactad.
7iaally« tho b u lc  pcoh lu  holla doom to  tha fac t th a t Atl ÜZX 
pcoHT—  haaa #1 pclaztty  sad th a t oppor u a a g aa u r apparaatly fcela 
th a t tha SIM pca#caa  la  aaaa fa r  aata aad tha easteoar ho duacd.
logor lo la ja ly  /o
p a g e 2
(Source: Report/, 255)
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M arshall in te rn a l memorandum in  the £aU oi 1985
SEP S
EA01
TO<
PSOM:
SA«i/L. H. m o ie r  
B401/J. e .  riAcaboer
SDVECTi 0 -p in c «feint Saaia
t  mm Beat anxleua to  be b r ie fed  on plana fo r  ia p ro r ln c  the SUM 
O -rlnc a a a la . S p e e lf t e a l ly ,  I  ean t to  reeiew  plana eh leh  lead  
t o  f l i g h t  g u a ilf ie a tto n a  aad the attandaat aea a d o iea . Z have 
been apprlaed o f  general ongoing a e t i r i t i e a  but th eae  do n et 
appear to  carry the p r io r ity  which X attach  to  th ia  a ito a t ie n .  
Z eon a id er  the o -r in g  a a a l problem on the SSM to  requ ire p r i­
o r i t y  a tte n tio n  o f  both Merton Thlokoi/WaaatcH and MSFC.
P leaae arrange each a b r ie f in g  no la t e r  than Septoober t j ,  
1985« from ay poin t o f  view , th ia  can be eeeoap liah ed  by 
te le e o n  w ith  Morton T hiokol. I would hope ouch a b r ie f in g  
co u ld  be done in  two heure c r  le a n .
EEOl RecU 
Aelhn/ 
SuspsKp
Copies
BgaboB
to e td r i  (
S c ien ce  and Engineering
c e t
Shot/H r> Lindatrca 
SAOl/Dr; LoTlngood 
EhOi/Mr. Hardy
EEOl/or: L it t le a  e f d m t / t  
EEil/M r: Horton /
EPOi/Hr; HeCoel 
Saoi/M r; Sehwlnghaaer
oo
e-es. 
e /t /wva-,
In thia memomndum. J .  E. Kna^mty irtonm Launenca 
MuHoy mat tie piacea Nah prtorty on me O-hno aaal pfoonw 
and daaiiaa addibanol infonrwion on plana for improving tha 
situation.
(Source: Report/, 256)
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W«r. at w  T^.4:,^ iroupg
XBWjtOCT
objecta  
Id a
/■aoagera
/  p u lled  coward knowledge 
/  standarda o f inveatora
/
takes  froa scien ce  
any ocnbinacion
ob jects' parts \
^tbac neat capitalian's \
/  need fo r  ecoooay and \
/  e ffic ie n c y , 
leaving behind
/  the in te g r ity  o f 
/  as determined in  sc ie n c e .. .  \
/  V
A
* . . .and bands
\  down to work-
\  era d é fin i-
\  tion a o f ob-
takea from work only je c ts  and pro-
tbose aspecta th at lend ceases chat
theanelvea to  universal make sense
statem ent, leaving behind &om econoiv/
the fu ll ejqperlence o f e ffien cy  point
work o f view  but
* ' are arbitrary
\  and out o f
jo in t from the 
\  worker
\  experience
\  Work force
possesses the fu ll  
inner eiQ erience of 
. work, assigned i t  
but i s  constant­
ly  forced to  act as 
as if i t  accepted 
only the d e fid tio n  
o f r e a lity  handed 
down by management
(Source: “Why Management Reforms Fail: A Knowledge Analytic” by David 
Camevale and Ralph Hummel. A Conference Paper Presented to the 
Oklahoma Political Science Association. November 1996. 63)
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